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Due to their fundamental utility within cryptography, prime numbers must be easy
to both recognise and generate. For this, we depend upon primality testing. Both
used as a tool to validate prime parameters, or as part of the algorithm used to
generate random prime numbers, primality tests are found near universally within a
cryptographer’s tool-kit. In this thesis, we study in depth primality tests and their
use in cryptographic applications.
We first provide a systematic analysis of the implementation landscape of primality
testing within cryptographic libraries and mathematical software. We then demon-
strate how these tests perform under adversarial conditions, where the numbers
being tested are not generated randomly, but instead by a possibly malicious party.
We show that many of the libraries studied provide primality tests that are not pre-
pared for testing on adversarial input, and therefore can declare composite numbers
as being prime with a high probability. We also demonstrate that for a number
of libraries, including Apple’s CommonCrypto, we are able to construct composites
that always pass the supplied primality tests.
We then explore the implications of these security failures in applications, focus-
ing on the construction of malicious Diffie-Hellman parameters. These malicious
parameter sets target the public key parameter validation functions found in these
same cryptographic libraries – particularly within the ones that offer TLS imple-
mentations. Using the analysis performed on these library’s primality tests, we are
able to construct malicious parameter sets for both finite-field and elliptic curve
Diffie-Hellman that pass validation testing with some probability, but are designed
such that the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is relatively easy to solve. We
give an application of these malicious parameter sets to OpenSSL and password
authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols.
Finally, we address the shortcomings uncovered in primality testing under adver-
sarial conditions by the introduction of a performant primality test that provides
strong security guarantees across all use cases, while providing the simplest possible
API. We examine different options for the core of our test, describing four different
candidate primality tests and analysing them theoretically and experimentally. We
then evaluate the performance of the chosen test in the use case of prime generation
and discuss how our proposed test was fully adopted by the developers of OpenSSL
through a new API and primality test scheduled for release in OpenSSL 3.0 (2020).
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This chapter gives an overview of the thesis. We provide the motivation for our
research and describe the contributions of this thesis. We also present the overall
structure of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good
fortune, must be in want of a prime [11]. Prime numbers are often referred to as
the building blocks of the natural numbers, but with more recent advancements in
the field of cryptography, we see just how integral primes are to our everyday lives.
With the rising prominence of the Internet, cryptography - the art of writing or
solving codes for secret communication - has evolved into a daily practice for most.
Supported by a deep and fast-growing research field, prime numbers and their use
in cryptography have a new found importance from the very first introduction of
public-key cryptography [48], to cutting edge post-quantum systems such as isogeny-
based cryptography [78].
The ubiquity of prime numbers throughout cryptography ensures that one is never
too far away from relying upon them. For cryptographic schemes in which security
arises from the extreme difficulty of certain computations, for example the factori-
sation of integers into primes or the discrete logarithm problem, the onus of the
security of the scheme can fall onto the prime parameter itself. We see examples of
such usage in public-key cryptography, with protocols like RSA and Diffie-Hellman
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key exchange. We participate in cryptographic protocols like these each time we
use mobile messaging applications, make an online purchase, connect to a website
encrypted with TLS, or when using smart cards through contactless payments and
even government-issued IDs. Since many of these devices are low-power (or compu-
tationally light) we often look to find efficient methods of prime generation on the
device, or source the prime parameters from elsewhere – be it an external server or
even from a standard. This however opens up the possibility of vulnerability, either
by an attack from a malicious party or from weak or erroneous implementation.
A failure in the selection of prime parameters can be disastrous. In the case of RSA,
there are numerous examples of large scale implementations of parameter generation
that have led to the compromise of the system’s security as a whole. For example,
RSA smart card moduli were generated using a predictable underlying structure
which therefore could be reverse engineered to recover the private key factors by
Coppersmith’s algorithm [114]. As another example, a faulty pseudorandom number
generator (PRNG) was used to generate RSA moduli for use in digital certificates,
and led to the trivial factorisation of public keys that shared a common factor [73].
Similarly, we see that poor choices of primes taken from standards for use in Diffie-
Hellman admit the use of small subgroup attacks [156]. We have even seen composite
numbers believed to be prime being used in the Diffie-Hellman parameters used by
a command-line data transfer utility socat [137].
A fundamental tool in a cryptographic developer’s tool-kit is the primality test. This
is an algorithm used to classify a given number as either composite or prime. Primal-
ity tests are implemented near universally throughout every cryptographic library or
computer algebra system (in mathematical software). These primality tests provide
utility in two main forms. The first is part of a fundamental step in prime genera-
tion. Since many cryptographic protocols require fresh prime parameters, a library
must provide the ability to generate them as and when needed. There are numerous
ways of performing prime generation, but a popular technique – due to it producing
uniformly random primes in a fairly efficient manner, is to simply generate random
integers of the desired bit length and test them for primality using a primality test.
The second significant use case of primality testing in this setting is its use in val-
idation and checking functions. These, primarily found in cryptographic libraries
that offer TLS implementations (for example OpenSSL, Botan, Bouncy Castle, and
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NSS) are functions that take as input a parameter set – often public key parameter
sets used for RSA or Diffie-Hellman, and perform various tests upon each parameter
to verify that it is correct. This could be a check that a prime parameter really is
prime, or can include other checks such as ensuring that the subgroup generated by
a generator is of the correct order.
However these primality tests are far from perfect. While there do exist deter-
ministic primality tests that are able to correctly distinguish prime from composite
with absolute certainty (even some proven to do so in polynomial time [4]) these
algorithms are far too slow and impractical for everyday use, particularly on large
inputs like those abundant in cryptography. We therefore rely upon probabilistic
testing, which offers us great performance and practicality, but comes at a cost of
accuracy. One vastly popular probabilistic primality test which sees use in nearly
every cryptographic library and piece of mathematical software is the Miller-Rabin
test [106, 135]. The accuracy of the Miller-Rabin test is very well understood, from
Monier [108] and Rabin [135] we know that for an odd composite number n, a single
round of the Miller-Rabin test will declare n as prime with probability no greater
than 1/4. Therefore by repeated testing we are able to reduce the error probability
down to a very small margin of error.
A Miller-Rabin test requires as input two parameters, the number n we wish to test
for primality, and an integer a with 1 ≤ a < n which we call a base. For any odd n >
1, we can write n = 2ed+1 where d is odd. We know that if n is prime, then for any
integer 1 ≤ a < n, either ad ≡ 1 mod n or a2id ≡ −1 mod n for some 0 ≤ i < e.
The Miller-Rabin test simply tests if either of these two conditions hold for the given
base a. If neither condition holds, then we have proven n as composite otherwise, n
is declared as probably prime. The Monier-Rabin [108, 135] theorem states that for
any odd composite n 6= 9, the number of bases a for which either of the above two
conditions hold is at most ϕ(n)/4 (where ϕ is Euler’s totient function). A result
of this is that the probability that an odd composite number n is declared prime
by t rounds of the Miller-Rabin test is at most 4−t. These are known as the worst-
case error estimates, as they give the largest possible probability that a composite
number is falsely classified as prime by the test.
In practice we may be presented with a large odd number n for which we are not sure
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if it is prime or composite. Suppose that this number n has been chosen randomly
from a set Nk of k-bit integers (as would be the case in random prime generation
by primality testing). Say that we continue to randomly choose numbers n from Nk
until we find one that passes t rounds (without failing any) of the Miller-Rabin test
when choosing bases uniformly at random. From the Monier-Rabin theorem as given
above, it may be tempting to think that the probability that this procedure returns
a composite number is 4−t for any bit-length k. However, as discussed in [17, 41],
such a conclusion is fallacious. This is due to the distribution of prime numbers.
In particular, because the primes are more sparsely distributed as k grows, it may
be more likely to observe an event with probability 4−t than the event that the
randomly chosen number is prime. Moreover, the work of [41] goes on to show that
it is a rare occurrence to find composite numbers n that meet the worst-case upper
bound of ϕ(n)/4 on the number of bases that indicate n is prime. That is, for most
n, the probability that a single round of Miller-Rabin would declare n as prime is
considerably smaller than 1/4. Therefore, when primality testing on random input
of bit size k, we instead use bounds known as average-case error estimates. These
take into consideration the distribution of the primes of this bit-size, and the rare
occurrence of composites that reach the Monier-Rabin bound. The average-case
error estimates are very useful in this context, as they can be used to give the
number of rounds of Miller-Rabin that need to be performed on a random input
to achieve a given error probability. We therefore see them used extensively when
determining how many rounds of testing to perform when generating prime numbers
in cryptographic libraries.
The distinction between working in the average-case or worst-case error estimates
must however be very carefully considered. While the average-case estimates provide
very precise error bounds when primality testing random input with Miller-Rabin,
these bounds must be reduced back to the worst-case error estimates as soon as
there is a possibility that input is not random. This distinction is perfectly illus-
trated by the two previously mentioned largest uses of primality testing in crypto-
graphic applications: prime generation and prime checking. Many primality tests in
cryptographic libraries are built for the main purpose of generating primes, and are
therefore mostly testing input generated locally within the library. For example, by
default the primality test in OpenSSL (pre-August 2018) utilises the average-case
error estimates given in [41], which propagated into many informative sources such
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as the Handbook of Applied Cryptography [105] and standards like the Digital Sig-
nature Standard (DSS) FIPS PUB 186-4 [84], to promise an error rate less than 2−80
when testing random input in OpenSSL’s test. However, if the same primality test is
made available as an external API or used elsewhere within the library, for example
within a public key parameter checking function, the assumption that the numbers
tested are random may no longer hold. In this case, we must work using instead the
worst-case error estimates. These can drastically differ from the average-case. Again
using the example of OpenSSL (pre-August 2018) the same primality test discussed
above was used within their own Diffie-Hellman parameter checking function. Here
OpenSSL called the test again using the average-case error estimates to calculate
how many rounds of Miller-Rabin to perform, when the purpose of the test was
to identify erroneous (or possibly malicious) parameters from an untrusted source.
This meant that when testing a Diffie-Hellman prime parameter p for primality of
size 1300 bits or more, just two rounds of Miller-Rabin were performed. Thus if a
composite number that met Monier-Rabin bound was tested, it would have proba-
bility 1/16 of being accepted as prime by this parameter checking function. This is
a vast difference from the assurance of error probability less than 2−80 given in the
average-case setting. The difference in the error estimates can worsen even further
if the implementation of the Miller-Rabin test chooses its bases for testing in a de-
terministic manner. In this case, carefully constructed malicious composite numbers
can be guaranteed to be declared prime with any amount of repeated testing.
While it is the responsibility of the library to provide sufficient documentation to
indicate how its primality test is being performed and give bounds on the error asso-
ciated with probabilistic primality testing, often the onus of distinguishing between
the use cases and error bounds ultimately falls upon the end-user of the library. In
some cases, particularly to a user or developer who is not familiar with the subtle
distinction between the theoretical bounds given, the documentation provided by
many cryptographic libraries is not sufficient. Moreover, some of the APIs provided
are insecure by default (like that seen in OpenSSL), or invite the user to misuse the
test. Gutmann [70] identified the need to carefully define cryptographic APIs, rec-
ommending to “[p]rovide crypto functionality at the highest level possible in order
to prevent users from injuring themselves and others through misuse of low-level
crypto functions with properties they aren’t aware of.”. Later many others within
the cryptographic community identified the need to design APIs which can be easily
13
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used in a secure fashion (see [164, 68] as examples of this).
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis we study in depth primality tests and their use in cryptographic appli-
cations. We provide a systematic analysis of primality testing in a wide breadth of
popular cryptography libraries and mathematical software. Our analysis ranges from
the fundamental algorithms and the standards which give instruction for their use,
to the implementation across cryptographic libraries and mathematical software,
to the creation of carefully constructed composite numbers that have the highest
probability of being declared prime by these tests. We present ways in which to
create public key parameter sets that exploit the probabilistic nature of primality
testing to produce malicious parameter sets for both elliptic curve and finite field
Diffie-Hellman key exchange that offer an adversary an advantage in breaking the
underlying hardness assumption of the scheme. It is the aim of this work to high-
light attacks of this nature, with the aim of preventing them from being practical
by promoting more resilient testing. We attempt to achieve this by outlining the
key areas of error and misconception and using these to create new primality testing
procedures that are efficient and secure across both the average-case and worst-case
error settings. We also use our findings in primality testing as a case study for the
design and implementation of a “misuse-resistant” API, that is, one which provides
reliable results in all use cases even when the developer is crypto-naive.
1.2.1 Thesis Structure
In this section we highlight our main contributions, and give an overview of the
chapters in this thesis and the problems by which they are motivated.
Chapter 2. This chapter provides the necessary preliminaries needed for the work
to follow. We give an overview of primality testing, in which we introduce the four
core primality tests we shall be discussing throughout the work. We also introduce
a number of public-key cryptographic primitives and concepts that will be called on
throughout the subsequent chapters. These are not designed to be comprehensive
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introductions, but rather serve as a solid foundation for the rest of the thesis. We
note that, where necessary, all other chapter-specific preliminaries are introduced in
the relevant chapters.
Chapter 3. In this chapter we introduce known techniques for producing pseudo-
primes for the Miller-Rabin and Lucas primality tests and extend them with our
target applications in mind. We then survey the implementation landscape of pri-
mality testing in cryptographic libraries and mathematical software, evaluating their
performance in the adversarial setting. We go on to examine the implications of our
findings for applications, focussing on Diffie-Hellman parameter testing. The chapter
ends with a discussion on avenues for improving the robustness of primality testing
in the adversarial setting.
Chapter 4. In this chapter we extend our analysis on the generation of pseudo-
primes for the Miller-Rabin test. We introduce methods to generate composite num-
bers with more than three prime factors, that are declared prime by a Miller-Rabin
test with the highest probability. We then extend current methods of producing
such numbers, to enable us to efficiently generate pseudoprimes with the particular
properties required to form malicious Diffie-Hellman parameter sets that appear to
be safe primes. These parameter sets pass standard approaches to parameter val-
idation with some probability, but are designed such that the Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP) is relatively easy to solve. We give an application of this malicious
parameter set to OpenSSL (which will only accept safe prime parameters for DH)
and password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols. While the main focus
of this chapter is on the finite field setting, we also briefly study malicious parameter
sets based on pseudoprimes in the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) setting. We
show how such malicious ECDH parameters lead to attacks on PAKEs running over
elliptic curves, as well as more traditional ECDH key exchanges.
Chapter 5. In this chapter we set out to design a performant primality test that
provides strong security guarantees across all use cases and that has the simplest
possible API. We examine different options for the core of our test, describing four
different candidate primality tests and analysing them theoretically and experimen-
tally. We then evaluate the performance of the chosen test in the use case of prime
generation and discuss how our proposed test was fully adopted by the developers of
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OpenSSL through a new API and primality test scheduled for release in OpenSSL
3.0 (2020).
Chapter 6. In this chapter we conclude and briefly mention avenues for further
work.
1.2.2 OpenSSL Timeline
Throughout all three publications included in this thesis, we worked closely with
the developers of OpenSSL. This included the disclosure of our findings before each
publication, as well as an ongoing contribution to the development of OpenSSL, with
the mitigations due to our results. As a consequence of this (and of course natural
development), OpenSSL changed significantly over the three years of our analysis.
This means that the parts of OpenSSL we analyse in one chapter may have changed
significantly in the next.
Therefore in the process of consolidating this work into a thesis, we are sure to be
as clear as possible on the version of OpenSSL being analysed at any one time. To
this end, we now present a timeline of the different releases of OpenSSL relevant to
this thesis, with a short explanation of the changes to OpenSSL made based on our
contributions and their corresponding chapters.
Chapter 3. The work of Chapter 3 was mainly conducted in 2018. At this time
OpenSSL were preparing the release of 1.1.1 - the new long term support (LTS)
version of OpenSSL. Chapter 3 therefore analysed the most current version of the
pre-release for 1.1.1 which was version 1.1.1-pre6 (May 2018) [122]. We note that
the components studied were largely stable in other LTS releases such as 1.1.0h [120]
and 1.0.2o [118] (to the extent in which the analysis performed still applies to the
primality tests in these other versions), and remained similar to that of the early
releases (version 0.9.5 of February 2000).
In August 2018 we reached out to OpenSSL to disclose the findings discussed in
Chapter 3 before the work became public. At this time OpenSSL were in the process
of amending their primality testing code to make it FIPS-complaint [117]. In light
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of this, OpenSSL released version 1.1.1-pre9 [123], 1.1.0i [121] and 1.0.2p [119] (Aug
2018) that changed part of the primality testing code we had analysed (1.1.1pre7
and 1.1.1pre8 remained the same as 1.1.1pre6).
Because the changes made between 1.1.1-pre6 and 1.1.1-pre9, 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i,
1.0.2o and 1.0.2p were motivated by FIPS compliancy mostly made before our dis-
closure, they do not consider the adversarial scenario on which this chapter focuses,
and therefore the default settings in OpenSSL remain weak in that scenario. While
the documentation given for the affected APIs were updated at this time to reflect
our findings, we will see how we further helped OpenSSL to address this issue in
Chapter 5.
Chapter 4. The work of Chapter 4 was conducted simultaneously with the work
done on Chapter 3 in 2018 but continued longer on into January 2019. Therefore
this work again started analysis on OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre6, 1.1.0h and 1.0.2o, but also
had to reflect the changes made to the primality tests in versions 1.1.1-pre9, 1.1.0i
and 1.0.2p that occurred throughout this work. In Chapter 4 we therefore refer to
versions of OpenSSL both before and after this update.
The update mainly concentrated on modifying the default rounds of Miller-Rabin
performed by OpenSSL’s primality test. More specifically, the function that gave the
number of rounds of Miller-Rabin to perform based on the bit-size of the number
being tested (see Table 3.4) was modified with the aim of achieving 128 bits of
security instead of 80 bits (see Table 5.1). We note that previously to this, the last
time these iteration counts were changed was in February 2000 (OpenSSL version
0.9.5), before which they were all 2, independent of the bit-size of the number being
tested.
This work resulted in a contribution to the OpenSSL codebase by a pull request to
increase the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin performed during the primality test
on Diffie-Hellman parameters p and q during the check found in DH check. This
request was accepted by reviewers and merged into OpenSSL in March 2019 and
was utilised as part of OpenSSL 1.1.1c [125] in May 2019.
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Chapter 5. The work of Chapter 5 was conducted in 2019 after the release of
OpenSSL version 1.1.1. We therefore studied the most recent version available at
the time, which was OpenSSL 1.1.1c May 2019. The specific parts of the code
studied remain almost completely unchanged in the most current version 1.1.1d [126]
September 2019.
In June 2019 we contacted the OpenSSL developers to communicate the findings
of Chapter 5. These suggestions were adopted with only minor modifications: the
forthcoming OpenSSL 3.0 (scheduled for release in Q4 of 2020) will include our
simplified API for primality testing, and the OpenSSL codebase has been updated
to use it almost everywhere (the exception is prime generation, which uses the old
API in order to avoid redundant trial division). Moreover, OpenSSL will now always
use our suggested primality test (64 rounds of Miller-Rabin) on all inputs up to 2048
bits, and 128 rounds of Miller-Rabin on larger inputs. This represents the first major
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This chapter provides a mathematical background on various aspects of number the-
ory and abstract algebra. We also give background material on the Diffie-Hellman
and discrete log problems, elliptic curve cryptography, and on primality testing and
its use in prime number generation
2.1 Mathematical Background
In this section we give a short introduction to the fundamental constructs in number
theory and abstract algebra that are required by the following work. These are by
no means a complete background, but aid in keeping the material required for the
digestion of this thesis self-contained, and establish the chosen notation.
2.1.1 The Prime Number Theorem
The prime number theorem [143] gives an asymptotic form for the prime counting
function π(x), which counts the number of primes less than or equal to some integer
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This means that for large values of x, π(x) is closely approximated by the expression
x/ lnx. We shall be referring to this approximation often throughout this thesis.
2.1.2 The Group Z∗n
In modular arithmetic, the integers that are relatively prime to n in the set Zn =
{0, 1, . . . , n−1} of n non-negative integers form a group under multiplication modulo
n, called the multiplicative group of integers modulo n. This group is defined as, for
any non-negative integer n
Z∗n = {a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} | gcd(a, n) = 1}.
This group is fundamental in number theory and has found applications in cryp-
tography, integer factorisation, and primality testing. It is an abelian, finite group
whose order is given by Euler’s totient function ϕ(n).
Definition 2.1 (Euler’s totient function). Let n be a non-negative integer. Euler’s
totient function is defined as
ϕ(n) = #(Z∗n) = #{a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} | gcd(a, n) = 1}.
In particular, if n is prime then Z∗n = {a | 1 ≤ a ≤ n− 1} and thus ϕ(n) = n− 1.
2.1.3 Cyclic Groups and Primitive Roots
We now introduce another important class of groups, known as cyclic groups. A
cyclic group is a group that can be generated by a single element g (the group
generator) and is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.2 (Cyclic group). A group G is cyclic if there exists an element a ∈ G
such that for each b ∈ G there is an integer i with b = ai. Such an element a is
called a generator of G
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By Gauss [59] we know that the group Z∗n is cyclic if and only if n is 1, 2, 4, pk or
2pk, where p is an odd prime and k > 0. The generator of a cyclic group is known as
a primitive element of Z∗n. In this thesis we are concerned only with groups of the
form Z∗p for some prime p, in this case a primitive element is more formally defined
by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1 (Primitive Root Theorem [145]). Let p be a prime number. Then
there exists an element g ∈ Z∗p whose powers give every element of Z∗p, i.e.,
Z∗p = {1, g, g2, . . . , gp−2}.
Elements with this property are called primitive roots of Zp or primitive elements of
Z∗p.
2.1.4 Lagrange’s Theorem
Over the next few sections we shall see how primitive elements are used within
public-key cryptography through the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Aside
from primitive elements, we also often require elements in the group that generate
only a proper subgroup of size q (i.e. one in which the subgroup q is not equal to
the whole group). To describe how to achieve this, we more formally introduce the
notion of order.
Definition 2.3. Let G be a group and a ∈ G. The order of a is defined to be the
smallest positive integer t such that at = 1, provided that such an integer exists. If
such a t does not exist, then a is said to have infinite order.
From the introduction of this definition we obtain a useful corollary of Theorem 2.1.
Corollary 2.1. Let p be a prime number. The primitive elements of Z∗p are the
elements of Z∗p having order p− 1.
For a finite group G, the order of a group |G| is the number of elements in G, known
as the cardinality of G. We can now introduce the following.
Theorem 2.2 (Lagrange’s Theorem [74]). Let G be a finite group and let a ∈ G.
Then the order of a divides the order of G. More precisely, let n = |G| be the order
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of G and let q be the order of a, i.e. aq is the smallest positive power of a that is
equal to 1. Then
an = 1 and q | n.
By Lagrange’s Theorem, we know that when working in the group Z∗n, the order of
the group is ϕ(n), and thus the order q of any element a ∈ Z∗n must be such that
q | ϕ(n). If the order of the group is prime, say p, then we know that ϕ(p) = p− 1
and therefore the order q of any a ∈ Z∗p must be such that q | p− 1.
2.1.5 Finding Primitive Elements and Elements of Order q
Finding primitive elements of Z∗n or elements of order q with q | ϕ(n) are both
common requirements of cryptographic applications. Given a cyclic group G of
order n, then for any divisor q of n we know that G has exactly ϕ(q) elements of
order q [58]. In particular, G has exactly ϕ(n) generators, and hence the probability
of a random element in G being a generator is ϕ(n)/n. Using the lower bound for
the Euler totient function [140], this probability is at least 1/(6 ln lnn). We can
therefore introduce Algorithm 1 as an efficient randomised algorithm for finding a
generator of a cyclic group, given the prime factorisation of the group order n.
Algorithm 1 Finding a generator of a cyclic group
Input a cyclic group G of order n, and the prime factorisation n = pe11 p
e2
2 · · · p
ek
k .
Output a generator g of G.
Step 1: choose a random element g in G.
1: g ←$ G
Step 2: compute the order of g.
2: for i = 1 to k do
3: b← gn/pi
4: if b = 1 then
5: go to Step 1
6: end if
7: end for
Step 3: output result.
8: Return g
If we instead wish to find an element of (high) order q, and not a generator then we
may do the following: given a generator g in a cyclic group G of order n, and given
a divisor q of n, an element h of order q can be efficiently obtained by computing
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h = gn/q. If q is a prime divisor of the order of n of a cyclic group G, then we are
able to find an element h ∈ G of order q without first having to find a generator of
G: select a random element g ∈ G and compute h = gn/q; repeat until h 6= 1.
2.2 The Diffie-Hellman and Discrete Log Problems
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem sits at the very foundation of public-key cryp-
tography [48]. Since its introduction, many cryptographic systems have been con-
structed from base assumptions on variants of the DH problem. Two of the most
important variants are the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and the decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problems.
Definition 2.4 (CDH problem). Fix a cyclic group G and a generator g ∈ G.
Given elements ga, gb ∈ G, the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is to compute
an element h such that h = gab.
Definition 2.5 (DDH problem). Fix a cyclic group G and a generator g ∈ G. Given
ga, gb ∈ G for uniformly and independently chosen a, b and a third element gz ∈ G,
the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is to decide if gz = gab or whether gz was
chosen uniformly at random from G.
The CDH assumption is a weaker assumption than the DDH assumption. This is
due to the fact that if the CDH problem was easy, we would be able to compute
gab from ga and gb and therefore given the tuple (ga, gb, gz), distinguishing gz = gab
from a uniform element in G would also be easy.
2.2.1 The Discrete Log Problem
Both the CDH and DDH problems are related to the discrete log problem (DLP).
Definition 2.6 (Discrete Log Problem (DLP)). Given a group G, a generator g ∈ G
and an element h ∈ G, the discrete log problem is to find an integer a such that
ga = h.
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If the discrete log problem in some group G is easy, then the CDH problem is
too: given ga and gb, it would be possible to efficiently compute the discrete log
a = logg g
a, then output gab by simply raising gb to the power a. It therefore also
follows that if the discrete log problem in some group G is easy, then the DDH
problem is too. However, the converse of these statements does not seem to be true,
and there are even examples of groups in which the discrete log and CDH problems
are believed to be hard despite the DDH problem being easy (cf. [43, 101, 103]).
2.2.2 Prime Parameters and Safe Primes
Although there are various classes of cyclic groups in which the discrete log and
Diffie-Hellman problems are believed to be hard, the most preferred are the cyclic
groups of prime order. There are multiple reasons for this choice, with some based
on usability features such as: finding a generator in prime order groups is trivial
(whereas finding a generator of a non-prime order group requires the full factorisation
of the order), and multiplicative inverses exist for all non-zero elements in a prime
order group. But we also choose to use prime order groups for security benefit, as
the discrete log problem is hardest in prime order groups. This is a consequence
of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, which shows that solving the discrete log problem
in a group of order q is easier if the group order is composed completely of small
prime factors. More precisely, the cost of solving the discrete log problem using the
Pohlig-Hellman algorithm is O(q
1/2
i ) where qi is the largest prime factor of the group
order q.
To ensure that the discrete log problem is hard to solve, we can select a group order q
that is prime, or contains a large prime factor. A typical recommendation is to work
over Z∗p where p is a safe prime, that is, to select p = 2q+1 for some prime q, where g
should generate the group of order q modulo p. The size of the prime p is commonly
chosen to be 1024, 2048, 3072 or 4096 bit. These sizes are chosen with respect to
the industry’s current understanding of the best known algorithms for solving the
discrete log problem as well as an estimate of computational resources [3]. These
primes chosen must be large enough to thwart subexponential algorithms for solving
the discrete log problem such as the Number Field Sieve. For p that are not safe
primes, the group order q can be much smaller than p. However, to maintain a high
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level of security, q must still be large enough to thwart generic attacks, which for
prime q run in time O(q1/2). A common parameter choice is to use a 160-bit q with
a 1024-bit p or a 224-bit q with a 2048-bit p. Diffie-Hellman parameters with p and q
of these sizes are suggested for use and standardised in Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) signatures in FIPS 186–4 [84].
We focus explicitly on how the security of schemes based on the Diffie-Hellman prob-
lem break down when we are able to trick implementations into believing they are
working with prime parameters (both safe and non-safe) that are actually composite
in Chapters 3 and 4.
2.2.3 Security Level and Generic Attacks
Throughout this thesis we shall often be referring to the security level, or the act
of achieving n-bits of security. In general, a cryptographic system offers an n-bit
security level if a successful generic attack can be expected to require an effort of
approximately 2n operations. A generic attack against a cryptographic primitive
is one that can be run independently of the details of how that primitive is imple-
mented. The security level is a measure for the security that may be attained and
allows us to more explicitly define the difficulty of problems in terms of effort, and
therefore elaborate on the terms “easy” or “hard”. The security level is also par-
ticularly helpful when comparing different cryptographic schemes with each other,
something we utilise when comparing finite field and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman in
Table 2.1 later in this section.
Generic attacks for solving the discrete log problem include algorithms such as
Shanks’ baby-step/giant-step method [144], Pollard’s rho algorithm [131] and the
Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [130].
2.2.4 Pollard Rho
The Pollard rho [132] method can be used to solve the discrete log problem ga = h
in a finite group G where g ∈ G is a generator, h ∈ G and a ∈ Z. We are interested
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in the case where the group G is the specific group Z∗p of nonzero residues modulo p
for some prime p > 3. The Pollard rho method is based upon the observation that
if one can find aj , bj , ak, bk ∈ Z∗p such that gbjhaj = gbkhak with aj 6= ak (mod p),
then one can solve the discrete log problem as:
h = g(bj−bk)(ak−aj)
−1 (mod p−1) (2.1)
To find such values we generate a pseudorandom sequence of integer pairs (ai, bi)
modulo (p − 1) and a sequence of integers xi = haigbi (mod p), starting from the




((ai + 1) (mod p− 1), bi), if 0 < xi < 13p,
(2ai (mod p− 1), 2bi (mod p− 1)), if 13p < xi <
2
3p,




hxi (mod p), if 0 < xi <
1
3p,
x2i (mod p), if
1
3p < xi <
2
3p,
gxi (mod p), if
2
3p < xi < p.
If we can find such a pair j, k with j < k such that xj = xk, then we have g
bjhaj =
gbkhak , and thus can use (2.1) to solve the discrete log problem for a. Floyd’s cycle-
finding algorithm [85] can be utilised to efficiently find such elements xj , xk with an
expected running time O(√p).
2.2.5 Pohlig-Hellman
We now give further details on the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [130], due to its ef-
fectiveness in solving the discrete log problem in a group G when all non-trivial
factors of the group order q are small, and known – something we shall utilise later
in Chapter 4.
Suppose we are given a generator g of a group G of order q, an element h ∈ G, and
wish to find the discrete log x such that gx = h. Given a factorisation of the group
order q =
∏k
i=1 qi, where qi are pairwise relatively prime (this therefore does not
need to be a complete factorisation), we know that
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= (gx)q/qi = hq/qi for i = 1, . . . , k.
Therefore, setting gi = g
q/qi and hi = h
q/qi , we have k instances of a discrete log
problem gxi = hi in k smaller groups of order qi respectively.
We then solve each of these k discrete log problems (using any suitable algorithm)
to produce a set of solutions {x1, x2, . . . , xk}, with xi ∈ Zqi , for which g
xi
i = hi = g
x
i
and therefore x = xi mod qi for all i.
The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) allows us to uniquely determine the so-
lution to the discrete log problem x mod q, using the k solutions {x1, x2, . . . , xk},
with xi ∈ Zqi , for which g
xi
i = hi = g
x
i .
Theorem 2.3 (Chinese Remainder Theorem). Given pairwise relatively prime in-
tegers q1, q2. . . . , qk and arbitrary integers x1, x2, . . . , xk, the system of simultaneous
congruences
x ≡ x1 (mod q1)
x ≡ x2 (mod q2)
...
x ≡ xk (mod qk)
has a solution x. Moreover, the solution x is unique modulo q =
∏k
i=1 qi and can be






where yi = q/qi and the zi are inverses defined by ziyi ≡ 1 (mod qi).
The implication of this is to choose to work in group q of prime order where possible.
2.2.6 Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Diffie-Hellman key exchange provides a method of securely exchanging cryptographic
keys over a public channel between two parties that require no prior knowledge of
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each other. Suppose Alice and Bob want to participate in a key exchange. In finite-
field Diffie-Hellman, Alice and Bob first agree on a prime p and a generator g of a
multiplicative subgroup modulo p. Alice sends ga (mod p) to Bob and Bob sends
gb (mod p) to Alice; each then computes a shared secret gab (mod p). The CDH
assumption states that an adversary observing the exchange cannot compute gab,
furthermore the DDH assumption states that an adversary cannot distinguish gab
from a random value gz. However, Alice and Bob can easily compute gab (mod p)
by using their private exponents to compute (gb)a (mod p) and (ga)b (mod p) re-
spectively.
2.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
In this section we introduce the basics of elliptic curves and elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy (ECC). We are only concerned with a particular use case of elliptic curves for
their use in Diffie-Hellman key exchange. We therefore only introduce the necessities
required for further work in Chapter 4.
As well as being based on modular arithmetic and groups in finite fields, Diffie-
Hellman can also be performed based upon groups consisting of points on an elliptic
curve. While there exist sub-exponential algorithms for solving the discrete log prob-
lem over the multiplicative group of a finite field (such as Coppersmith’s algorithm
for F∗2n [36] or the number field sieve (NFS) [64, 79, 142]), there are currently no
known1 sub-exponential algorithms for solving the discrete log problem in appropri-
ately chosen elliptic-curve groups. The consequence of this is that we are able to
achieve n-bits of security using elliptic-curve groups of order 2n-bits. This means
that practically, elliptic-curve based Diffie-Hellman can use significantly smaller pa-
rameters than a finite field counterpart, resulting in more efficient implementations.
See Table 2.1 for a direct comparison given by the US National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) [16].
1This is however a very active field of research, with recent breakthroughs including conjectured
sub-exponential algorithms based upon heuristic assumptions and experimental evidence, see [128]
and a broader discussion of the state of the art in [56].
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Effective Order-q Elliptic-Curve
Key Length Subgroup of Z∗p Group Order q
112 p : 2048, q : 224 224
128 p : 3072, q : 256 256
192 p : 7680, q : 384 384
256 p : 15360, q : 512 512
Table 2.1: A summary of the key lengths (in bits) recommended by NIST
to achieve n-bits of security (effective key length) when using finite field
and elliptic-curve discrete log based primitives.
2.3.1 Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve over a prime field Fp (with p > 3) in short Weierstrass form is the
set of solutions (x, y) ∈ Fp × Fp of an equation of the type y2 = x3 + ax+ b, where
a, b ∈ Fp satisfy 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0, together with the point at infinity O.
By introducing a group operation (namely point addition) this set of solutions form
an abelian group, called the elliptic-curve group of E. Let P1, P2 6= O be points on
a given curve E, with P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2). The addition rule is defined
as follows [83].
1. If x1 6= x2, then P1 + P2 = (x3, y3) with
x3 = m
2 − x1 − x2 (mod p) and y3 = m(x1 − x3)− y1 (mod p),
where m = y2−y1x2−x1 (mod p).
2. If x1 = x2 but y1 6= y2 then P1 = −P2 and so P1 + P2 = O.
3. If P1 = P2 and y1 = 0 then P1 + P2 = 2P1 = O.
4. If P1 = P2 and y1 6= 0 then P1 + P2 = 2P1 = (x3, y3) with
x3 = m





Consequently, for a non-negative integer k, it is possible to define the scalar multi-
plication [k]P of a point P on the curve as the successive k-time addition of a point
P with itself.
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2.3.2 The Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem
Using the notation established above, we can now introduce the analogue of the
discrete log problem for elliptic curves, known as the elliptic curve discrete log
problem (ECDLP).
Definition 2.7 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem). Suppose E is an elliptic
curve over Fp and P ∈ Fp×Fp is a point on E. Given a scalar multiple Q of P , the
elliptic curve discrete log problem is to find k ∈ Z such that Q = [k]P .
This problem forms the fundamental building block for elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy, and has been a major area of research in computational number theory and
cryptography for several decades. We now go on to describe one of its uses in the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol for elliptic curves.
2.3.3 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
We again consider the scenario in which two individuals, Alice and Bob, wish to
securely create a shared cryptographic key over a public channel. For this we use
elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, described as follows.
Alice and Bob first agree on a public elliptic curve E and a public point P ∈ E
which generates a subgroup of order n. (In many scenarios, n is prime, or admits
of a large prime factor. We look at precisely how the security of the scheme can
be broken down when this is not the case, in Chaper 4.) Alice selects at random
her private key ka ∈ [2, n − 2] and computes her public key (a point on the elliptic
curve E) Q = [ka]P . She then sends this public key to Bob. Bob also selects at
random his private key kb ∈ [2, n − 2] and computes his public key R = [kb]P . He
sends his public key R to Alice. Alice and Bob can then construct their mutual
shared key by computing K = [ka]R and K = [kb]Q, respectively. Because of the
group structure of the elliptic curve, we know these two K values are equivalent,




A primality test is an algorithm used to determine whether or not a given number
is prime. Primality tests come in two different varieties: deterministic and proba-
bilistic. Deterministic primality testing algorithms prove conclusively that a number
is prime, but they tend to be slow and are not widely used in practice. A famous
example is the AKS test [4]. We do not discuss such tests further in this thesis,
except where they arise in certain mathematical software.
Probabilistic primality tests make use of arithmetic conditions that all primes must
satisfy, and test these conditions for the number n of interest. If the condition does
not hold, we learn that n must be composite. However, if it does hold we may only
infer that n is probably prime, since some composite numbers may also pass the
test. By making repeated tests, the probability that n is composite conditioned on
it having passed some number t of tests can be made sufficiently small for crypto-
graphic applications. A typical target probability is 2−80, cf. [105, 4.49]. A critical
consideration here is whether n was generated adversarially or not, since the bounds
that can be inferred on probability may be radically different in the two cases; more
on this in Chapters 3 and 4.
We now discuss four widely-used tests: the Fermat, Miller-Rabin, Lucas, and Baillie-
PSW tests.
2.4.1 Fermat Test
The Fermat primality test is based upon the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4 (Fermat’s Little Theorem). If p is prime and a is not divisible by p,
then
ap−1 ≡ 1 (mod p).
To test n for primality, one simply chooses a base a and computes an−1 (mod n).
If an−1 6≡ 1 (mod n), then we can be certain that n is composite. If after testing
a variety of bases ai, we find that that they all satisfy a
n−1
i ≡ 1 (mod n), we may
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conclude that n is probably prime.
It is well known that there exist composite numbers that satisfy an−1 ≡ 1 (mod n)
for all integers a that are not divisible by n. These numbers completely thwart the
Fermat test, and are known as Carmichael numbers. These will be of relevance in
the sequel. The following result is fundamental in the construction of Carmichael
numbers.
Theorem 2.5 (Korselt’s Criterion [88]). A positive composite integer n is a Carmichael
number if and only if n is square-free, and p− 1 | n− 1 for all prime divisors p of n.
2.4.2 Miller-Rabin Test
The Miller-Rabin [106, 135] (MR) primality test is based upon the fact that there
are no non-trivial roots of unity modulo a prime. Let n > 1 be an odd integer to be
tested and write n = 2ed + 1 where d is odd. If n is prime, then for any integer a
with 1 ≤ a < n, we have:
ad ≡ 1 mod n or a2id ≡ −1 mod n for some 0 ≤ i < e.
The Miller-Rabin test then consists of checking the above conditions, declaring a
number to be (probably) prime if one of the two conditions holds, and to be com-
posite if both fail. If one condition holds, then we say n is a pseudoprime to base a,
or that a is a non-witness to the compositeness of n (since n may be composite, but
a does not demonstrate this fact).
For a composite n, let S(n) denote the number of non-witnesses a ∈ [1, n − 1]. By
the following theorem, the exact number of non-witnesses S(n) for any composite
number n can be computed given the factorisation of n:
Theorem 2.6 (Monier [108], Proposition 1). Let n be an odd composite integer.
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An upper-bound on S(n) is given by results of [108, 135]:
Theorem 2.7 (Monier-Rabin Bound). Let n 6= 9 be odd and composite. Then
S(n) ≤ ϕ(n)
4
where ϕ denotes the Euler totient function.
This bound will be critical in determining the probability that an adversarially
generated n passes the Miller-Rabin test. Since for large n, we have ϕ(n) ≈ n, it
indicates that no composite n can pass the Miller-Rabin test for t random bases
with probability greater than (1/4)t. The test is commonly implemented using
either (a) a set of fixed bases (e.g. Apple corecrypto) or (b) randomly chosen bases
(e.g. OpenSSL). Of course, the (1/4)t bound only holds in the case of randomly
chosen bases.
2.4.3 Lucas Test
The Lucas primality test [15] makes use of Lucas sequences, defined as follows:
Definition 2.8 (Lucas sequence [9]). Let P and Q be integers and D = P 2 − 4Q.
Then the Lucas sequences (Uk) and (Vk) (with k ≥ 0) are defined recursively by:
Uk+2 = PUk+1 −QUk where, U0 = 0, U1 = 1,
Vk+2 = PVk+1 −QVk V0 = 2, V1 = P.





denotes the Legendre symbol, with value 1 if x is a square modulo p and value −1
otherwise):
Theorem 2.8 ([39]). Let P and Q be integers, D = P 2 − 4Q, and let the Lucas






) ≡ 0 (mod p). (2.2)
The Lucas probable prime test repeatedly tests property (2.2) for different pairs






denotes the Jacobi symbol, since n is composite).
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Definition 2.9 (Lucas pseudoprime). Let P and Q be integers and D = P 2 − 4Q.
Let n be a composite number such that gcd (n, 2QD) = 1. If Un−(Dn )
≡ 0 (mod n),
then n is called a Lucas pseudoprime with respect to parameters (P,Q).
We can now introduce the notion of a strong Lucas probable prime and strong Lucas
pseudoprime with respect to parameters (P,Q) by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.9 ([9]). Let P and Q be integers and D = P 2 − 4Q. Let p be a prime





= 2kq with q odd. Then one of the following
conditions is satisfied:
p | Uq or ∃i such that 0 ≤ i < k and p | V2iq. (2.3)
The strong Lucas probable prime test repeatedly tests property (2.3) for different
pairs (P,Q). This leads to the definition of a strong Lucas pseudoprime with respect
to parameters (P,Q).
Definition 2.10 (strong Lucas pseudoprime). Let P and Q be integers and D =






with q odd. Suppose that:
n | Uq or ∃i such that 0 ≤ i < k and n | V2iq.
Then n is called a strong Lucas pseudoprime with respect to parameters (P,Q).
A strong Lucas pseudoprime is also a Lucas pseudoprime (for the same (P,Q) pair),
but the converse is not necessarily true. The strong version of the test is therefore
seen as the more stringent and useful option.
Analogously to the Monier-Rabin theorem for pseudoprimes for the Miller-Rabin
primality test, Arnault [9] gives a theorem on pseudoprimes to the strong Lucas
test.
Theorem 2.10 (Arnault [9]). Let D be an integer and n a composite number rela-








is less than or equal to 4n/15 except if n is the product
n = (2k1q1 − 1)(2k1q1 + 1)
of twin primes with q1 odd and such that the Legendre symbols satisfy (D/2
k1q1−1) =
−1, (D/2k1q1 − 1) = 1. Here, n is an slpsp(P,Q) denotes that n is a strong Lucas
pseudoprime with respect to parameters (P,Q). Also, the following inequality is
always true:
SL(D,n) ≤ n/2.
Therefore if (P,Q) are chosen at random from 0 ≤ P,Q < n with P 2 − 4Q ≡ D
(mod n) and gcd(n, 2QD) = 1, we can infer that t applications of the strong Lucas
test would declare a composite n to be probably prime with a probability at most
(4/15)t (with the exception of the specific twin primes mentioned in Theorem 2.10
which are declared prime with probability at most (n/2)t – however one can easily
test for such an n).
2.4.4 Baillie-PSW
The Baillie-PSW test [134] is a probabilistic primality test consisting of a single
Miller-Rabin test with base 2 followed by a single Lucas test. A slight variant of
the test in which the Lucas test is replaced with a strong Lucas test is mentioned
in [15]. Generally, the consensus that has emerged over time is that the Lucas test
should be used with the parameters (P,Q) set as defined by Selfridge’s method A:
Definition 2.11 (Selfridge’s Method A [15]). Let D be the first element of the





= −1. Then set P = 1 and Q =
(1−D)/4.
If no such D can be found, then n must be a square and hence composite. In
practice, one might attempt to find such a D up to some bound Dmax, then perform
a test for squareness using Newton’s method for square roots (see Appendix C.4
of [84]), before reverting to a search for a suitable D if needed. This is generally
more efficient than doing a test of squareness first.
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Since the parameters for both the Miller-Rabin and Lucas part of the test are fixed,
the result of the Baillie-PSW test implemented this way is in-fact deterministic (in
that the result of such a test will remain constant). We do however still classify
Baillie-PSW as a probabilistic test.
The idea of this test is that the two components are “orthogonal” and so it is very
unlikely that a number n will pass both parts. Indeed, there are no known composite
n that pass the Baillie-PSW test. Gilchrist [60] confirmed that there are no Baillie-
PSW pseudoprimes less than 264. PRIMO [99] is an elliptic curve based primality
proving program that uses the Baillie-PSW test to check all intermediate probable
primes. If any of these values were indeed composite, the final certification would
necessarily have failed. Since this has never occurred during its use, PRIMO’s author
Martin estimates [158] that there are no Baillie-PSW pseudoprimes with less than
about 10000 digits – yet this is just speculation.
This empirical evidence suggests that numbers of cryptographic size for use in Diffie-
Hellman and RSA are unlikely to be Baillie-PSW pseudoprimes. However, Pomer-
ance gives a heuristic argument in [133] that there are in fact infinitely many Baillie-
PSW pseudoprimes. The construction of a single example is a significant open prob-
lem in number theory. There do not appear to exist any bounds demonstrating the
test’s strength on uniformly random k-bit inputs, in contrast to the results of [41]
for the Miller-Rabin test. In summary, while the Baillie-PSW test appears to be
very strong, there are no proven guarantees concerning its accuracy. One positive
feature is that, being that we choose the parameters in a deterministic manner, it
does not consume any randomness (whereas a properly implemented Miller-Rabin
test does).
2.4.5 Supplementary and Preliminary Tests
It is often more efficient to perform some supplementary or preliminary testing on
an input n before executing the main work of the primality test. A common strategy
is to first perform trial division on n using a list of r small primes. This can be done
directly, or by equivalently checking if gcd(
∏r
i pi, n) 6= 1 where {p1, . . . , pr} is the list
of primes used. The list of primes can be partitioned and multiple gcds computed,
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so as to match the partial products of primes with the machine word-size. This is a
very cheap test to perform and can be quite powerful when testing random inputs.
The question arises of how r, the number of primes to use in trial division, should
be set. We shall discuss this question in more detail in Chapter 5.
2.4.6 Standards and Technical Guidelines
Technical guideline documents such as Cryptographic Mechanisms BSI TR–02102–
1 [55] and standards such as the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) FIPS 186–4
C.3.2 [84] and the International Standard for Prime Number Generation ISO/IEC
18032 [146] provide formal guidance and suggestions on primality testing algorithms
and parameter choices.
BSI TR–02102–1 suggests that in the worst case, 50 rounds of random base selection
Miller-Rabin must be performed, and in the average case it, like ISO/IEC 18032,
references the method proposed by Damgȧrd et al. [41] and the Handbook of Ap-
plied Cryptography [105] as described above. BSI TR–02102–1 also references the
guidance given in FIPS 186–4, which suggests Miller-Rabin with more conservative
numbers of rounds of iterations (t = 40 for 1024 and t = 56 for 2048 bit n) for
DSA parameter generation, as well as giving a detailed justification. FIPS 186–4
advocates the use of an additional Lucas primality test (cf. Section 2.4.3) and also
gives an elaboration of the distinction between the difference in the probability that
a composite number survives t rounds of Miller-Rabin testing, with the probability
that a number surviving t rounds of Miller-Rabin is composite. This is given explic-
itly as a warning when using error estimates in its Appendix F.2. While the current
ISO/IEC 18032:2005 states correctly the worst case and average case error bounds,
it does not make as clear the distinction between their use. This however seems to
be addressed in the latest draft of ISO/IEC DIS 18032 (under development 2020),





A critical use case for primality testing is prime generation (e.g. for use in RSA keys).
The exact details of the algorithms used vary across implementations, but the ma-
jority follow a simple technique based on first generating a random initial candidate
n of the desired bit length k, possibly setting some of its bits, then doing trial di-
vision against a list of small primes, before performing multiple rounds of primality
testing using a standard probabilistic primality test such as Miller-Rabin. If the
trial division reveals a factor or the Miller-Rabin test fails, then another candidate
is generated. This can be a fresh random value, but more commonly, implementa-
tions add 2 to the previous candidate n. This method is commonly known as an
incremental search, and we give pseudocode of the algorithm in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Generating a random prime by incremental search
Input desired bit length k.
Output a k-bit prime.
Step 1: generate a random k-bit integer.
1: n′ ← {0, 1}k−2
2: n := 1||n′||1 # this forces n to be odd and have exactly k bits
3: nmax = min(2
k, n+ 2µ)
Step 2: test n for primality.
4: Run trial division and the Miller-Rabin test on n
5: if the output is prime then
6: Return n
7: end if
Step 3: increment n.
8: n← n+ 2
9: if n > nmax then
10: go to Step 1
11: else
12: go to Step 2
13: end if
In order for this to be an efficient algorithm for generating primes, we must consider
both the probability that a uniform k-bit integer is prime and how to efficiently
test whether a given integer n is prime. The analysis in [31] provides choices for the
length of the search such that error probability and failure probability are in practice
negligible. We see these guidelines permeate through to standards, with ISO/IEC
18032:2005 standardising the incremental search algorithm, setting the choice for
the size of the search as min(2k, n+ 2µ) where µ = 10 ln(2k) [146].
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One might be concerned that an incremental search may not produce uniform prime
output. For example, one may argue that primes p such that there exists another
prime p′ < p with p−p′ < δ for some small δ > 0, are much less likely to be produced
by incremental search. However, Brandt et. al. [31] strongly suggest that, compared
to a uniform choice, there is no significant loss of security when using incremental
search in cryptographic applications where secret primes are required.
2.5.1 Bias in Prime Generation
There are however prevalent examples of the use of biased algorithms for prime
generation leading to cryptographic vulnerabilities. For example, a popular method
for generating prime numbers (in this case for the eventual use in RSA public keys)
is to construct a candidate of the form: n = k ×M + 65537a (mod M), where k, a
are integers such that a is chosen randomly, k is a buffer used to ensure n is of the
correct bit size and M is a primorial (a product of the first t successive primes),
i.e. M =
∏t
i=1 pi. This technique ensures that any candidate n produced would be
such that n 6≡ 0 (mod pi) for any of the t primes included in the primorial M , i.e.
we achieve sieving over a list of small primes during the first stage. This structure
is as described in [81, 80] and was widely deployed within the cryptographic library
RSALib. This allowed an attack [114] in which knowledge of this specific structure
allowed the factorisation of 1024 and 2048 bit RSA public keys in a widely used
application.2
OpenSSL [124] provides a cryptographically secure strong pseudorandom number
generator (see [149] for further analysis). However, aside from PRNG bugs like
that seen in the Debian OpenSSL vulnerability [165], OpenSSL has also suffered
from algorithmic biases that can be used to fingerprint primes as likely originating
from OpenSSL. Mironov [107] observes that while OpenSSL’s prime generation code
contains methods both to generate safe primes (primes of the form p = 2q+ 1 where
q is also prime) and non-safe primes, an implementation bug caused part of the
generation process for safe primes to be left over in the non-safe prime case. This
meant that in the non-safe prime case, OpenSSL would output primes p such that
2Interestingly, we will be harnessing the techniques described here in Chapters 3 and 4 as we




p− 1 6≡ 1 mod 3, 5, . . . , 17863. Although no vulnerably was found, this fingerprint
was used by Mironov, and later Heninger et. al. [73], to attribute the source of
factorisable RSA keys found in digital certificates to OpenSSL.
Prime generation, and the primality testing performed there within, will be discussed
further in Chapter 5.
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In this chapter we provide a systematic analysis of primality testing under adver-
sarial conditions, where the numbers being tested for primality are not generated
randomly, but instead provided by a possibly malicious party. Such a situation can
arise in secure messaging protocols where a server supplies Diffie-Hellman parame-
ters to the peers, or in a secure communications protocol like TLS where a developer
can insert such a number to be able to later passively spy on client-server data. We
study a broad range of cryptographic libraries and assess their performance in this
adversarial setting. As examples of our findings, we are able to construct 2048-bit
composites that are declared prime with probability 1/16 by OpenSSL’s primality
testing in its default configuration; the advertised performance is 2−80. We can also
construct 1024-bit composites that always pass the primality testing routine in GNU
GMP when configured with the recommended minimum number of rounds. And,
for a number of libraries (Apple corecrypto and CommonCrypto, Cryptlib, LibTom-
Crypt, JavaScript Big Number, WolfSSL), we can construct composites that always
pass the supplied primality tests. We explore the implications of these security
failures in applications, focusing on the construction of malicious Diffie-Hellman pa-
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rameters. We show that, unless careful primality testing is performed, an adversary
can supply parameters (p, q, g) which on the surface look secure, but where the dis-
crete logarithm problem in the subgroup of order q generated by g is easy. We close
by making recommendations for users and developers. In particular, we promote
increasing the number of rounds performed in the Miller-Rabin test to 64. This en-
sures that composite numbers are wrongly identified as being prime with probability
at most 2−128. We also suggest considering the use of the Baillie-PSW test if the
additional code required is not too costly for the library.
3.1 Introduction and Motivation
Many cryptographic primitives rely on prime numbers, with RSA being the most
famous example. However, even in constructions that do not rely on the difficulty
of factoring integers into prime factors, primality is often relied upon to prevent an
adversary from applying a divide-and-conquer approach (e.g. in the Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm or in a Lim-Lee small subgroup attack [156]) or to prevent the existence
of degenerate cases such as zero divisors (which may complicate security proofs or
reduce output entropy).
One approach to obtaining prime numbers in instantiations of these cryptographic
primitives is to produce such numbers as they are needed on whatever device requires
them. This is accomplished by sampling random integers and checking for primality.
This process can be computationally intensive to the point of being prohibitively so.
The high cost of producing prime numbers led implementations to seek ways to
reduce this cost and, as demonstrated in [114], these performance improvements
may then lead to devastating attacks.
If the required prime numbers are public, an alternative approach is possible: (low-
power) devices are provisioned with prime numbers from a server or a standard.
For example, the popular Telegram messenger [93] uses Diffie-Hellman (DH) param-
eters provided by the server to establish end-to-end encryption between peers. If
the peers do not validate the correctness of the supplied DH parameters,1 the Tele-
gram server can provide malicious DH parameters with composite group orders and
1We stress that they do perform validation in the default implementation.
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thereby passively obtain the established secrets. As a concrete and closely related
example, Bleichenbacher [26] showed how the reliance on a small and fixed set of
bases in Miller-Rabin primality testing in GNU Crypto 1.1.0 could be exploited to
fool GNU Crypto into accepting malicious DH parameters. In particular, this led
to an attack on the GNU Crypto implementation of SRP enabling users’ passwords
to be recovered.
Another example is the Transport Layer Security protocol [47] which can use Diffie-
Hellman key exchange to establish master secrets in the handshake protocol. The DH
parameters are generated by the TLS server and sent to the client during each TLS
handshake.2 It is clear that the TLS server provider does not gain any advantage by
sending malicious DH parameters to the client since it knows the established master
key. However, we can consider an adversarial developer who implements a malicious
server with backdoored DH parameter generation, cf. [161, 54]. If such parameters
are accepted by TLS clients and used in the DH key exchange, a passive adversary
can observe the traffic and obtain the master key. Here, weak DH parameters that
still pass tests by trusted tools offer a sense of plausible deniability. Moreover, if an
application simply silently rejects bad parameters then any countermeasures could
be overcome by repeatedly sending malicious parameter sets having a reasonable
probability of fooling those countermeasures, until the target client accepts them.
In recent years we have seen several backdoors in cryptographic implementations.
For example, NIST standardised the Dual EC pseudorandom number generator
(PRNG) which allows an adversary to predict generated random values if it can
select a generator point Q whose discrete logarithm is known and collect enough
PRNG output [34]. In 2016 it was shown that Juniper had implemented this PRNG
in such a way as to enable an adversary to passively decrypt VPN sessions [33].
A notable example of a potential backdoor involving a composite number is the
security advisory [137] pushed by command-line data transfer utility socat, which
is popular with security professionals such as penetration testers. There, the DH
prime p parameter was replaced with a new 2048 bit value because “the hard-coded
1024 bit DH p parameter was not prime’ ’. The advisory goes on to state “since there
is no indication of how these parameters were chosen, the existence of a trapdoor that
2Up to version 1.2 (inclusive) of the protocol.
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makes possible for an eavesdropper to recover the shared secret from a key exchange
that uses them cannot be ruled out”, which highlights a real world application of
this attack model. Similarly, the prime group parameter p given by Group 23 of
RFC5114 [90] for use in DH key exchanges has been found to be partially vulnerable
to small subgroup attacks [156]. It might seem that code reviews and the availability
of rigorous primality testing (in, say, mathematical software packages, cf. Section 3.4)
would impose high rates of detectability for malicious parameter sets in code or
standards, but as these examples highlight, such sets still occur in practice.
Given these incidents we can assume a motivated adversary who is able to implement
software serving maliciously generated primes and/or DH parameters. Thus, there
is a need for cryptographic applications that rely on third-party primes to perform
primality testing. Indeed, many cryptographic libraries incorporate primality testing
facilities and thus it appears this requirement is easy to satisfy. However, the primary
application of these tests is to check primality (or, more precisely, compositeness)
for locally-generated, random inputs during prime generation. Thus, it is a natural
question to ask whether these libraries are robust against malicious inputs, i.e. inputs
designed to fool the library into accepting a composite number as prime. We refer
to this setting as primality testing under adversarial conditions.
3.1.1 Overview of Primality Testing
In this chapter we will be focused on the primality tests found in cryptographic
libraries and mathematical software. The tests discussed are the Fermat, Miller-
Rabin, Lucas and Baillie-PSW tests. While these tests were formally introduced in
Chapter 2, we now discuss more specific details of their implementation within the
libraries we study.
Clearly, when conducting a Miller-Rabin or Lucas test, the choice of the param-
eter t (the number of trials) is critical. Many cryptographic libraries, for exam-
ple OpenSSL [124], use test parameters originating from [41] as popularised in the
Handbook of Applied Cryptography [105]. These give the number of iterations of
Miller-Rabin needed for an error rate less than 2−80, when testing a random input
n. A main result of [41] is that if n is a randomly selected b-bit odd integer, then t
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independent rounds of Miller-Rabin testing to give an error probability:
P (X|Yt) < b3/22tt−1/242−
√
tb for 3 ≤ t ≤ b/9 and b ≥ 21,
where X denotes the event that n is composite, and Yt the event that t rounds of
Miller-Rabin declares n to be prime. This bound enables the computation of the
minimum value t needed to obtain P (X|Yt) ≤ 2−80 for a range of bit-sizes b; see
Table 3.4 later in this chapter.
However, these error estimates are for primality testing with Miller-Rabin on ran-
domly generated n. In the adversarial setting, we are actually concerned with the
probability that t trials of Miller-Rabin (or some other test) declare a given n to be
prime, given that it is composite. This probability is independent of bit-size, and
is at most (1/4)t if random bases are used in Miller-Rabin tests. Similar remarks
apply for both variants of the Lucas test.
Many libraries, for example GNU GMP [66], provide primality testing functions to
be deployed in applications such as mathematical software packages that require big
integer arithmetic. These functions often obligate the user to choose the ‘certainty’
or accuracy of the primality test performed. Since these parameters are often hidden
from the end user, this then forces the responsibility of choosing suitable parameters
on the developer of the application using the library. The only resulting guidance
that filters through from the standards is then found in the documentation of the
library, which is often brief and informal.
3.1.2 Contributions & Outline
We investigate the implementation landscape of primality testing in both crypto-
graphic libraries and mathematical software packages, and measure the security im-
pact of the widespread failure of implementations to achieve robust primality testing
in the adversarial setting.
In Section 3.2 we review known techniques for constructing pseudoprimes and ex-
tend them with our target applications in mind. In Section 3.3, we then survey
primality testing in cryptographic libraries and mathematical software, evaluating
their performance in the adversarial setting. We propose techniques to defeat their
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tests where we can. Overall, our finding is that most libraries are not robust in the
adversarial setting. Our main results in this direction are summarised in Table 3.3.
As one highlight of our results, we find that OpenSSL 1.1.1pre6 with its default
primality testing routine will declare certain composites n of cryptographic size to
be prime with probability 1/16, while the documented failure rate is 2−80. This
arises from OpenSSL’s reliance on Table 3.4 to compute the number of rounds of
Miller-Rabin testing required, and this number decreases as the size of n increases.
As another highlight, we construct a 1024-bit composite that is guaranteed to be
declared prime by the GNU GMP library [66] for anything up to and including
15 rounds of testing (the recommended minimum by GMP). This is as a result of
GNU GMP initialising its PRNG to a static state and consequently using bases
in its Miller-Rabin testing that depend only on n, the number being tested. We
also show how base selection by randomly sampling from a fixed list of primes, as in
Apple’s corecrypto library, Cryptlib, LibTomCrypt, JavaScript Big Number (JSBN)
and WolfSSL, can be subverted: we construct composites n of cryptographic size
that are guaranteed to be declared prime by these libraries regardless of how many
rounds of testing are performed.
We go on to examine the implications of our findings for applications, focussing on
DH parameter testing. The good news is that OpenSSL is not impacted because of
its insistence on safe primes for use in DH; that is, it requires DH parameters (p, q, g)
for which q = (p− 1)/2 and both p, q are tested for primality. Using the techniques
in this chapter we cannot produce malicious parameters of this form. However,
we will revisit the safe prime setting in Chapter 4, where the main focus will be
to produce malicious safe prime DH parameters that are accepted by OpenSSL
with some probability. In this chapter we show that when more liberal choices of
parameter are permitted, as is the case in Bouncy Castle and Botan, we are able
to construct malicious DH parameter sets which pass the libraries’ testing but for
which the discrete logarithm problem in the subgroup generated by g is easy.
We close by discussing avenues for improving the robustness of primality testing in




In this section, we review known methods of constructing pseudoprimes for the
Miller-Rabin and Lucas tests. We also provide variations on these methods. We
will use the results of this section in the next one, where we study the robustness of
cryptographic libraries for primality testing in the adversarial setting.
3.2.1 Miller-Rabin Pseudoprimes
The exact number of non-witnesses S(n) for any composite number n can be com-
puted given the factorisation of n [108]. Generating composites n that have large
numbers of non-witnesses is not so straightforward. In empirical work, Pomerance
et al. [134] showed that many composite numbers that pass a Miller-Rabin primality
test have the form n = (k+1)(rk+1) where r is small and both k+1 and rk+1 are
prime. More recently, Höglund [75] and Nicely [115] used the Miller-Rabin primality
test as implemented in GNU GMP to test randomly generated numbers of this form
for various values of r and for various different sizes of k. Their results support the
claims made by [134].
We now consider existing methods for producing composites which have many non-
witnesses, for two forms of the Miller-Rabin test: firstly where the bases are chosen
randomly and secondly where a fixed set of bases is used.
3.2.1.1 Random Bases
For random bases, we are interested in constructing composite n that have large
numbers of non-witnesses, i.e. for which S(n) is large. Such numbers will pass the
Miller-Rabin test with probability S(n)/n per trial; of course, this probability is
bounded by ϕ(n)/4n ≈ 1/4 by the Monier-Rabin theorem, but we are interested in
how close to this bound we can get.





i , where each prime pi can be expressed as 2
ei · di + 1 with
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where integers e, d are found by writing n = 2e · d+ 1 where d is odd.
Note how the bound in this theorem does not depend on the exponents qi, indicating
that square-free numbers will have relatively large S(n). Also note the dependence
on the terms gcd(d, di), ensuring that the odd part of each prime factor pi has a
large gcd with the odd part of n is necessary to achieve a large value for S(n). As
an easy corollary of this theorem, we obtain:
Corollary 3.1 ([108]). Let x be an odd integer such that 2x+1 and 4x+1 are both
prime. Then n = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) has ϕ(n) = 8x2 and achieves the Monier-Rabin
bound, i.e. it satisfies S(n) = ϕ(n)/4.
The proof of this corollary follows easily on observing that we may take m = 2 and
d1 = d2 = x so that gcd(d, di) = x in the preceding theorem. Narayanan [113]
extended work from Monier [108] who showed that if n is a Carmichael number of
the form p1p2p3, where each pi is a distinct prime with pi ≡ 3 (mod 4), then S(n)
achieves the Monier-Rabin bound. Narayanan also gave further results showing that
these two forms for n are the only ones achieving the Monier-Rabin bound, with all
other n satisfying S(n) ≤ ϕ(n)/6.
3.2.1.2 Fixed Bases
Some implementations of the Miller-Rabin primality test select bases from a fixed
list (often of primes), rather than choosing them at random. For example, until
an update motivated by the disclosure of this work, the primality test provided by
Apple’s CommonCrypto library CCBigNumIsPrime performed 16 rounds of Miller-
Rabin using the first 16 primes as bases [6]. Similarly, Cryptlib, LibTomMath and
WolfSSL all choose the first t entries from a hard-coded list of primes as bases when
performing Miller-Rabin in their respective primality tests.
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Arnault [8] presented a method for producing composite numbers n = p1p2 · · · ph
that are guaranteed to be declared prime by Miller-Rabin for any fixed set of prime
bases A = {a1, a2, . . . , at}.
Not only is Arnault’s method effective when an implementation chooses bases from
a fixed list, it can also be utilised if an implementation chooses bases randomly from
a large fixed list of possibilities. For example, an implementation might select prime
bases randomly from a list of primes below 1000; since Arnault’s method scales well
(we simply need to solve more congruences simultaneously with the CRT) we can
use this method to produce a composite n such that all primes below 1000 are non-
witnesses for n. We shall see applications of this approach for different libraries in
Section 3.3.
Since this approach is a very useful tool for us, we now go into more detail on the
method proposed by Arnault, and give an example.
3.2.1.3 An Overview of Arnault’s Method
Arnault’s method generates n of the form n = p1p2 . . . ph where the pi are distinct
odd primes such that n is pseudoprime to a set of t prime bases A = {a1, a2, . . . , at}.





= −1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ h,
then a will be a Miller-Rabin non-witness with respect to n (this set of conditions
is sufficient but not necessary for a to be a Miller-Rabin non-witness with respect
to n).









and the values of a and p taken modulo 4. This in turn
means that, for each a, we can compute the set Sa of possible non-residues mod 4a




= −1 ⇐⇒ p mod 4a ∈ Sa.
Arnault’s method selects p1 and then determines the other pi from equations of the
form pi = ki(p1 − 1) + 1 where the ki are values also chosen as part of the method
(with k1 = 1). This is done so as to ensure that the resulting n = p1p2 . . . ph is a
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= −1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ h imply that,
for each a ∈ A and each 1 ≤ i ≤ h we have ki(p1 − 1) + 1 ∈ Sa. Rewriting this, we
obtain that:
p1 mod 4a ∈
h⋂
i=1
k−1i (Sa + ki − 1), (3.1)
where k−1i (Sa + ki − 1) denotes the set {k
−1
i (s + ki − 1) mod 4a|s ∈ Sa}. This
gives a set of conditions on the value of p1 modulo 4a for each a ∈ A; typically a
few candidates for p1 mod 4a remain for each value of a. By selecting one of these
candidates za for each a ∈ A and using the CRT, the conditions can be combined
into a single condition on p1 modulo m = lcm(4, a1, . . . , at). The ki values must be
selected so that the sets on the right of (3.1) are non-empty; typically, they are set
to small primes larger than the maximum of the a ∈ A so that k−1i exists mod 4a
for each a.
Arnault’s method then brings into play other restrictions on p1 mod ki for each
i = 2, . . . , h. These result from the requirement that n be a Carmichael number.
We omit the full details, but, for example, when h = 3, the additional restrictions
can be written as:
p1 = k
−1
3 mod k2 and p1 = k
−1
2 mod k3
Making the ki co-prime to each other and to the a ∈ A ensures that another appli-
cation of the CRT can be made to incorporate these conditions. The end result is a
single condition of the form:
p1 = z mod lcm(4, a1, . . . , at, k2, . . . , kh)
where z is a fixed value determined by the choice of the za values and the additional
restrictions.
Finally, the method repeatedly generates candidates for p1 satisfying the above
constraint and uses the equations pi = ki(p1− 1) + 1 to determine the other pi. The
method is successful for a given p1 if all of the resulting p1, . . . , ph are prime.
Evidently, the method is complex and not guaranteed to succeed on every attempt for
a given set A. However, it can be iterated with different choices of the ki until the sets
on the right of (3.1) are non-empty; moreover a back-tracking approach can be used
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5 {3, 7, 13, 17}
7 {5, 11, 13, 15, 17, 23}
11 {3, 13, 15, 17, 21, 23, 27, 29, 31, 41}
13 {5, 7, 11, 15, 19, 21, 31, 33, 37, 41, 45, 47}
17 {3, 5, 7, 11, 23, 27, 29, 31, 37, 39, 41, 45, 57, 61, 63, 65}
19 {7, 11, 13, 21, 23, 29, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 47, 53, 55, 63, 65, 69}
23 {3, 5, 17, 21, 27, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 45, 47, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 65, 71, 75, 87, 89}
29 {3, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21, 27, 31, 37, 39, 41, 43, 47, 55, 69, 73, 75, 77, 79, 85, 89, 95, 97, 99, 101, 105, 113}
to select the za values to speed-up the entire process of constructing p1. The density
of all-prime solutions (p1, . . . , ph) amongst all possible candidates (p1, . . . , ph) satis-
fying p1 = z mod lcm(4, a1, . . . , at, k2, . . . , kh) and pi = ki(p1−1)+1 for i = 2, . . . , h
can be estimated using standard heuristics concerning the distribution of primes of




Notice that, the larger the set A, the larger the modulus L in the condition deter-
mining p1 will be. Thus, if A contains many bases, then larger pi and hence larger n
will tend to result. Moreover, all-prime solutions will become less dense. As an ex-
ample, when analysing the primality test in Maple V.2, Arnault [8] considers h = 3
so n = p1p2p3 and A = {2, 3, 5, 7, 11} (so t = 5); he works with k2 = 13 and k3 = 41
and arrives finally at the condition:
p1 = 827443 mod 4924920.
For p1 = 286472803, this yields a 29-decimal digit composite passing Maple’s fixed-
base Miller-Rabin primality test.
We give a short example of the method described for an n of the form n = p1p2p3
for which the first 10 primes are Miller-Rabin non-witnesses. That is, we target
A = {2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29}.




= −1 for each base a ∈ A.







i (Sa + ki − 1) Modulo
2 {3, 5} 8
3 {7} 12




17 {5, 29,31, 39, 63, 65} 68
19 {33, 37, 39,47, 69} 76
23 {31,47, 57, 87, 89} 92
29 {19, 37, 41,55, 77, 95, 99, 113} 116




i (Sa + ki − 1) when k2 = 41 and
k3 = 101.
We now set k2 = 41 and k3 = 101; these are coprime to all a ∈ A. We find subsets
of the Sa that meet the requirement:
p1 (mod 4a) ∈
h⋂
i=1
k−1i (Sa + ki − 1).
This gives us a set of residues modulo 4a for each a ∈ A that p1 must satisfy. We
give an example of this for the first 10 primes in Table 3.2.
We then need to make a choice of one residue za per set. This choice is arbitrary,
but we note that not all combinations of choices will lead to a solution. We give an
example of a good set of choices in Table 3.2 in bold.
We then have two additional conditions to add, based on our choice of the ki values.
These can be written as:
p1 = k
−1
3 mod k2 and p1 = k
−1
2 mod k3
In our example, we chose k1 = 41 and k2 = 101 which gives us:
p1 ≡ 28 (mod 41) and p1 ≡ 32 (mod 101).
We can then use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to simultaneously solve for the
10 conditions implied by the bold entries in Table 3.2 and the two conditions above.
In this case, we have the solution:





satisfies this condition, and yields primes
p2 = 5840260873618034778597880982145214452934254453252643
p3 = 14386984103302963722887462907235772188935602433622363
such that the product n = p1p2p3 is a 512-bit number that is a Miller-Rabin pseu-
doprime to the bases 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23 and 29.
3.2.1.4 Hybrid Technique
The method above produces composites that are in fact always Carmichael numbers.
We know from Section 3.2.1.1 that if n is a Carmichael number with 3 distinct
prime factors all congruent to 3 (mod 4), then n has the maximum number of non-
witnesses, ϕ(n)/4. We can set h = 3 in Arnault’s method and tweak it slightly
to ensure that, as well as producing n with a specified set A of non-witnesses, it
produces an n meeting the Monier-Rabin bound, so that random base Miller-Rabin
tests will also pass with the maximum probability. The tweak is very simple: we
ensure that 2 ∈ A; this forces p1 ≡ 3 or 5 (mod 8); we then select p1 ≡ 3 (mod 8)
so that p1 ≡ 3 (mod 4). Arnault’s method sets pi = ki(p1 − 1) + 1 where the ki are
co-prime to all the elements of A. Since 2 ∈ A, the ki must all be odd; it is easy to
see that this forces pi ≡ 3 (mod 4) too.
We will give an application of this technique in Section 3.3.11.
3.2.1.5 Extension For Composite Fixed Bases
The method of Arnault [8] works (as presented) only for prime bases, and not for
composite bases. Although less common, some implementations use both prime and
composite bases in their Miller-Rabin testing. By setting n ≡ 3 (mod 4), we know
that e = 1 when writing n = 2e·d+1 for d odd. In this case, the conditions to pass the
Miller-Rabin test simply become a(n−1)/2 ≡ ±1 (mod n). Hence, if n ≡ 3 (mod 4)
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is pseudoprime to some set of bases {a1, a2, . . . at}, then n is also pseudoprime for
any base b arising as a product b = ae11 · a
e2
2 · · · · · a
et
t (mod n) (for any set of indices
ei ∈ Z). Therefore we can construct a composite n that is pseudoprime with respect
to any list of bases {b1, . . . , bt} (of which any number can be composite) by using the
hybrid method described in Section 3.2.1.4, but with set A in that method being the
complete set of prime factors arising in the bi. Note that in this method, n is of the
form n = p1p2p3 where each pi ≡ 3 (mod 4), so we have n ≡ 3 (mod 4) as needed.
Moreover, because of the form of n, the composites generated in this manner will
also meet the Monier-Rabin bound.
We will give an application of this technique in Section 3.3.3, where we study Mini-
GMP [66] which uses Euler’s polynomial to generate Miller-Rabin bases.
3.2.2 Lucas Pseudoprimes
Like Miller-Rabin pseudoprimes, Lucas pseudoprimes are with respect to some choice
of test parameters. Throughout this work we follow Selfridge’s Method A [15] of
parameter selection, which is summarised as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Selfridge’s Method A [15]). Let D be the first element of the se-





= −1. Then set P = 1 and Q = (1−D)/4.
There are two reasons for studying this particular method for setting parameters.
The first is that it is the parameter choice used when performing the Lucas part of the
Baillie-PSW primality test [134, 15]. The second is that this is the method that both
Java [38] and Crypto++ [40] libraries that we study use in their implementation of
the Lucas test.
The Lucas and strong Lucas-probable prime tests with this parameter choice are
commonly referred to in the literature as Lucas and strong Lucas-Selfridge probable
prime tests. Pseudoprimes for this parameter choice are well-documented. The
OEIS sequence A217120 [13] presents a small list of them, referring to a table of
all Lucas pseudoprimes below 1014 ≈ 247 compiled by Jacobsen [76]. There is an
equivalent sequence A217255 [14] for strong Lucas pseudoprimes. Any pseudoprime
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for the strong Lucas probable prime test with respect to some parameter set (P,Q),
is also a pseudoprime for the Lucas probable prime test.
Arnault [8] also presented a scalable method that takes as input a set of parameter
choices {(P1, Q1, D1), (P2, Q2, D2), . . . , (Pt, Qt, Dt)} and returns a composite n of
the form n = p1p2 · · · ph that is a strong Lucas pseudoprime to the parameters
(Pi, Qi, Di) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. The method is similar to that for constructing Miller-
Rabin pseudoprimes for fixed bases, but differs in its details. In particular, the two
construction methods are sufficiently different that it seems hard to derive a single
method producing n that are pseudoprimes for both the Miller-Rabin and Lucas
tests.
3.2.2.1 A Specialisation of Arnault [8] for Selfridge’s Method A





= −1, then a
single test on n with parameter set (P,Q,D) = (1,−1, 5) will be performed. We next
show how to specialise Arnault’s construction [8] so that it will produce composites
n that are guaranteed to be declared prime by a strong Lucas test for this parameter
set.
Following Arnault’s construction, we consider n of the form n = p1p2p3 where pi =
ki(p1 + 1)− 1 for i ∈ {2, 3}, with k2 and k3 odd integers.
We first note that the pi must satisfy certain conditions with respect to Legendre









= −1 for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.















= −1⇔ pi ≡ 3 (mod 4). Since pi = ki(p1 + 1)− 1 for i ∈ {2, 3}, and the
ki are odd, then it is easy to show that if p1 ≡ 3 (mod 4) then it follows that pi ≡ 3





= −1 ⇔ pi ≡ 2 or 3 (mod 5).
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Therefore condition (3.2) is satisfied when p1 ≡ 3 or 7 (mod 20) (by the CRT) and
pi ≡ 2 or 3 (mod 5) for i ≥ 2.
At this point we must choose k2, k3 and add conditions that ensure the coefficients
in [8, Lemma 6.1] are indeed integers. These conditions are simple:
p1 ≡ k−13 (mod k2) and p1 ≡ k
−1
2 (mod k3).
We choose to fix p1 ≡ 7 (mod 20) and select (k2, k3) = (31, 43).
This produces our final congruence that prime p1 must satisfy: p1 ≡ 6647 (mod 26660).
We now search for a prime p1 that satisfies this congruence, and such that p2 and
p3 satisfying pi = ki(p1 + 1) − 1 for i = 2, 3 are also primes with p2 ≡ p3 ≡ 2 or 3
(mod 5).
The smallest solution is the following:
p1 = 486527, p2 = 15082367, p3 = 20920703
This yields a 68-bit n = 153515674455111174527 which indeed does pass the strong
Lucas test using Selfridge’s Method A for parameter selection. Of course, we can
take any (p1, p2, p3) satisfying the above conditions (which are not too onerous to
satisfy), and in this sense the method scales well to numbers n of cryptographically
interesting size.
This generation technique is also versatile, as we can simply include additional pa-
rameters in our set dependent on which parameter selection methods a particular
test uses. This allows us to generate composites that are declared prime by a va-
riety of strong Lucas tests, at the small cost of solving a few more simultaneous
congruences with the CRT.
A Large Strong Lucas Pseudoprime. To show just how well this method scales
to produce numbers of a cryptographically interesting size, we use our SAGE imple-
mentation of the method as described above to construct an n of the form n = p1p2p3,
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where pi = ki(p1 + 1)− 1 with (k2, k3) = (31, 43) and
p1 = 2
576 · 0x0000000000000000000000822d0000000000000000000000
+ 2384 · 0x000000001a09000000000000000000000000000000000000
+ 20 · 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000007254e7cb.
Then n = p1p2p3 is a 2048-bit strong Lucas pseudoprime for Selfridge’s Method A
of parameter selection.
3.3 Cryptographic Libraries
Many cryptographic libraries offering implementations of common cryptographic
protocols also provide a toolkit for handling arbitrary-precision integer arithmetic,
including primality testing. These functions would be used, for example, for testing
the primality of Diffie-Hellman parameters.
This section provides a survey of primality testing in a broad and representative
range of cryptographic libraries (OpenSSL, GNU GMP and Mini-GMP, NSS, Apple
corecrypto and CommonCrypto, Cryptlib, JavaScript Big Number (JSBN), LibTom-
Math, LibTomCrypt, WolfSSL, Libgcrypt, Java, Bouncy Castle, Botan, Crypto++
and Golang). For each library, we first describe how it implements primality testing.
We then tailor a composite likely to be declared prime by each particular library, and
quantify the probability that our composite passes the library’s primality test (so
that the primality test fails). Our findings are summarised in Table 3.3. Throughout
this chapter, we will refer to the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin testing as t.
3.3.1 OpenSSL
OpenSSL is the most widely used open source cryptographic library and TLS imple-
mentation. Throughout, we consider OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre6 [122] (May 2018) as this is
the most current pre-release of the next long term support (LTS) version OpenSSL
1.1.1. We note that the components studied are largely stable to other LTS releases
such as 1.1.0h [120] and 1.0.2o [118] (to the extent in which the analysis performed
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Table 3.3: Results of our analysis of cryptographic libraries. This shows how
the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin used is determined, whether a Baillie-
PSW test is implemented, the documented failure rate of the primality test
(that is, the probability that it wrongly declares a composite to be prime),
and our highest achieved failure rate for composite input.
Library Rounds of MR BPSW? Documented Our Highest
Failure Rate Failure Rate
Apple CommonCrypto 16 No < 2−32 100%
Apple corecrypto User-defined t ≤ 256 No (1/4)t 100%
Botan 2.6.0 User-defined t No ≤ (1/2)t (1/4)t
Bouncy Castle C# 1.8.2 User-defined t No (1/4)t (1/4)t
Cryptlib 3.4.4 User-defined t ≤ 100 No Not given 100%
Crypto++ 7.0 2 or 12 Yes Not given 0%
GNU GMP 6.1.2 User-defined t No (1/4)
t
100% for t ≤ 15
GNU Mini-GMP 6.1.2 User-defined t No (1/4)
t
100% for t ≤ 101
Golang 1.10.3 User-defined t Yes < (1/4)
t
0%
Golang pre-1.8 User-defined t No < (1/4)
t
100% for t ≤ 13
Java 10 User-defined t Yes‡ < (1/2)t 0% for ≥ 100 bits
JSBN 1.4 User-defined t No < (1/2)t 100%
Libgcrypt 1.8.2 User-defined t No Not given 1/1024†
LibTomCrypt 1.18.1 User-defined t ≤ 256 No (1/4)t 100%
LibTomMath 1.0.1 User-defined t ≤ 256 No (1/4)t 100%
NSS 3.50 User-defined t No Not given 100% for t ≤ 10††
OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre6 Default bit-size based No < 2−80 1/16
WolfSSL 3.13.0 User-defined t ≤ 256 No (1/4)t 100%
† When calling the check prime function as opposed to gcry prime check (or calling gcry prime check
in versions prior to 1.3.0).
‡ When testing input of size at least 100 bits.
†† Results of testing do not appear to be consistent across different machines.
still applies to the primality tests in these other versions), and remain similar to
that of the early releases (version 0.9.5 of February 2000).
Analysis. The primality tests in OpenSSL reside in the crypto library, which also
houses a wide range of implementations of cryptographic algorithms. The services
provided by the crypto library are used by the OpenSSL implementations of SSL,
TLS and S/MIME, and have also been used to implement SSH, OpenPGP, and
other cryptographic standards.
The functions called upon to perform primality testing in the OpenSSL BIGNUM li-
brary are BN is prime ex and BN is prime fasttest ex found in bn prime.c. The
bulk of the primality testing algorithm is done in BN is prime fasttest ex where
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Table 3.4: The rounds t of Miller-Rabin performed chosen by OpenSSL
when testing b-bit integers with checks = BN prime checks.
b t b t
b ≥ 1300 2 400 > b ≥ 350 8
1300 > b ≥ 850 3 350 > b ≥ 300 9
850 > b ≥ 650 4 300 > b ≥ 250 12
650 > b ≥ 550 5 250 > b ≥ 200 15
550 > b ≥ 450 6 200 > b ≥ 150 18
450 > b ≥ 400 7 150 > b 27
t =checks rounds of Miller-Rabin are performed, each with a randomly chosen base.
The checks variable is provided as a parameter to the primality verification func-
tion. The function BN is prime ex simply calls BN is prime fasttest ex without
doing any trial divisions. The composites n that we produce have factors much
larger than those in the trial divisions that OpenSSL performs. This means that,
for our purposes, the result of calling either function is equivalent. Therefore we will
focus only on BN is prime fasttest ex.
Number of Miller-Rabin rounds. Both primality testing functions allow the
user to determine the rounds of Miller-Rabin performed. The documentation in-
dicates that if the user sets the value of checks to the variable BN prime checks,
then the number of Miller-Rabin iterations t is chosen such that the probability of
a Miller-Rabin test declaring a random composite number n as prime is less than
2−80. The number of rounds performed is then based on the bit-size b of the number
n being tested. The relationship between these two values is shown in Table 3.4.
The entries here are based on average case error estimates taken from the Handbook
of Applied Cryptography [105], which in turn references [41].
Base Selection. OpenSSL chooses the Miller-Rabin bases it uses in a pseudoran-
dom manner, by using OpenSSL’s function BN rand range() with an optional flag
set to PRIVATE. This then calls bnrand to generate a pseudorandom base a in the
range 1 ≤ a < n using a cryptographically strong pseudorandom number genera-
tor with entropy inputs gathered from the operating system, cf. [149] for details on
OpenSSL’s random number generation.
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Pseudoprimes. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the average case estimates from [41]
are designed only to be used on testing numbers during prime generation. Indeed,
OpenSSL correctly applies primality testing as outlined above in this situation.
However, we found nothing in the documentation to warn about the adversarial
setting. Instead it appears to be left up to the user to decide how many rounds of
testing are needed, and if they set checks = BN prime checks then Table 3.4 would
dictate how many rounds are applied.
In this setting, we are able to undermine OpenSSL’s guarantees by producing com-
posite numbers using the methods described in Section 3.2.1.1. That is, we can easily
construct numbers of the form n = (2x+ 1)(4x+ 1) with x odd and 2x+ 1, 4x+ 1
prime, and be sure that n will pass random-base Miller-Rabin tests with probability
roughly 1/4 per test. For example, for n having b = 2048 bits, OpenSSL will apply
t = 2 tests, and we have a 1/16 chance of our composite n deceiving OpenSSL.
An Example Pseudoprime for OpenSSL.
Let
x = 2960 · 0x0000000000000000000000000000000058971a1a5c1b26e7
+ 2768 · 0x26a401f6937c462b9c3460e0000000000000000000000000
+ 2192 · 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000058971a
+ 20 · 0x1a5c1c624a1531999dbd1b6f5bbcb1942e8c4f8138f86231.
Then n = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) produces a 2048-bit composite number that is declared
prime by OpenSSL’s BN is prime fasttest ex with checks = BN prime checks
with probability 1/16.
3.3.2 GNU GMP
The GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library [66], GNU GMP or simply GMP, is
a popular open source arbitrary precision integer library that is widely deployed in




Analysis. GMP provides its own datatype to handle big integers known as mpz t.
GMP’s primality test is implemented in mpz probab prime p(mpz t n, int reps).
On input n, this function performs some trial divisions, then a fixed-base Fermat
test with base 210 = 2 · 3 · 5 · 7, and finally t = reps rounds of Miller-Rabin; the
latter is implemented in function mpz millerrabin. The value of reps is selected
by the caller. The documentation gives assurance that a composite number will be
identified as being prime with a probability of less than (1/4)reps and states that
“reasonable values of reps are between 15 and 50”.
Base Selection. GMP uses a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) to choose
the base used for each Miller-Rabin test. The PRNG’s state is initialised in the
function mpz millerrabin by calling gmp randinit default(rstate), which uses
the Mersenne Twister algorithm. This initial seed state is then used as a source of
randomness in mpz urandomm(a, rstate, n) to generate a uniform random integer
base a between 2 and n− 2 inclusive.
While GMP offers to seed PRNGs and to explicitly pass the state to functions
requiring access to pseudorandom numbers, this option is not available for primality
testing, i.e. each call to mpz millerrabin will work with an identical PRNG state.
Thus, since the initial seed state is constant, the resulting sequence of a values
chosen by mpz urandomm for a fixed n is also constant. Note, though, that different
a may be chosen for different n, since the bases a are sampled uniformly in a range
depending on n. This, in effect, means that the bases chosen when testing n are
defined as a function of n. Therefore the result of mpz probab prime p(mpz t n,
int reps) for fixed values of n and t is deterministic.3
Pseudoprimes. For integers n, t, let (a1, a2, . . . , at) denote the deterministic list
of bases used by GMP, where t = reps. By setting n = (2x+ 1)(4x+ 1) with x odd
and 2x+ 1, 4x+ 1 both prime, we will obtain a number for which random base MR
tests will pass with probability roughly 1/4. Since (a1, a2, . . . , at) is pseudorandom,
we may expect that an n constructed in this way would pass the MR tests in GMP
with probability (1/4)t. Thus, for example, for the minimum recommended value of
3We note that the same sequence of ai may still be produced even for different n when n is
only slightly smaller than a power of two. This is due to the application of rejection sampling by
comparison with n to sample in a range up to n.
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t = 15, it might be feasible to construct a suitable n which would always be declared
prime by just trying sufficiently many random values of x.
However, recall that we need 2x + 1 and 4x + 1 to be simultaneously prime, and
we must also pass the base 210 Fermat test. This makes the cost of constructing
n prohibitively high with this direct approach, since the probability that random
x will give prime pairs (2x + 1, 4x + 1) is approximately (2/ lnx)2, and the special
form of n means that a Fermat test will pass with probability roughly 1/2, while
passing t rounds of MR testing will happen with probability only (1/4)t. Putting
this together, each x would pass with probability about 1/22t−1(lnx)2; for a 99%
chance of success in finding a good x with lnx = s, we would need about 5 · 22t−1s2
trials, each trial involving at least a primality test on 2x+ 1. For a 1024-bit n and
t = 15 trials (the minimum recommended by GMP), roughly 247 trials would be
needed, each involving at least a 512-bit primality test.
Instead, and partly inspired by the ROCA attack [114] and the form of the primes
exploited there [81, 80], we consider x of the special form x = kM + 189 where M
is a product of the first ` primes in the set P = {2, 3, . . . , 373} and k is a randomly
chosen integer of a size to make n = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) have the desired target size
(say, 1024 bits). Here ` is a parameter to be chosen later. The selection of x of this
form ensures that 2x + 1 = 2kM + 379 and 4x + 1 = 4kM + 757 are not divisible
by the first ` primes in P, boosting the chances that 2x + 1 and 4x + 1 are both
prime (the form of x essentially ensures that 2x + 1, 4x + 1 pass trial divisions for
the first ` primes in P; here we rely on the fact that 379 and 757 are both prime and
larger than 373). The offset of 189 is specially chosen so that the Fermat test on n
to base 210 will always pass for n of the chosen form. This follows from a bespoke
mathematical analysis that we now discuss, before giving an example pseudoprime
for GMP.
Constructing GMP Pseudoprimes. Recall that we work with candidates x of
the form x = kM + 189, and then consider n = (2x+ 1)(4x+ 1); we select x so that
2x+ 1 and 4x+ 1 are both prime, and we select M as a product of the first ` primes
from the set P = {2, 3, . . . , 373}. We justify this construction here.
62
3.3 Cryptographic Libraries
First, note that 2x + 1 = 2kM + 379 while 4x + 1 = 4kM + 757, where both 379
and 757 are prime. Considering 2x + 1 modulo each of the ` prime factors p in
M , we see that 2x + 1 = 379 mod p 6= 0 mod p because p < 379; similarly, we
obtain 4x + 1 = 757 mod p 6= 0 mod p. Hence no such p divides either 2x + 1 or
4x + 1, so these numbers are not divisible by any of the primes in the product
M (i.e. the first ` primes). For this reason, with random choices of k and with
x = kM + 189, it follows that 2x + 1 and 4x + 1 are more likely to be prime
than they would be for random choices of x. An analysis of the effect involves an
application of the inclusion-exclusion principle to determine how many numbers are
“sieved out” by the process. We omit the full analysis here, but note that, for
numbers of cryptographically interesting size and with ` = 69 that we use in the
construction of our 1024-bit example for n, the effect is to increase the probability
of primality for each number from 2/ lnx to roughly 10/ lnx. Since we have two
numbers 2x + 1, 4x + 1 whose primality behaves largely independently over the
choice of x, this yields a 25-fold improvement in the performance of our approach
over the direct approach of trying random x values. This speed up is discussed more
extensively in Section 4.3.4 of Chapter 4 and can be calculated from Equation 4.4.
Next, we consider the Fermat test on n with base a = 210, assuming the factors
2x + 1 and 4x + 1 are prime. This test computes the value of an−1 mod n and
compares it to 1. Now n − 1 = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) = 8x2 + 6x = 2x(4x + 3), so we
obtain:
an−1 = (a4x+3)2x = 1 mod 2x+ 1
and
an−1 = a8x
2+6x = (a2x+1)4x · a2x = 1 · a2x = a2x mod 4x+ 1.
Here, we have made repeated use of Fermat’s Little Theorem (which states that
ap−1 = 1 mod p for prime p and a 6= 0 mod p).
It follows that an−1 = 1 mod n if and only if a is a quadratic residue modulo 4x+ 1.
Hence n passes a Fermat test to base a for roughly half of the possible bases a (since
roughly half of the values a mod n are quadratic residues mod4x+ 1).





















Since M is even, we can write 4x+1 = 8k(M/2)+757 = 5 mod 8, hence ( 24x+1) = −1.
Also ( 34x+1) = (
4kM+757
3 ) = (
757
3 ) = (
1
3) = 1, where we use Gauss’s Law of Quadratic
Reciprocity and 3|M . Similarly, we obtain ( 54x+1) = −1 and (
7
4x+1) = 1. Combining




= (−1) · 1 · (−1) · 1 = 1.
We conclude that the Fermat test for n of the given form with base a = 210 always
passes.
A Pseudoprime for GMP. Our code for constructing x (and n) of this special
form first picks a target bit-size for n, then selects ` as large as possible so that
there are enough choices for k for there to be sufficiently many candidates that one
suitable x will result. For each resulting x, our code tests 2x+ 1 and then 4x+ 1 for
primality, and (if these tests pass) applies the GMP primality test for the desired
number of t rounds of MR testing.
For n of 1024 bits, we set ` = 69, taking M as the product of the primes up to 349,
and leaving a 51-bit value for k. The choice of M increases the probability that both
of 2x+ 1 and 4x+ 1 are prime by a factor of roughly 25, and the form of x ensures
that the Fermat test always passes, giving another factor of 2 improvement. Using
a total of 33,885 core-hours (3.87 core-years) of computation in parallel on 872 cores
running at 2.4GHz (kindly donated by CloudFlare), we found the following 1024-bit
example passing GMP’s primality test with t = 15 rounds of MR testing:
n = 2960 · 0x0000000000000000000000000000000081d564fbdd20b406
+ 2768 · 0x750af7bd334dcf547b131a1d8f8235fd603dba44e22e0775
+ 2576 · 0x0ecf755051d33cb8895413f5d69f5a3df701889e3a69f92e
+ 2384 · 0xdd3f5f36662521877231ba4753a3e7185a89ddb0b2d73a35
+ 2192 · 0x9e976a9bcfeae1a7c026d74bc7515a5010f3cd62c69fa9ad
+ 20 · 0x7b699f40e7a85192e1a4aa95537363fcb93d789aee32bbbf.
We recall that this n will always pass GMP’s primality testing for 15 MR rounds




Mini-GMP is a small implementation of a subset of GMP’s mpn and mpz interfaces
included within GMP 6.1.2 [66]. This library includes its own miniature implemen-
tation of mpz probab prime p(n, reps). The most significant change compared
to GMP is that Miller-Rabin testing is performed explicitly with a deterministic
sequence of t bases obtained by evaluating Euler’s polynomial a(x) = x2 +x+ 41 at
x = 0, 1, 2, . . . , t− 1. It also omits GMP’s Fermat test.
Pseudoprimes. The use of a sequence of deterministic bases in Mini-GMP enables
us to predict the bases that will be chosen for any particular value t of reps. The
bases are not all prime (though Euler’s polynomial famously does produce many
primes), so we cannot directly use Arnault’s method from Section 3.2.1.2. Instead,
we use our extension for composite, fixed bases method in Section 3.2.1.5.
Using this approach, we constructed a 2960-bit composite n = p1p2p3 that passes up
to t = 101 rounds of Mini-GMP’s Miller-Rabin testing. Of the 101 bases produced by
Euler’s polynomial, 86 were already primes and the remaining 15 bases all factorised
into various combinations of the four primes 163, 167, 179 and 199. The combined
list of 90 unique primes was then used with the method described in Section 3.2.1.5
to produce n. This n is given in the example below.
We note that the documentation for Mini-GMP is shared with the main GMP library,
implying to a user that 15 to 50 rounds of MR testing would be reasonable.
A Pseudoprime for Mini-GMP. Using our SAGE implementation of the com-
posite fixed base technique as described in Section 3.2.1.5, we construct an n of the
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form n = p1p2p3, where pi = ki(p1 − 1) + 1 with (k2, k3) = (10937, 11257) and
p1 = 2
960 · 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000002e394
+ 2768 · 0x1a2fe4aa9e66358347f63732494d08635ccc9ae0a3c17764
+ 2576 · 0xa8e266f4d26758ab804a702c235f63b1e109a81fc007f94b
+ 2384 · 0xec5158f231a30b1cbf96a7fc444c09be62f5a809f049cc5d
+ 2192 · 0xe94b84275c38885c9b61a6bdc44111501527722a8ac87ea2
+ 20 · 0xa5d4498caa2d9d07b34001a508fa53063991206268c547d7.
This yields a 2960-bit composite n that is guaranteed to pass any number up to and
including t = 101 rounds of Mini-GMP’s primality test. This large example was
created to emphasise how the recommended number of rounds of MR to perform by
GMP’s documentation can be vastly surpassed.
However, we are also able to generate numbers of a more suitable bit-size for cryp-
tographic use. Using the same SAGE implementation we construct an n of the form
n = p1p2p3, where pi = ki(p1 − 1) + 1 with (k2, k3) = (10709, 10781) and
p1 = 2
576 · 0x0000000000000000000000031f56286a48b9e806b0a4dc84
+ 2384 · 0xbbf808788471fb4b91c291e92f25617f832581dd28b88325
+ 2192 · 0xd8d391bc68e6b720ef5a6f6701d8845658af13436b63217f
+ 20 · 0x71d60fade1aaea8eaf28b3c2ac81b9233d18fc962a7761b3.
This produces the following 2048-bit composite n that is guaranteed to pass any
number up to and including t = 70 rounds of Mini-GMP’s primality test. This is
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still well above the advised 15-50 rounds.
n = 21920 · 0x0000000000000000d17cafbd9fb7f539a99b9f970e13e0e8
+ 21728 · 0xac245b6a8937b4047d70858d6aea422f2d00f84a52906bb6
+ 21536 · 0xf39431237ae9f21a341337d37cf88b8668a91313c3bbb5e1
+ 21344 · 0xe3243ba1d22a22b81b497befd0dbb83bfe88e269438ceb8c
+ 21152 · 0x22fe8211696dae60f6770064904c5675accd31933f686727
+ 2960 · 0xe325348a2d42394d50708924257b2a38141e035333ae12ab
+ 2768 · 0xe9161b0757c5fec92dab42c507126d0ed02cab6cd69879c6
+ 2576 · 0x5cd68172318fe5a28805a24a3a71a7135b9582cafd5ea8e1
+ 2384 · 0x6a733b98bf41d770b80fc5067d80c44b86b73707764f176b
+ 2192 · 0xab00cb70531918ca06fe9c8096dd98db1bace156d0222e1a
+ 20 · 0x28217bf86d18a4c08c28f579c566d2adbe1bf5721d2334cb.
3.3.4 NSS
Mozilla’s Network Security Services (NSS) [109] is a set of libraries designed to sup-
port cross-platform development of security-enabled client and server applications.
NSS is the TLS library used by Mozilla’s Firefox browser. Applications built with
NSS can also support SSL v3, various PKCS, X.509 v3 certificates and many other
security standards. We consider NSS 3.50 (Feb. 2020) throughout.
Analysis. NSS provides the primality test mpp pprime found in mpprime.c. This
function takes as input a number n to be tested and the number of rounds of testing
chosen by the user, t. Each round of testing is composed of a Miller-Rabin test
performed on a base a, where a is chosen by the function mpp random. The function
mpp random uses the C library’s rand() function to generate random values. In the
corresponding documentation for mpp random, it is noted that “[i]t is up to the caller
to seed this generator before it is called.”, yet there is no seeding of this generator
before its use in mpprime.c. Therefore, this pseudorandom number generator will
output a deterministic sequence of numbers, and thus the Miller-Rabin test will be
performed on the same bases each time mpp pprime is invoked (in a manner similar
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to that found in GMP above).
Pseudoprimes. As was the case with GMP: if a composite number n is found such
that the first x bases produced by the function mpp random when testing n are non-
witnesses, then n will be declared prime for t ≤ x. Due to the similarities in the GMP
method of base selection, we are able to construct pseudoprimes for mpp pprime by
modifying the code used for the generation of the examples in Section 3.3.2. To do
this, we simply change the call to the primality test in GMP with mpp pprime.
However, unlike deterministic sequence of bases seen in GMP, the return values of
rand() do not appear to be consistent across different machines. This reduces the
portability of pseudoprimes to mpp pprime, as the result of performing the test may
be specific to just one machine. Furthermore, depending on the platform and con-
figuration, the underlying arbitrary precision integer arithmetic library used by NSS
(known as mpi) uses different limbs [110], which may change the number of rand()
calls (and thus its output). While this may affect the usability of these pseudo-
primes, it is still conceivable that a particular pseudoprime could be constructed
with the sole purpose of being accepted by just one machine, that could for example
be a particularly desirable host.
An Example Pseudoprime for NSS. By modifying the C implementation de-
scribed to efficiently generate pseudoprimes to GMP (described in Section 3.3.2) to
instead make calls to mpp pprime in NSS, we were able to produce an example pseu-
doprime for NSS. Using approximately 60 core-hours on 3.2GHz CPUs we produced
a 1024-bit composite number n of the form n = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) that passed the
primality test provided by NSS with t = 10 round of MR testing, with
x = 2384 · 0x00000000000000004071079147a638c3701eed9a97d0267e
+ 2192 · 0x6a7a7744256f79b5fb0f420fb2623219a17775639f052cdf
+ 20 · 0xff70763848269b02017b92484b65779743b2f6bcbfcaed3d.
However, due to the inconsistency of results across machines, this was declared prime
by NSS with t = 10 rounds of MR testing only on the single machine with which it
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was produced (our particular target machine). No further attempts were made to
produce an example that was declared prime across multiple machines.
3.3.5 Apple corecrypto and CommonCrypto
Apple’s CommonCrypto [6] library provides iOS and OS X cryptographic services.
CommonCrypto relies upon Apple’s corecrypto library [7] to provide implementa-
tions of low-level cryptographic primitives. The Apple corecrypto does not have
explicit version numbers, but we are able to give the various versions of Apple’s
operating systems which were using the corecrypto library analysed here in August
2018. Therefore, the results here affect versions prior to iOS 12.1, macOS Mojave
10.14.1, tvOS 12.1, watchOS 5.1, iTunes 12.9.1, and iCloud for Windows 7.8.
Analysis. Apple’s primality test can be found in corecrypto file ccz is prime.c,
which contains the function ccz is prime. This function takes as input a number n
to be tested and the number of rounds of testing chosen by the user, t. This function
then calls the function ccprime rabin miller found in ccprime rabin miller.c.
This in turn optionally checks that the number being tested is odd, is not one
of the first 256 primes, and not divisible by one of the first 119 primes (via a gcd
computation). It then performs min{t, 256} rounds of Miller-Rabin testing, selecting
the bases incrementally from a hard-coded list of the first 256 primes. The code
documentation states that when performing t = 32 rounds of testing, the probability
of a false prime classification is estimated as 2−64.
CommonCrypto provides the primailty test CCBigNumIsPrime which calls ccz is-
prime provided by corecrypto. However, the user has no choice over the number of
rounds of testing t in this case, as it is hard-coded to 16.
Pseudoprimes. Since the bases are chosen deterministically based on the value
of t, we can achieve a failure rate of 100% with respect to that value t, simply by
using the method of Section 3.2.1.2 to produce a composite n that has the first t
primes as non-witnesses. Such an n is in fact guaranteed to be declared prime by
ccz is prime, for any user input ≤ t. We give examples of composites n that will
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be declared prime by corecrypto for t ≤ 256 and t ≤ 40 in Section 3.3.17. (These
examples are shared between a few different libraries, so are placed in a separate
section for clarity.)
Since CommonCrypto forces ccz is prime to perform 16 rounds of testing, we can
achieve a 100% success rate even more easily in this case. Indeed, both examples in
Section 3.3.17 are guaranteed to be declared prime in this case, as are the supple-
mentary examples for a variety of bit-sizes provided below.
Example Pseudoprimes for Apple CommonCrypto. Using our SAGE im-
plementation of the method as described in Section 3.2.1.2 with A containing the
first 16 primes, we construct three compsites n of the form n = p1p2p3, where
pi = ki(p1 − 1) + 1 with (k2, k3) = (113, 173) where:
p1 = 0x32972d4e607a45f57d7144df60a7abf8b473a1680b
produces a 512-bit n,
p1 = 2
192 · 0x00000000000151452e0a832f27b9eead0000000000000000
+ 20 · 0x000000000000000000000000aff3796792e7ceb8d55206a3
produces a 1024-bit n, and
p1 = 2
576 · 0x000000000000000000000032972d4e607a45f57d66c00000
+ 20 · 0x000000000000000000000001f2a7b5c6a50fc1e38aae911b
produces a 2048-bit n.
These composites are always declared prime by CommonCrypto.
3.3.6 Cryptlib
Cryptlib 3.4.3 [71] is an open source security toolkit library developed by Peter
Gutmann. It provides a variety of services including: public-key algorithms, various
cryptographic functions and primality testing.
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Analysis. The primality test in Cryptlib is the function primeProbable found in
kg prime.c and is composed of t rounds of Miller-Rabin, where the value of tmust be
between 1 and 100 (inclusive) and is chosen by the user upon calling. The function
then chooses the base for each test incrementally from the start of a fixed list of
primes. This is either a list of the first 54 primes (2 to 251) or the first 2048 primes
(2 to 17863), depending on the preprocessor directive CONFIG CONSERVE MEMORY.
Pseudoprimes. Since t ≤ 100, we will at most only ever test using the primes
between 2 and 541 (the hundredth prime) as bases. We can therefore generate
numbers that are guaranteed to be declared prime by this test for any valid input t,
simply by using Arnault’s method to generate a composite n that has the first 100
primes as non-witnesses. Indeed, using the method described in Section 3.2.1.2 we
can produce a 2315-bit composite that is pseudoprime to all prime bases up to and
including 541.
An Example Pseudoprime for Cryptlib. Using our SAGE implementation of
the method as described in Section 3.2.1.2 with A containing the first 100 primes,
we construct a 2315-bit n of the form n = p1p2p3, where pi = ki(p1 − 1) + 1 with
(k2, k3) = (641, 677) and
p1 = 2
576 · 0x24a027808260908b96d740bef8355ded63f6edb7f70de9a9
+ 2384 · 0xb99c408f131cef3855b4b0aea6b17a4469ed5a7ec8b2be62
+ 2192 · 0x66c3a9eae83a6769e175cb2598256da977b9e191b9b847a7
+ 20 · 0xe2cf4750d9bc2d64ccd3406f5db662c22c3fc65e3c56eff3.
This n is declared prime for any valid number of rounds t of testing performed by
Cryptlib’s primality test.
3.3.7 JavaScript Big Number (JSBN)
The Java Script Big Number (JSBN) library written by Tom Wu [163] provides a
small cryptographic toolkit for Java Script applications. Here we study the most
recent release JSBN 1.4 from 2013. According to its homepage the library has been
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used in a variety of applications, including: Forge (a pure JavaScript implementation
of SSL/TLS), Google’s V8 benchmark suite version 6, the JavaScript Cryptography
Toolkit, and the RSA-Sign JavaScript library.
Analysis. The library offers the primality test bnIsProbablePrime(t) where the
parameter t defines the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin the user wishes to perform.
The code documentation states that this function will “test primality with certainty
≥ 1− .5t”. The function pseudorandomly chooses a base a for each round of Miller-
Rabin from a hard-coded list of all primes below 1000 called lowprimes.
Pseudoprimes. We can consider this implementation as performing tests with
fixed bases, where the bases chosen are all primes between 2 and 1000. We can then
use Arnault’s method (Section 3.2.1.2) to construct composite numbers n that pass
JSBN’s primality test no matter how many rounds of testing t the user wishes to
perform.
An Example Pseudoprime for JSBN. Using our SAGE implementation of the
method as described in Section 3.2.1.2 with A containing the first 1000 primes, we
construct a 4279-bit n of the form n = p1p2p3, where pi = ki(p1 − 1) + 1 with
(k2, k3) = (1013, 2053) and
p1 = 2
1344 · 0x0000000000000000000000000000083dda18eb04a7597ca3
+ 21152 · 0xc6bc877df8a08eec6725fa0832cba270c42adc358bc0cf50
+ 2960 · 0xc82cb10f2733c3fb8875231fc1498a7b14cb675fac1bf3c5
+ 2768 · 0x127a76fc11e5d20e27940c95ceba671fe1c4232250b74cbd
+ 2576 · 0xf8448c90321513324c0681afb4ba003353b1afb0f1e8b91c
+ 2384 · 0x60af672a5a6f4d06dd0070a4bc74e425f3eae90379e57754
+ 2192 · 0x82d26e80e247464a4bb817dfcf7572f89f8b9cacd059b584
+ 20 · 0x0e4389c8af84f6a6ea15a3ea5d62cb994b082731ba4cde73.
This produces an n that is guaranteed to be declared prime by JSBN’s primality




LibTomMath v1.0.1 [45] is an open source multiple-precision integer library with a
number theoretic toolkit.
Analysis. LibTomMath includes several methods for primality testing in the form
of trial division, Fermat tests, and Miller-Rabin tests. The latter two take a single
base a and a number n to test as arguments and return whether a is a witness or
non-witness. The main primality test is defined by the function mp prime is prime,
which takes arguments n (the number to be tested), and integer t with 1 ≤ t ≤ 256.
It then performs some trial divisions (on a default of the first 256 primes) and then
t rounds of Miller-Rabin. The selection of bases to be used is made similarly as in
Cryptlib: it simply picks incrementally from a list of hard-coded primes (but this
time a list of 256 primes up to 1619 are used).
The documentation of LibTomMath (bn.pdf) discusses the number of rounds of
Miller-Rabin required with the statement: “Generally to ensure a number is very
likely to be prime you have to perform the Miller-Rabin with at least a half-dozen or
so unique bases.” This is complemented with a function mp prime rabin miller-
trials that gives the number of rounds needed to achieve an error rate less than
2−96 based on the bit-size of the number tested (similar to that in OpenSSL and [41])
and a comment in the header file tommath.h above mp prime rabin miller trials
that states the probability of a false classification is no more than (1/4)t.
Pseudoprimes. Since the bases are chosen deterministically based on the value
of t, we can achieve a failure rate of 100% simply by using the method of Section
3.2.1.2 to produce a composite n that has the first 256 primes as non-witnesses;
such an n is guaranteed to be declared prime by mp prime is prime, for any value
of t (including the t chosen by mp prime rabin miller trials that describes an
error rate less than 2−96). Section 3.3.17 provides a 7023-bit example of such an
n. Much smaller examples can be obtained if smaller values of t are guaranteed to





LibTomCrypt v1.18.1 [44] is an additional cryptographic toolkit that shares many
resources with LibTomMath.
Analysis. The primality test in LibTomCrypt is called as isprime(n,t,result).
It takes as arguments an n to test and carries out t rounds of Miller-Rabin. The
documentation of LibTomCrypt advises that each round of Miller-Rabin reduces the
probability of n being a pseudoprime by a factor of 4, and therefore deduces that the
overall error is at most (1/4)t. LibTomCrypt supports selection from three different
big integer libraries at runtime.
If LibTomMath is chosen then isprime will call mp prime is prime as described
in Section 3.3.8, passing on parameters n and t. If TomsFastMath [46] is chosen
then isprime will call fp isprime ex, a function defined in the math library Toms-
FastMath that performs equivalent testing as LibTomMath’s mp prime is prime.
If GMP is selected then isprime will call mpz probab prime p as described in Sec-
tion 3.3.2. The value of t used by any of the three choices is inherited from the
original call to isprime, however if t = 0 the value is overwritten to t = 40.
Pseudoprimes. If either LibTomMath or TomsFastMath are selected, the pseu-
doprimes described in Section 3.3.8 will always be declared prime by the primality
test, for an example see Section 3.3.17. If GMP is selected we can apply the analysis
in Section 3.3.2 to generate pseudoprimes.
3.3.10 WolfSSL
WolfSSL 3.13.0 [160] (formerly CyaSSL) is a small SSL/TLS library targeted for
use in embedded systems. WolfSSL provides primality testing tools based on public
domain TomsFastMath 0.10 [46] and LibTomMath 0.38 [45] functions.
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Analysis. The primality test in WolfSSL is the function mp prime is prime which
takes a number n to be tested and the rounds of testing t as parameters. This
function is directly taken from an older version of LibTomMath, namely 0.38 [45].
WolfSSL will use LibTomMath by default, but can optionally be compiled to use
TomsFastMath 0.10 [46] at runtime. The primality test in LibTomMath 0.38 is
unchanged from that analysed in version 1.0.1 in Section 3.3.8. When using Toms-
FastMath, mp prime is prime calls fp isprime which strips the user’s choice of t
and simply calls fp isprime ex with the hard-coded value of t = 8. The function
fp isprime ex then performs trial division (on a default of the first 256 primes) and
then does 8 rounds of Miller-Rabin using the first 8 primes as bases. It thus acts
equivalently to mp prime is prime in LibTomMath, but with t = 8.
Pseudoprimes. Since the testing in WolfSSL is in effect the same as that per-
formed in LibTomMath (but using only 8 rounds of Miller-Rabin when using Toms-
FastMath), the composite examples given in Section 3.3.17 are also declared prime
with 100% success.
3.3.11 Libgcrypt
Libgcrypt [87] is a general purpose cryptographic library originally based on code
from GnuPG. The library provides various cryptographic functions, including public-
key algorithms, large integer functions and primality testing. We analyse version
1.8.2, released in December 2017.
Analysis. The documentation for Libgcrypt states that the function used for
checking the primality of primes is gcry prime check which is found in primegen.c.
This function then calls check prime in which the actual testing performed. This
function check prime performs three testing steps. The first step is trial division
with all primes up to 4999. The second step is a Fermat test with base a = 2. The
last step comprises t rounds of Miller-Rabin where the bases are pseudorandomly
chosen. We note that t is user-defined, but cannot be set to less than 5. The default
for checking the numbers produced in the prime generation algorithm is set to 5,
but when a user calls gcry prime check the choice of t is hard-coded to 64.
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Pseudoprimes. Following Section 3.2.1, beating steps 1 and 2 of the testing per-
formed in check prime is trivial if we choose n as a Carmichael number of the form
n = pqr where p, q, r > 4999. By using the hybrid technique in Section 3.2.1.4, we
can create a Carmichael number that also has the maximum number of randomly
distributed non-witnesses. We then need only to overcome the t Miller-Rabin tests
with pseudorandom bases. This happens with probability (1/4)t. If the user calls
gcry prime check then the probability with which we can fool this test would be
only 2−128. Yet performing 64 rounds of Miller-Rabin is quite time consuming, and
a user may be tempted to bypass gcry prime check and call check prime with
fewer rounds. In this hypothetical situation, or in versions of Libgcrypt prior to
1.3.0 (2007) [86] (where gcry prime check would call t = 5 rounds by default) the
best we could achieve is passing the test with probability 1/1024 (for t = 5).
3.3.12 Java
Java implementations provide their own methods for arbitrary precision arithmetic,
including primality tests, as seen in java.math.BigInteger. We consider Open-
JDK10 [38], although there seems to be no significant changes to this section of the
code in older versions such as JDK8.
Analysis. The primality testing function isProbablePrime is passed a single pa-
rameter certainty. This is a value chosen by the user and is described in the
documentation as: “a measure of the uncertainty that the caller is willing to toler-
ate: if the call returns true the probability that this BigInteger is prime exceeds
(1 − 1/2certainty).” The certainty parameter is then used to determine how
many rounds of testing will be performed. This is done by calling the function
primeToCertainty. We include the source code of the function primeToCertainty
from the class java.math.BigInteger.
This function first sets a variable n as (certainty + 1)/2. This would produce
a non-integer result when certainty is even, yet the result is cast to an integer,
implicitly flooring the result.4
4Because of the role that n plays in determining the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin
to be performed, the result is that there is no difference in testing isProbablePrime(k) and
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Listing 3.1: OpenJDK10 java.math.BigInteger function primeToCertainty
boolean primeToCertainty ( int c e r ta in ty , Random random) {
int rounds = 0 ;
int n = (Math . min ( c e r ta in ty , I n t eg e r .MAXVALUE−1)+1) /2 ;
// The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c e r t a i n t y and the number o f rounds
// we perform i s g iven in the d r a f t standard ANSI X9. 80 , ”PRIME
// NUMBER GENERATION, PRIMALITY TESTING, AND PRIMALITY CERTIFICATES” .
int s i z e I nB i t s = this . b i tLength ( ) ;
i f ( s i z e I nB i t s < 100) {
rounds = 50 ;
rounds = n < rounds ? n : rounds ;
return passe sMi l l e rRab in ( rounds , random) ;
}
i f ( s i z e I nB i t s < 256) {
rounds = 27 ;
} else i f ( s i z e I nB i t s < 512) {
rounds = 15 ;
} else i f ( s i z e I nB i t s < 768) {
rounds = 8 ;
} else i f ( s i z e I nB i t s < 1024) {
rounds = 4 ;
} else {
rounds = 2 ;
}
rounds = n < rounds ? n : rounds ;
return passe sMi l l e rRab in ( rounds , random) && passesLucasLehmer ( ) ;
}
This function also takes into consideration the bit-size of the number being tested;
if it is less than 100, then Miller-Rabin is performed with at most 50 rounds; if it
is greater than 100, then both Miller-Rabin and a Lucas probable prime test with
Selfridge’s parameters are performed, as described in Section 3.2.2. In the latter
case, the maximum number of rounds of Miller-Rabin is determined based on the
bit-size of the tested number, similarly to OpenSSL. In both cases, the user’s choice
of certainty will determine the actual number of rounds of Miller-Rabin performed
only if it is less than the internally-specified number for that bit-size.
Pseudoprimes. For numbers of cryptographically interesting size, Java performs
both Miller-Rabin and Lucas probable prime tests. Using the method outlined in
Section 3.2.2 we could produce composites that are guaranteed to be declared prime
by the Lucas test. However, the resulting forms do not fit into any of the known
isProbablePrime(k+1) when k is odd. This has an effect on the assurance given to the user
— the guarantee of 1− 1/2certainty is no longer accurate for half of the values of certainty.
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families of composites having high numbers of Miller-Rabin non-witnesses. Hence,
we are unable to construct any numbers passing Java’s primality test with high
probability using our current techniques.
3.3.13 Bouncy Castle
Bouncy Castle is a cryptographic library written in Java and C# [116]. The pri-
mality test in Bouncy Castle Java is based on the BigInteger class from JDK as
described in Section 3.3.12. Bouncy Castle C# implements its own primality tests.
We analyse Bouncy Castle C# version 1.8.2.
Analysis. The relevant function responsible for primality tests is located in the
class BigInteger. This class provides method IsProbablePrime which accepts
certainty as a parameter. The method then uses Miller-Rabin tests with t rounds,
where t is computed as t = ((certainty−1)/2)+1. In each round the base is selected
using a secure random number generator (SecureRandom) which is provided by the
Bouncy Castle library.
The certainty parameter must always be provided to invocation of the IsProbable-
Prime method. Therefore, the user’s choice completely determines how many Miller-
Rabin rounds are performed. For example, this method is directly used in the
TlsDHUtilities class, which provides Diffie-Hellman operations for TLS. When val-
idating the incoming DH parameters, the ValidateDHParameters method invokes
isProbablePrime with certainty = 2. This results in only a single Miller-Rabin
test being carried out.
Pseudoprimes. We can produce composites n using any of the methods in Sec-
tion 3.2.1; such n meet the Monier-Rabin bound and so will pass Bouncy Castle’s
primality testing with probability (1/4)t with t as derived from certainty. Al-
though there is no formal documentation, a comment above the primality testing
code indicates that the failure rate of this testing function should be (1/2)certainty,




Botan is a cryptographic library written in C++11 [94]. In addition to the crypto
functionality it offers a TLS client and server implementation. We analyse Botan
2.6.0.
Analysis. The relevant primality test implementation can be found in numthry-
.cpp, which contains function is prime. This function first evaluates whether a
tested number is divisible by small primes up to 65521. It then performs Miller-
Rabin primality tests with randomly chosen bases. The source of randomness and
the number of Miller-Rabin rounds are based on parameters passed to the is prime
function.
The number of rounds is computed based on parameter prob and t is set as (prob+
2)/2. Botan’s documentation is very clear on the distinction between testing num-
bers of random and possibly adversarial origin. To distinguish the source, the func-
tion is prime contains a boolean flag is random. If set, then the code uses [41] to
assign t based on the bit-size of the number being tested, with a target failure rate
less than 2−80.
Pseudoprimes. As with Bouncy Castle, we can produce composite n using any
of the methods in Section 3.2.1; such n meet the Monier-Rabin bound and will pass
Botan’s primality test with the highest probability of (1/4)t where t is from the
user’s choice of prob via t = (prob+2)/2. In this sense, the test’s guarantees match
the user’s expectations.
3.3.15 Crypto++
Crypto++ 7.0 is an open source C++ cryptography library originally written by Wei
Dai [40]. Crypto++ has a variety of primality testing algorithms in nbtheory.cpp.
These consist of trial division, Fermat, Miller-Rabin and both strong and standard
Lucas probable prime tests. Crypto++’s primality testing function isprime per-
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forms both Miller-Rabin and strong Lucas tests. Thus, to fool it, we would need
to find Baillie-PSW pseudoprimes (though the Miller-Rabin test is a random base
test, unlike that performed in Baillie-PSW). We do not currently know any such
pseudoprimes.
3.3.16 Golang
The Go programming language (Golang) 1.10.3 [62] created at Google in 2009 is
an open source project including arbitrary-precision arithmetic and cryptographic
functionality.
Analysis. The relevant primality test implementation can be found in int.go,
which contains function ProbablyPrime(t). The parameter t defines the number
of rounds of Miller-Rabin the user wishes to perform. The function first performs
trial division with a series of small primes, then t rounds of Miller-Rabin (where one
base is forced to be 2 and all other bases are chosen pseudorandomly), and finally a
Lucas probable prime test. Therefore the function is performing a Baillie-PSW test.
Before version 1.8, Go’s ProbablyPrime(t) function applied only the Miller-Rabin
tests. The documentation provided by Golang makes it clear that the probability
of the function declaring a randomly chosen composite input to be prime is at most
(1/4)t. It also states that “ProbablyPrime(t) is not suitable for judging primes
that an adversary may have crafted to fool the test”.
From an attack perspective it is interesting that the pseudorandom number generator
used in this primality test is seeded with the tested number n. Thus, an attacker
can reliably predict the pseudorandomly generated Miller-Rabin bases.
Pseudoprimes. Since a Baillie-PSW test is being performed, we know of no com-
posites that are incorrectly declared prime by Golang. However, for versions prior to
1.8 released in 2017, we are able to exploit the insecure nature of the Miller-Rabin
base selection to produce composite numbers that are guaranteed to be declared
prime with respect to a parameter t. Since this is the same method GNU GMP uses
to choose bases for Miller-Rabin, we can use the method described in Section 3.3.2
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to produce such composites.
We now give an example of a composite n that is always declared prime for t ≤ 13.
An Example Pseudoprime for Golang pre-1.8. Using the method described
in Section 3.3.2, we construct a 1024-bit composite n that is declared prime by
Golang’s primality test in versions prior to 1.8 with 100% success for t ≤ 13. We
take
n = 2960 · 0x00000000000000000000000000000000ff7d428a8a9f9ffc
+ 2768 · 0x2ea178501115ec855f1154c054f5f67e15967a139a92fe15
+ 2576 · 0xddf2c49b044820ea8c58551b74f81b45b116da4e1f11b926
+ 2384 · 0x93e0cdc58006bc2052eb9b2fc32c71dd041d1907225e2814
+ 2192 · 0xebe18736f626fea57c965b67b296a6461455226b39aba263
+ 20 · 0x3faeb483847a715c6a01d8d0e401a4aaf8f3d22121fd142f.
3.3.17 Example Pseudoprimes for Apple corecrypto and CommonCrypto,
LibTomMath, LibTomCrypt and WolfSSL
Using our SAGE implementation of the method as described in Section 3.2.1.2 with
A containing the first 256 primes, we constructed a composite number n that is a
pseudoprime to all bases a ∈ A. While the size of this number n may seem arbitrary,
it was simply the first number constructed that met all requirements. Previous to
this, we are unaware of any pseudoprime constructed by the Arnault method to have
as many as 256 chosen bases in A.
We construct a 7023-bit n of the form n = p1p2p3, where pi = ki(p1 − 1) + 1 with
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(k2, k3) = (2633, 5881) and
p1 = 2
2304 · 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000001e46d6a8
+ 22112 · 0x4d42d684ddb3415e871b661303b1c60f0388dfb9e525f8bc
+ 21920 · 0x51c9de3c9f45627608de2f75dee580d9d4d97cab6fa86dad
+ 21728 · 0x9e6bbfd721f297472480a9bed9508aa884bda9dc56833752
+ 21536 · 0xfac8e89f413a9517d14731277148789987806654a8723593
+ 21344 · 0xa452f960facc9b65f6962cb26131b42650c29c8735083c7e
+ 21152 · 0x6c3a220d77d1cbe7f9628885a7b79465287d4b02ad546007
+ 2960 · 0x1d43306a8813836de5ccd162fbeca4f117552dba01975451
+ 2768 · 0x2f7684e32b0377e76f87b96906f8fa276381db612f76c2c7
+ 2576 · 0xdd97ab4380042c991a4719884377c70065a3614237a41289
+ 2384 · 0x24a1017fbb529443b0ad43c5424753db5b518cee5a1fcd87
+ 2192 · 0xea038ffcad33380db1d89cd4e0b15b480cf0c62e8999924d
+ 20 · 0x0284af806081ea106f35f85a664456166b864650ef034cf3.
This n is declared prime for any valid number of rounds t for the Apple corecrypto
and CommonCrypto, LibTomMath, LibTomCrypt and WolfSSL libraries.
Also using the method as described in Section 3.2.1.2 but now with A containing
the first 40 primes, we can construct a 1024-bit n of the form n = p1p2p3, where
pi = ki(p1 − 1) + 1 with (k2, k3) = (233, 241) and
p1 = 2
192 · 0x000000000000e17516504450e648b6aedb0c0784e17dda33
+ 20 · 0x63e1956a843076a9e5b6d15a819cf0907a96154d47662d0b.
This n is guaranteed to be declared prime by mp prime is prime with t ≤ 40,
and therefore also guaranteed to be declared prime by mp prime is prime as in
LibTomCrypt 1.18.1 and WolfSSL 3.13.0 for the same values of t. The same applies




In this section we conduct an analysis of primality testing found in a selection of
popular mathematical software. We focus mainly on computer algebra systems that
provide number-theoretic tools, as these offer more functionality in primality test-
ing, namely: Magma, Maple, MATLAB, Maxima, SageMath, SymPy and Wolfram
Mathematica. Since this software is usually made to run on less computationally
constrained devices, with a higher focus on mathematical accuracy than efficiency,
we expect the testing here to be more thorough. We include these in our analysis
since they might be relied upon by developers when manually checking values in
standards or code. Some of the libraries use deterministic tests for proving primal-
ity, though most still rely on probabilistic methods when testing candidates larger
than 64 bits in size. Maple, Maxima and SymPy have dependencies on GMP and
therefore inherit the same issues with its primality test as discussed in Section 3.3.2;
however they all also perform Lucas tests in their latest versions, so this “cross con-
tamination” does not result in exploitable weaknesses. Our findings are summarised
in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Results of our analysis of mathematical software. This shows
how the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin used is determined, whether
a Baillie-PSW test is implemented, the documented failure rate of the
primality test (that is, the probability that it wrongly declares a composite
to be prime), and our highest achieved failure rate for composite input.
Software Rounds of Baillie-PSW? Documented Our Highest
MR Failure Rate Failure Rate
Magma V2.23-9† Default 20 No (1/4)t (1/4)t
Maple 2017 5 Yes, on n > 233 Not given 0%
MATLAB R2019b 10 No Not given (1/4)10
Maxima 5.41.0 25 No†† (1/4)25 0%
SageMath 8.2 1 Yes Not given 0%
SymPy 1.0‡ 46 No “small probability” 100%
SymPy 1.1 1 Yes, on n > 264 “small probability” 0%
Wolfram
Mathematica 11.3
2 Yes “correct for n < 1016” 0%
† When testing input of size at least 34 × 1013 or invoking the test with the parameter proof =
False.
†† An additional Lucas test is performed on input of size at least 249.




Magma V2.23-9 [29] is a mathematical software package designed for computations
in algebra, number theory, algebraic geometry and algebraic combinatorics.
Analysis. Magma provides a primality testing function that can either invoke a
primality proving algorithm, or what they call a probable-primality test, depending
on the arguments given when called. The main function call for primality testing is
IsPrime(n: Proof). The more rigorous method of primality proving is based on
an implementation of the ECPP (Elliptic Curve Primality Proving) method [10]. It
is used by default, unless the number tested is greater than 34×1013 or the parameter
Proof is set to False. In this case, the probable-primality test IsProbablePrime is
instead called. By default, this consists of 20 rounds of Miller-Rabin with random
bases. By setting the optional parameter Bases to some value B, the number of
bases used is B instead of 20.
Pseudoprimes. The pseudoprimes generated in Section 3.2 attempt only to over-
come probabilistic primality testing and are not designed to overcome primality
proving methods such as ECPP.
However, if the parameters are set to invoke the probable-primality test with de-
fault parameters, then composites generated by the methods in Section 3.2.1 have
a probability of 2−40 of being falsely declared prime. This probability is correctly
alluded to as being worst-case by the documentation given for this function.
3.4.2 Maple
Maple 2017 [157] is a computer algebra system developed by Maplesoft, that provides




Analysis. The primality test in Maple is called as isprime(n) on a candidate
n to be tested. Documentation states that “It returns false if n is shown to be
composite within one strong pseudo-primality test and one Lucas test. It returns
true otherwise”. The function begins with some trial division on a series of small
primes before calling gmp isprime(n). If the result of gmp isprime(n) is 1 (i.e.
the number is “probably prime”) and the candidate n being tested is greater than
5 × 109 ≈ 233, then isprime will go on to perform a Lucas test on n. In all other
cases, the Lucas test is omitted.
Although we cannot directly inspect the code of gmp isprime(n) (since Maple is
proprietary software) we are able to reverse-engineer this function by calling it on
our own input n and assessing how it performs. Maple’s documentation states
that it performs a Miller-Rabin test and uses GMP for this function, yet since
there is no other code indicative of a Miller-Rabin test in gmp isprime(n), we
deduce that Maple is calling GMP’s function mpz probab prime p(n, reps). Since
gmp isprime(n) takes only a single argument, we inferred that Maple passes a
hardcoded value of reps to GMP.
We were able to verify that the value of reps is actually 5. We did this by using
the methods described in Section 3.3.2 to generate composite numbers of various
bit-sizes that are declared prime by mpz probab prime p (n, reps) for reps =
1,2,3,4,5. For composites that can only pass at most reps = 4 tests, Maple’s
gmp isprime correctly identifies these as composite. But for composites that pass
reps = 5, the function falsely declares them to be prime.
Pseudoprimes. When testing numbers n ≤ 5× 109, isprime acts as a determin-
istic version of the Miller-Rabin test. We have verified this by calling mpz probab-
prime p(n,5) for all n ≤ 5×109 and comparing the results to a list of primes below
5×109. The different sets of bases that GMP chooses for each n are such that there
are no composites below this threshold that are declared prime by mpz probab -
prime p with reps > 3. However, any change made to the (flawed) way GMP cur-
rently chooses its bases for testing could actually make Maple’s isprime function
less accurate (and no longer deterministic) for n ≤ 5× 109!
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To fool Maple’s primality testing for numbers larger than 5× 109, we would need a
composite n passing a Lucas test and 5 rounds of Miller-Rabin testing. We do not
currently know any such n.
3.4.3 MATLAB
MATLAB R2019b is a widely used numerical computing environment and propri-
etary programming language developed by MathWorks. It provides capabilities for a
variety of mathematical tasks including linear algebra, calculus and number theory.
Analysis. The primality test in MATLAB is called as isprime(n) on a candidate
n to be tested. The documentation states that isprime(n) is performing the Miller-
Rabin primality test with 10 independently and randomly chosen bases. MATLAB’s
documentation does not mention explicit bounds of error probabilities, but does
inform users: “If n is positive and isprime returns TRUE, then n is prime with a
very high probability.”.
Like Maple, MATLAB is proprietary software. This means we are unable to directly
inspect all parts of the code. However, we can use documentation and tools such as
edit to inspect some of the code of the inbuilt functions. By calling edit isprime
we are able to see only the preliminary testing performed on n – this is mainly sanity
checking, but also includes MATLAB’s trial division code.
Pseudoprimes. If MATLAB is indeed just performing 10 rounds of Miller-Rabin
on n, we can produce composite numbers n using any of the methods in Section 3.2.1;
such n meet the Monier-Rabin bound and will pass MATLAB’s primality test with
the highest probability of (1/4)10, yet we were unable to verify this claim.
3.4.4 Maxima
Maxima 5.41.0 [98] is a free, open source computer algebra system developed by
the Macsyma group. Maxima is a general-purpose system including tools for a
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variety of mathematical functions and the manipulation of symbolic and numerical
expressions.
Analysis. The primality test supplied by Maxima is the function primep(n).
When testing an n less than 341550071728321 (≈ 249) a deterministic version of
the Miller-Rabin test is used. This is achieved by calling repeated rounds of Miller-
Rabin tests with a set of bases for which it has been verified that no composites
are falsely declared prime. These are as defined in [77, 104], and therefore can in
general be used to create a deterministic test for numbers less than 264.
When testing an n bigger than 341550071728321, primep(n) performs 25 random
base Miller-Rabin tests, then conducts one Lucas test. The source Maxima uses for
base selection is then provided by the Maxima random number generator, which is
an implementation of Mersenne twister MT 19937 [97].
Maxima’s documentation correctly states that “The probability that a non-prime
n will pass one Miller-Rabin test is less than 1/4. Using the default value 25 for
primep number of tests, the probability of n being composite is much smaller that
10−15.”
Pseudoprimes. When testing numbers n < 341550071728321 (≈ 249) the func-
tion primep(n) is deterministic, so no pseudoprimes can arise. If instead n >
341550071728321, then the combination of Miller-Rabin testing and a Lucas test
mean that no pseudoprimes for the test are known.
3.4.5 SageMath
SageMath 8.2 (or simply Sage) is a free Python-based open source mathematics
software system originally created by William Stein [148] but now developed by
many volunteers. Sage provides a toolkit of mathematical functions in areas such as
algebra, combinatorics, numerical mathematics, number theory, and calculus.
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Analysis. Although there are many methods one could use to test the primal-
ity of a number in Sage, the flagship function is is prime(n, proof) found in
/src/sage/rings/integer.pyx. If called with the value of proof set as True (de-
fault when starting Sage), the function will perform a provable primality test. If set
to False it uses a strong pseudo-primality test and instead calls is pseudoprime(n).
The “provable primality test” called when proof = True is the PARI [154] isprime
function. This then uses a combination of the Baillie-PSW test, Selfridge “p − 1”,
and Adleman-Pomerance-Rumely-Cohen-Lenstra (APRCL) test [35]. It is indicated
in documentation that this test can be “very slow” when testing a prime that “has
more 1000 digits”.
The “strong pseudo-primality test” called when proof = False is less accurate,
but much quicker, and is therefore a likely choice when testing large candidates.
The candidates are then tested by PARI’s is pseudoprime(n), which consists of a
Baillie-PSW test.
Pseudoprimes. Since a Baillie-PSW test is being performed, we know of no com-
posites that are incorrectly declared prime by SageMath for either boolean value of
proof.
3.4.6 SymPy
SymPy [151] is a free, open source and widely used symbolic computation Python
library that provides computer algebra system capabilities.
Analysis. SymPy provides the primality test isprime(n), which like Maxima,
uses select bases to perform a deterministic version of Miller-Rabin when testing
candidates n < 264. We shall consider two recent versions of SymPy (SymPy 1.0




SymPy 1.0. Prior to release 1.1 in July 2017, the primality test isprime pro-
vided by SymPy 1.0 first conducted some initial trial division, before performing a
deterministic version of the Miller-Rabin test using bases described in [77, 104]. For
numbers larger than ≈ 253, the test would call additional rounds of Miller-Rabin.
In all releases up to and including 0.6.6 of 2009, this would simply perform 8 rounds
of Miller-Rabin on the bases {2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19}. In version 0.6.7 [150], this was
increased to 46 rounds of Miller-Rabin, using the first 46 primes as bases. SymPy’s
documentation addresses the accuracy of its primality test by vaguely stating that
“For n < 1016 the answer is accurate; greater n values have a small probability of
actually being pseudoprimes.”. The test remained fundamentally unchanged until
version 1.1 in 2017.
SymPy 1.1 onwards. In July 2017 the function isprime was revised. Much
like Maxima, SymPy would now perform a deterministic version of the Miller-Rabin
test on input less than 264. This is achieved by calling repeated rounds of Miller-
Rabin tests with a set of bases for which it has been verified that no composites are
falsely declared prime [77, 104]. For numbers greater than 264, SymPy would instead
perform a Baillie-PSW test as described in Section 2.4.4. SymPy’s documentation
addresses the accuracy of its primality test by stating that “For n < 264 the answer is
definitive; larger n values have a small probability of actually being pseudoprimes.”
Pseudoprimes. SymPy 1.0 and all previous versions are vulnerable to composite
numbers n generated by the methods in Section 3.2.1.2. These numbers are trivial
to construct when the final Miller-Rabin test is based on the first 8 primes, but
even after the changes made in version 0.6.7, all versions prior to 1.1 would wrongly
declare composites generated in this manner to be prime.
An Example Pseudoprime for SympPy 1.0 and previous versions. Using
the method of Section 3.2.1.2, we are able to construct a 1024-bit n of the form
n = p1p2p3 that is pseudoprime to all bases selected by SymPy in all versions prior
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to 1.1. Here pi = ki(p1 − 1) + 1 with (k2, k3) = (241, 257) and
p1 = 2
192 · 0x000000000000f8ae31e07964373e4997647e75fa186dd5e7
+ 20 · 0xe42ada869da0b3a333813f8102b1fb5f20623d6543e78a3b.
Since SymPy 1.1 introduced a Baillie-PSW test, we can no longer generate compos-
ites that would be declared prime by SymPy.
3.4.7 Wolfram Mathematica
Wolfram Mathematica is a computational software package developed by Wolfram
Research that covers scientific, engineering, mathematical, and computing fields.
The version we study, Mathematica 11.3 [136], (March 2018) features built-in inte-
gration with Wolfram Alpha.
Analysis. Mathematica provides the inbuilt primality test PrimeQ that is said
to perform two Miller-Rabin tests using bases 2 and 3, combined with a “Lucas
pseudoprime” test. Since the source code is not open source, we are unable to
verify the parameters used in the Lucas test. We note that the documentation
references Baillie and Wagstaff [15], from which Selfridge’s parameters originate.
Documentation of the function also indicates that this procedure is only known to
be correct for n < 1016 and that “it is conceivable that for larger n it could claim a
composite number to be prime”.
Pseudoprimes. Since a Baillie-PSW test is being performed, we know of no com-
posites that are incorrectly declared prime.
3.5 Application to Diffie-Hellman
Validating the correctness of Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters is a vital step for
verifying the integrity of the key exchange. As mentioned in the introduction of
this section, since the DH parameter set (p, q, g), with g ∈ Zp generating a group
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of order q, is public, they can originate from third-party sources such as a server or
a standard. An adept DH parameter validation function should check that p, q are
both prime and that p = kq+1 for some integer k. It should also test that the given
generator g generates the subgroup of order q and that any received DH values lie in
the correct subgroup. A common choice is to set k = 2, so that p is a safe prime. For
p that are not safe primes, the group order q can be much smaller than p, offering
performance improvements. The security level is then based upon the bit-size of q,
which must still be large enough to thwart the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm for solving
the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), which for prime q runs in time O(
√
q). A
common parameter choice is a 160-bit q with a 1024-bit p or a 256-bit q with a
2048-bit p.
More precisely, the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm runs in time O(
√
t) where t is the
largest prime factor of q. Thus, an attacker armed with the ability to fool a primality
test can supply a sufficiently smooth composite q such that p = kq+ 1 is still prime.
For example, if q is of the form (2x+ 1)(4x+ 1) this leads to an attack on DLP with
complexity 240 resp. 264 for the sizes mentioned above.
We stress, though, that none of the constructions for malicious composites in this
chapter pose a risk to protocols such as Telegram that insist on k = 2, i.e. which
check both q = (p− 1)/2 and p for compositeness. For example, the construction of
Section 3.2.1.1 would set q = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) and yield p that is always divisible
by 3; moreover, q would not be smooth enough for Pohlig-Hellman to pose a threat
for parameters of cryptographically appropriate size. However, it is the focus of the
next chapter to find a large, sufficiently smooth composite q passing a primality test
with a high probability such that p = 2q+ 1 is prime or passes a primality test, too.
We now discuss DH verification functions in various libraries. For each library, we
apply the analysis from Section 3.3 to check how robust these libraries are to attack.
We note that the other libraries discussed in Section 3.3 do not implement a higher-
level function for verification of DH parameters. Of course, this does not prevent an
application from using these libraries to realise its own verification function. Such
an application would inherit the weaknesses and strengths of the underlying library
(when k 6= 2 is permitted). We give an example of this scenario for the GMP library
below. We close with a discussion of the important use case of SSL/TLS.
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OpenSSL. The file dh check.c contains the functions DH check params and DH -
check. The former is a lightweight check that just confirms that p and g are ‘likely
enough’ to be valid, by testing to see if p is odd and 1 < g < p − 1. The latter
function is more thorough and calls BN is prime ex to test the primality of both p
and q = (p−1)/2. These primality tests are called with checks = BN prime checks,
therefore the rounds of Miller-Rabin are determined by Table 3.4. This means for
example that they will declare as prime with probability 1/16 composites n of the
special form n = (2x+ 1)(4x+ 1), for x odd and 2x+ 1, 4x+ 1 prime, when n has
more than 1300 bits. Since no private data is required, this testing function’s most
likely use-case is checking Diffie-Hellman parameters that have been generated by
someone else (perhaps from an untrusted server or an unknown origin) and therefore
clearly misuses OpenSSL’s own primality testing functions.
In Chapter 4 we exploit the misuse of the average-case error estimates in OpenSSL’s
Diffie-Hellman parameter checking function to generate parameters (p, q, g) that pass
primality testing on both p and q (with some probability) simultaneously and allow
efficient solving of the DLP.
Bouncy Castle. The validation of DH parameters in ValidateDHParameters ex-
tracts p, g from a DH parameter set and then only checks the primality of p with
1 round of Miller-Rabin. We can therefore produce composites that are accepted
as DH moduli with probability 1/4. More seriously, q is not given to the check
function, so even with a prime p, the value of g can be chosen so that it has small
order, making Pohlig-Hellman as easy as desired. Even if g had large prime order,
the flexibility in choosing parameters would allow Lim-Lee small subgroup attacks,
as explored in [156].
Botan. The Botan function is prime is used in the class DL Group (located in
dl group.cpp) which is also used for verifying DH parameters. This class contains
the verify group function, which can be invoked with boolean parameter strong.
If strong is set to true, the is prime function is invoked with prob=128. This
results in t = 65 Miller-Rabin computations. Otherwise, prob=10 and 6 Miller-
Rabin computations are performed. This test is performed for both p and q; the
code also checks that q|(p− 1) but does not insist on p being a safe prime.
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Using the methods described in Section 3.2.1 we can find a q of 160-bits that passes
6 rounds of MR testing with probability 1/4096 such that q has 2 or 3 prime factors.
Then we can construct 1024-bit prime p as p = kq + 1 by using the flexibility in
k, and a g that generates the subgroup of size q. Since this p is indeed prime and
q|(p− 1), all of Botan’s tests on the parameter set (p, q, g) will pass with probability
1/4096 if strong is set to false. We can subsequently use the Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm to solve the DLP in the subgroup generated by g and break DH with
about 228 effort.
An Example of a Malicious DH Parameter Set for Botan. Using our
SAGE implementation of the method in Section 3.2.1.4, we construct a 160-bit
q of the form q = q1q2q3, where qi = ki(q1 − 1) + 1 with (k2, k3) = (61, 101) and
q1 = 537242417098003.
This q is declared prime with probability 1/4096 by Botan’s verify group function.
By setting k = 2864 + 134 in p = kq + 1 we obtain a prime p, and thus by setting
the generator g as:
g = 2960 · 0x0000000000000000000000000000000075ead4f9fa60a06e
+ 2768 · 0x0787a1e0708f5e2055b2899691f7dd73303d5643e57b1636
+ 2576 · 0x66ce328086bd6a0df756175c35549ba7a5ffe517036c0ef1
+ 2384 · 0x44a9542f698255efb66cda28b0b8a5ebebf2c0892f8147d3
+ 2192 · 0x72083822a36098addcd30a1767ccefaae65d1dcd6b45de92
+ 20 · 0x09047326d40b622af6a76218664ba3df13eb0fead02d772a
we obtain a parameter set (p, q, g) such that g generates the subgroup of order q. The
probability that this set is accepted by Botan’s verify group function is 1/4096.
The DLP in the subgroup generated by g can be solved using the Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm over each of the 49-bit, 55-bit and 56-bit factors q1, q2 and q3 of q. The
cost is dominated by the largest prime factor, and is approximately 228 operations.
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GNU GMP. The 256-bit integer q = (2x+ 1)(4x+ 1) with
x = 0x400286bac15132db85b1c936709f369b
passes 15 rounds of GMP’s primality test mpz is probab prime p; picking k =
21792 + 1254 produces the 2048 bit prime p = kq + 1. The resulting parameter set
(p, q, g) would pass even fully adept DH validation with certainty if the underlying
primality testing was based on GNU GMP’s code with the minimum recommended
number of rounds of Miller-Rabin.
SSL/TLS. We close by commenting on the situation for DH parameter testing in
SSL/TLS. Here, the server chooses parameters but only sends (p, g) to the client.
There is no requirement that p be a safe prime. This makes it difficult for clients to
validate the DH parameters (they would need to factor p− 1 and then try different
divisors to determine the order of q) or to perform group membership tests on
received DH values. Consequently most clients perform only simple sanity checks,
e.g. checking that g /∈ {0,±1}. This makes SSL/TLS vulnerable to a variety of
malicious DH parameter attacks, cf. [161, 156], and in view of these, exhibiting
composite p that fool primality tests would be overkill for the SSL/TLS standards
in their present form. However, our work shows that even if clients tried to validate
DH parameters by factoring p − 1, finding the order of g and then testing it for
primality, they could still fall foul of malicious DH parameters. And if the SSL/TLS
protocol were amended so that the server provides full DH parameters, careful checks
would still be needed. Finally we note that only a small number of fixed, safe prime
DH parameter sets are permitted in TLS 1.3. These were recently standardised in
RFC 7919 [61], alleviating these issues for future versions of the protocol.
3.6 Disclosure and Mitigations
We reported our findings and suggested suitable mitigations based on the outcome
of our analysis to OpenSSL, GMP, Mozilla, Apple, Cryptlib, JSBN, LibTomMath,
LibTomCrypt, WolfSSL, Bouncy Castle and Botan. We give a short review of the
outcome of these discussions.
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• When we reached out to the OpenSSL developers, they were in the process of
amending its primality testing code to make it FIPS-complaint [117]. These
changes were included in OpenSSL versions 1.1.1-pre9, 1.0.2p and 1.1.0i (re-
leased 14/08/2018).5 However, these changes do not consider the adversarial
scenario on which our work focuses, and the default settings in OpenSSL re-
main weak in that scenario. We continued to work with OpenSSL to address
this further, and will discuss this throughout Chapters 4 and 5.
• Apple changed its corecrypto library from using fixed bases in Miller-Rabin
testing to using pseudorandom bases. This vulnerability was assigned CVE-
2018-4398.6
• LibTomMath and LibTomCrypt developers are in the process of adjusting the
primality testing functions within their library. They plan to remove the fixed
base Miller-Rabin testing and replace the function with a Baillie-PSW test in
accordance with our recommendations [91].
• WolfSSL has made several adaptations to its primality testing in version 3.15.5
in response to our findings [159]. This includes now performing Miller-Rabin
with pseudorandom bases, not overriding the users choice of iterations, and
increasing the number of rounds performed on prime parameters in DH and
DSA check functions.
• Bouncy Castle has also made changes based upon our findings, by removing
the DH verification function and replacing it with a whitelisting approach in
release 1.8.3. They are also looking into performing Baillie-PSW in future
versions as per our suggestion, yet this is not present in the current release
1.8.6 February 2020.
• Botan version 2.7.0 [95] has increased the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin
performed in DH verification and includes the Lucas test to perform Baillie-
PSW as per our suggestions.
• Mozilla filed a sec-moderate security bug in response to our disclosure to the
primality test in NSS in October 20197. NSS will update the primality test
5See https://www.openssl.org/news/changelog.html.
6See https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-4398 and https://support.apple.com/
en-gb/HT201222.
7See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1602379 (requires approval process).
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to perform testing on random bases chosen by a more secure PRNG. We have
been told this will take place in one of the next NSS releases.
• GNU GMP, Mini-GMP and Cryptlib all remain unchanged, but the authors
of Cryptlib pointed out a code comment that indicates the limitations of their
primality test.
• We received no response from JSBN.
3.7 Conclusion and Recommendations
Our work has explored primality testing in the adversarial setting and its impact
on Diffie-Hellman parameter testing. Our main finding is that leading libraries are
not designed for this setting, and therefore often vulnerable to accepting as prime
composite inputs that are maliciously chosen, see Table 3.3.
The need for careful distinction between non-adversarial (or random) and adversarial
primality testing is of course well understood in the cryptographic research commu-
nity. However, this distinction is not necessarily reflected and implemented in cryp-
tographic libraries and their documentation. As such, we can generally classify the
underlying cause of the failure in prime classification accuracy as a non-consideration
of the adversarial setting. More explicitly, we can categorise most failures in terms
of how the bases for Miller-Rabin are chosen, i.e. fixed base, predictable bases, insuf-
ficient number of bases. Mini-GMP, JSBN, Cryptlib, LibTomMath, LibTomCrypt
and WolfSSL all fail due to the selection of bases from a fixed list, whereas GNU
GMP and Golang pre 1.8 both suffer from predictable bases. OpenSSL, Libgcrypt,
Botan and Bouncy Castle C# all have options to run as many rounds of Miller-
Rabin as the user desires, but either default to, or call the test (elsewhere in the
library) with too few rounds.
Based on our analysis, we make the following recommendations:
• Libraries that wish to continue to use Miller-Rabin only (for example, to main-
tain a small codebase) should use pseudorandom bases, cf. Apple corecrypto
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and CommonCrypto, Cryptlib, JavaScript Big Number, LibTomCrypt, NSS,
WolfSSL. In particular, the bases should not depend only on n, cf. GNU GMP.
• We also recommend to default to worst-case bounds when picking the number
of iterations and only assume average-case behaviour when explicitly instructed
to by the user. Specifically, we recommend using 64 iterations to ensure that
composite numbers are wrongly identified as being prime with probability at
most 2−128. The impact on the performance of defaulting to worst-case bounds
should be minimal in the non-adversarial setting since testing can be aborted
as soon as a Miller-Rabin witness for compositeness is identified, and these
are exceedingly common (as the bounds of [41] show). On the other hand, it
is precisely in the adversarial setting that the worst-case bounds are needed.
Adopting this recommendation may require changes to interfaces to primality
testing code. In Chapter 5 we look in more detail at these changes, and perform
a cost-benefit analysis for performing Miller-Rabin with 64 rounds.
• If the size and complexity of the codebase is not a concern, or in mathemati-
cal libraries for which the functionality already exists (e.g. the computation of
Jacobi symbols), it may be suitable to perform the Baillie-PSW test. The neg-
ative impact on performance is moderate, and the positive impact on security
is significant. An existing benchmark for such a trade-off is found in the doc-
umentation of the computer algebra system PARI/GP [154] (on which Sage
bases its primality testing functions). PARI/GP implements both a Miller-
Rabin test with user-defined t and a Baillie-PSW test and indicate [153] that
their Baillie-PSW test is about as fast as their Miller-Rabin test with t = 3.
In Chapter 5 we will give a more detailed comparison between Baillie-PSW
and Miller-Rabin, to better solidify these benchmarks.
• Designers of new protocols should avoid the pitfalls made in SSL/TLS, where
DH parameter validation is made impractical for clients. TLS 1.3 does so by
fixing and requiring the use of a small collection of parameter sets.
Definitions in the cryptographic literature routinely start with “Let p be a prime . . . ”
whereas our work highlights that many implementations do not necessarily provide
strong guarantees for this assumption to hold. It is thus an interesting open question
which other seemingly innocuous assumptions concerning domain parameters in the
literature can be undermined in a similar fashion.
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In this chapter we consider the problem of constructing Diffie-Hellman (DH) pa-
rameters which pass standard approaches to parameter validation but for which the
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is relatively easy to solve. We consider both the
finite field setting and the elliptic curve setting.
For finite fields, we show how to construct DH parameters (p, q, g) for the safe prime
setting in which p = 2q + 1 is prime, q is relatively smooth but fools random-base
Miller-Rabin primality testing with some reasonable probability, and g is of order q
mod p. This problem was left open in Chapter 3. The construction involves modify-
ing and combining known methods for obtaining Carmichael numbers. Concretely,
we provide an example with 1024-bit p which passes OpenSSL’s Diffie-Hellman vali-
dation procedure with probability 2−24 (for versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.1pre9,
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1.1.0i and 1.0.2p Aug. 2018). Here, the largest factor of q has 121 bits, meaning that
the DLP can be solved with about 264 effort using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm.
We go on to explain how this parameter set can be used to mount offline dictionary
attacks against PAKE protocols.
In the elliptic curve case, we use an algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen to construct
an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp having a specified number of points n. We
are able to select n of the form h · q such that h is a small co-factor, q is relatively
smooth but fools random-base Miller-Rabin primality testing with some reasonable
probability, and E has a point of order q. Concretely, we provide example curves at
the 128-bit security level with h = 1, where q passes a single random-base Miller-
Rabin primality test with probability 1/4 and where the elliptic curve DLP can be
solved with about 244 effort. Alternatively, we can pass the test with probability 1/8
and solve the elliptic curve DLP with about 235.5 effort. These ECDH parameter
sets lead to similar attacks on PAKE protocols relying on elliptic curves.
Our work in this chapter shows the importance of performing proper (EC)DH pa-
rameter validation in cryptographic implementations and/or the wisdom of relying
on standardised parameter sets of known provenance.
4.1 Introduction and Motivation
In Chapter 3 we conducted a systematic study of primality testing “in the wild”.
We found flaws in primality tests implemented in several cryptographic libraries, for
example a reliance on fixed-base Miller-Rabin primality testing, or the use of too
few rounds of the Miller-Rabin test when testing numbers of unknown provenance.
We also studied the implications of this work for Diffie-Hellman (DH) in the finite
field case, showing how to generate DH parameter sets of the form (p, q, g) in which
p = kq+1 for some k, p is prime, q is composite but passes a Miller-Rabin primality
test with some probability, yet q is sufficiently smooth that the Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP) is relatively easy to solve using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm in
the order q subgroup generated by g. Such a parameter set (p, q, g) might pass
DH parameter validation with non-negligible probability in a cryptographic library
that performs “naive” primality testing on p and q, e.g. one carrying out just a few
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iterations of Miller-Rabin on each number. If such a parameter set were used in
a cryptographic protocol like TLS, then it would also allow an attacker to recover
all the keying material and thence break the protocol’s security, cf. [161]. In Sec-
tion 3.5 we posited this as a plausible attack scenario when, for example, a malicious
developer hard-codes the DH parameters into the protocol.
It is notable that the methods described in Section 3.2 for producing malicious DH
parameters and the examples given in Section 3.5 do not work in the safe prime
setting, wherein p = 2q + 1. This is because we need flexibility in choosing k to
arrange p to be prime. It is also because our methods can only produce q with 2
or 3 prime factors, meaning that q needs to be relatively small so that the Pohlig-
Hellman algorithm applies (recall that Pohlig-Hellman runs in time O(B1/2) where B
is a bound on the largest prime factor of q; if q has only 3 prime factors and we want
an algorithm requiring 264 effort, then q can have at most 384 bits). Yet requiring
safe primes is quite common for DH in the finite field setting. This is because it
helps to avoid known attacks, such as small subgroup attacks [92, 156], and because
it ostensibly makes parameter validation easier. For example, OpenSSL’s Diffie-
Hellman validation routine DH check1 insists on the safe prime setting by default.
Indeed, it was left as an open problem in Chapter 3 to find a large, sufficiently
smooth, composite q passing a primality test with high probability such that p =
2q + 1 is also prime or passes a primality test.
Interestingly, more than a decade ago, Bleichenbacher [26] addressed a closely related
problem: the construction of malicious DH parameters (p, q, g) for which p and q
pass fixed-base Miller-Rabin primality tests. This was motivated by his observation
that, at this time, the GNU Crypto library was using such a test, with the bases
being the first 13 primes a = 2, 3, . . . , 41. He produced a number q having 1095 bits
and 27 prime factors, the largest of which has 53 bits, such that q always passed the
primality test of GNU Crypto, and such that p = 2q + 1 is prime. His q has very
special form: it is a Carmichael number obtained using a modified version of the
Erdös method [51]. Of course, his DH parameter set (p, q, g) would not stand up
to the more commonly used random-base Miller-Rabin testing, but his construction
is nevertheless impressive. Bleichenbacher also showed how such a parameter set
1See https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/DH_check.html for a description and
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/dh/dh_check.c for source code.
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could be used to break the SRP Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE)
protocol: he showed that a client that accepts bad DH parameters in the SRP
protocol can be subject to an offline dictionary attack on its password. Here, the
attacker impersonates the server in a run of the SRP protocol, sending the client
malicious DH parameters, and inducing the client to send a password-dependent
protocol message. It is the attacker’s ability to solve the DLP that then enables
the offline password recovery. Thus Bleichenbacher had already given a realistic and
quite standard attack scenario where robust DH (and ECDH) parameter validation
is crucial: PAKE protocols in which an attacker impersonating one of the parties
can dictate (EC)DH parameters.
4.1.1 Contributions & Outline
In this chapter, we address the problem left open from Chapter 3 of finding malicious
DH parameters in the safe prime setting. We also study the analogous problem in
the elliptic curve setting.
Finite Field Setting: As a flavour of the results to come, we exhibit a DH pa-
rameter set (p = 2q + 1, q, g) in which p has 1024 bits and q is a composite with
9 prime factors, each at most 121 bits in size, which passes a single random-base
Miller-Rabin test with probability 2−8. We show that no number with this many
factors can achieve a higher passing probability. Because of the 121-bit bound on
the factors of q, the DLP in the subgroup of order q generated by g can be solved
with about 264 effort using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm. When OpenSSL’s DH
validation routine DH check is used in its default configuration, this parameter set is
declared valid with probability 2−24 for versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.1pre9, 1.1.0i
and 1.0.2p (released 14th August 2018). This is because OpenSSL uses the size of q
to determine how many rounds of Miller-Rabin to apply, and adopts non-adversarial
bounds suitable for average case primality testing derived from [41]. These dictate
using 3 rounds of testing for 1023-bit q for versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.1pre9,
1.1.0i and 1.0.2p, and 5 rounds in later versions (the increase was made in an effort
to achieve a 128-bit security level). We also give a DH parameter set (p = 2q+1, q, g)
in which p is a 1024 bit prime and q has 11 prime factors, each at most 100 bits
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in size, which passes a single random-base Miller-Rabin test with probability 2−10.
This parameter set is declared valid with a lower probability of 2−30 for versions of
OpenSSL prior to 1.1.1pre9, 1.1.0i and 1.0.2p, however the DLP in the subgroup of
order q generated by g can be solved using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm with less
effort, in about 254 operations.
The probability of 2−24 or 2−30 for passing DH validation may not seem very large,
and indeed can be seen as a vindication of using safe primes for DH. On the other
hand, Bleichenbacher-style attacks against PAKEs can be carried out over many
sessions and against multiple users, meaning that the success probability of an overall
password recovery attack can be boosted. We exemplify this in the context of J-
PAKE, a particular PAKE protocol that was supported in OpenSSL until recently
(but we stress that the attack is not specific to J-PAKE).
Obtaining such malicious DH parameter sets in the finite field setting requires some
new insights. In particular, we are interested in numbers q that are relatively smooth
(having all prime factors less than some pre-determined bound B, say), but which
pass random-base Miller-Rabin primality tests with probability as high as possible.
We therefore investigate the relationship between the number of prime factors m of
a number n and the number of Miller-Rabin non-witnesses S(n) for n, this being
the number of bases a for which the Miller-Rabin test fails to declare n composite.
We are able to prove that S(n) ≤ ϕ(n)/2m−1 where ϕ(·) is the Euler function.
Since for large n we usually have ϕ(n) ≈ n, this shows that the highest probability
a malicious actor can achieve for passing a single, random-base Miller-Rabin test
is (roughly) 21−m. (This already shows that an adversary can only have limited
success, especially if multiple rounds of Miller-Rabin are used.) We are also able
to completely characterise those numbers achieving equality in this bound for m ≥
3: they are exactly the Carmichael numbers having m prime factors that are all
congruent to 3 mod 4.
This characterisation then motivates us to develop constructions for such Carmichael
numbers with a controlled number of prime factors. We show how to modify the
existing Erdös method [51] and the method of Granville and Pomerance [67] for con-
structing Carmichael numbers, and how to combine them, to obtain cryptographically-
sized q with the required properties.
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However, this only partly solves our problem, since we also require that p = 2q + 1
should pass primality tests (or even be prime). We explore further modifications of
our approach so as to avoid trivial arithmetic conditions that prevent p from being
prime (the prime 3 is particularly troublesome in this regard). We are also able to
show that the probability that p is prime is higher than would be expected for a
random choice of p by virtue of properties of the Granville-Pomerance construction:
essentially, the construction ensures that p cannot be divisible by certain small
primes; we tweak the construction further to enhance this property. Combining all
of these steps leads to a detailed procedure by which our example DH parameter
set (p = 2q + 1, q, g) described above was obtained. This procedure is amenable to
parallelisation. The computation of our particular example required 136 core-days
of computation using a server with 3.2GHz processors.
Elliptic Curve Setting: While the main focus of this chapter is on the finite
field setting, we also briefly study the elliptic curve setting. Here ECDH parameters
(p,E, P, q, h) consist of a prime p defining a field (we focus on prime fields, Fp), a
curve E over that field defined in some standard form (for example, short Weierstrass
form), a point P , the (claimed) order q of P , and a co-factor h such that #E(Fp) =
h · q. Parameter validation should verify the primality of p and q, and check that P
does have order q on E by computing [q]P and comparing the result to the point at
infinity.
Bröker and Stevenhagen [32] gave a reasonably efficient algorithm to construct an
elliptic curve E over a prime field Fp having a specified number of points n, given
the factorisation of n as an input. Their algorithm is sensitive to the number of
prime factors of n – fewer is better. We use their algorithm with n being one of our
specially constructed Carmichael numbers q passing Miller-Rabin primality testing
with highest possible probability, or a small multiple of such a q.
Since p ≈ q in the elliptic curve setting and we only need these numbers to have,
say, 256 bits to achieve a 128-bit security level, the task of constructing q is much
easier than in the finite field setting considered above. Indeed, we could employ
a Carmichael number q with 3 prime factors to pass Miller-Rabin with probability
1/4 per iteration. At the 128-bit security level, q then has 3 prime factors each of
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roughly 85 bits, and the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm would solve the ECDLP on the
constructed curve in about 244 steps. Using a Carmichael q with 4 prime factors each
of exactly 64 bits, we would pass Miller-Rabin with probability 1/8 per iteration and
solve the ECDLP with only 234 effort. We give concrete examples of curves having
such properties.
These malicious ECDH parameters (p,E, P, q, h) lead to attacks on PAKEs running
over elliptic curves, as well as more traditional ECDH key exchanges. These attacks
are fully analogous to those in the finite field setting. They highlight the impor-
tance of careful validation of ECDH parameters that may originate from potentially
malicious sources, especially in the case of bespoke parameter sets sent as part of
a cryptographic protocol. For example, the specification of the TLS extension for
elliptic curve cryptography [25] caters for the use of custom elliptic curves, though
this option does not seem to be widely supported in implementations at present. Our
work shows that robust checking of any such parameters would be highly advisable.
4.1.2 Related Work
In the light of the Snowden revelations, a body of work examining methods by
which the security of cryptographic algorithms and protocols can be deliberately
undermined has been developed. Our work can be seen as fitting into that theme
(though we stress that the application of our work to PAKE protocols shows that
there are concerns in the “standard” cryptographic setting too).
Young and Yung laid the foundations of kleptography, that is, cryptography designed
with malicious intent, see for example [166]. Bellare et al. [18] studied the problem
of how to subvert symmetric encryption algorithms, and how to protect against such
subversions.
Fried et al. [54] followed up on early work of Gordon [63] to examine how to backdoor
the DLP in the finite field setting. These works showed how to construct large primes
p for which the Special Number Field Sieve makes solving the DLP possible if one
is in possession of trapdoor information about how p was generated. This provides
another avenue to subverting the security of DH parameters. It appears that the
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1024-bit example in [54] is not in the safe-prime setting, however.
The NIST DualEC generator was extensively analysed [34] and found to be used in
Juniper’s ScreenOS operating system in an exploitable way [33]. This inspired more
theoretical follow-up work on backdoored RNGs [49] and PRNGs [42].
Bernstein et al. [20] extensively discuss the problem of certifying that elliptic curve
parameter sets are free of manipulation during generation.
The dangers of allowing support for old algorithms and protocol versions, especially
those allowing export-grade cryptography, are made manifest by the FREAK [23],
Logjam [3] and DROWN [12] attacks on SSL and TLS.
4.2 Miller-Rabin Primality Testing and Pseudoprimes
In this section, we extend the analysis of Section 3.2.1 on Miller-Rabin pseudoprimes,
focusing more on the number of non-witnesses a particular composite number con-
tains. We briefly recap on some of the definitions discussed in the preliminaries in
Section 2.4.2 in order to establish and refresh notation.
Suppose n > 1 is an odd integer to be tested for primality. We first write n = 2ed+1
where d is odd. If n is prime, then for any integer a with 1 ≤ a < n, we have:
ad = 1 mod n or a2
id = −1 mod n for some 0 ≤ i < e.
The Miller-Rabin test then consists of checking the above conditions for some value
a, declaring a number to be composite if both conditions fail and to be (probably)
prime if either of the two conditions hold. If n is composite but one condition
holds, then we say n is a pseudoprime to base a, or that a is a non-witness to the
compositeness of n (since n may be composite, but a does not demonstrate this
fact).
We begin by exploring the relationship between a composite number n and the
number of non-witnesses this number possesses, denoted S(n). Since in this work
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we are interested in constructing numbers n that fool the Miller-Rabin test with as
high a probability as possible for random bases a, our main interest is in constructing
n for which S(n) is as large as possible. However, since we are also interested in
solving discrete logarithm problems in subgroups of order n, we will also want n to
be relatively smooth.
Recall Theorem 2.6 that can be used to calculate the exact number of non-witnesses
that some composite n has, and the general upper-bound on S(n) given by results
of [108, 135]:
Theorem 4.1 (Monier-Rabin Theorem). Let n 6= 9 be odd and composite. Then
S(n) ≤ ϕ(n)
4
where ϕ denotes the Euler totient function.
It is known from [108] that the bound in Theorem 4.1 is met with equality for
numbers n of the form n = (2x+ 1)(4x+ 1) with 2x+ 1, 4x+ 1 prime and x odd. It
is also known that the bound is met with equality for numbers n that are Carmichael
numbers with three prime factors, n = p1p2p3, and where each factor pi is congruent
to 3 mod 4.
Definition 4.1 (Carmichael numbers). Let n be an odd composite number. Then n
is said to be a Carmichael number if an−1 = 1 mod n for all a co-prime to n.
Note that Carmichael numbers are those for which the Fermat primality test fails
to identify n as composite for all co-prime bases a.
Theorem 4.2 (Korselt’s Criterion). Let n be odd and composite. Then n is a
Carmichael number if and only if n is square-free and for all prime divisors p of n,
we have p− 1 | n− 1.
For a proof of this theorem, see [108]. It is also known that Carmichael numbers
must have at least 3 distinct prime factors.
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4.2.1 On the Relationship Between S(n) and m, the Number of Prime
Factors of n
The Monier-Rabin bound is synonymous with understanding the accuracy of the
Miller-Rabin test; it states that any odd composite n 6= 9 can have at most ϕ(n)/4
non-witnesses, and therefore can pass a single round of Miller-Rabin with probability
at most ≈ 1/4. We present an extension of this bound to classify the maximum
number of non-witnesses an odd composite number n can have, with respect to
the number m of distinct prime factors it has. We show that is bound is at most
ϕ(n)/2m−1 non-witnesses, and therefore n has the probability of at most ≈ 1/2m−1
of being declared prime by a single round of Miller-Rabin. This result is central to
our work in this chapter.
Theorem 4.3 (Extended Monier-Rabin Bound). Let n be an odd composite integer




i . Write n = 2
ed + 1 where d is odd and
pi = 2








with equality if and only if n is square-free and, for all i, ei = 1 and di | d.
































Therefore, using Theorem 2.6, we have:
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We obtain equality in equation (4.1) above when min(ei) = 1 and in equation (4.2)
when e1 = e2 = · · · = em and gcd(d, di) = di for all i (which is equivalent to di | d).
We obtain equality in equation (4.3) when ϕ(n) =
∏m
i=1(pi − 1). This occurs if and
only n is square free. The result follows.
Remark 4.1. For the case m = 2, Monier [108] remarked that the bound is met in
this case for numbers of the form n = (2x + 1)(4x + 1) with 2x + 1, 4x + 1 prime
and x odd, see also [113]. This form was exploited extensively in Chapter 3, but
will be less useful in this chapter because we require numbers n of cryptographic
size that satisfy a smaller smoothness bound. For example, we will be interested in
constructing 1024-bit n in which each prime factor has at most 128 bits, meaning n
will have at least 8 prime factors.
We now go on to show that, when m ≥ 3, the bound in the above theorem is attained
if and only if n is a Carmichael number of special form. This result is of particular
significance, as not only have we shown the maximum number of non-witnesses a
generic odd composite number n with m distinct factors can have, we now provide
a method to produce such a number that meets this bound for any m.
Theorem 4.4. Let n be a Carmichael number with m ≥ 3 prime factors that are
all congruent to 3 mod 4. Then S(n) = ϕ(n)
2m−1 . Conversely, if n has m ≥ 3 prime
factors and S(n) = ϕ(n)
2m−1 , then n is a Carmichael number whose prime factors are
all congruent to 3 mod 4.
Proof. By Korselt’s criterion we know that n is square-free. Write n = p1 · · · pm
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m Cm S(Cm)
3 7 · 19 · 67 ϕ(Cm)/4
4 7 · 19 · 67 · 199 ϕ(Cm)/8
5 7 · 11 · 19 · 103 · 9419 ϕ(Cm)/16
6 7 · 11 · 31 · 47 · 163 · 223 ϕ(Cm)/32
7 19 · 23 · 31 · 67 · 71 · 199 · 271 ϕ(Cm)/64
8 11 · 31 · 43 · 47 · 71 · 139 · 239 · 271 ϕ(Cm)/128
9 19 · 31 · 43 · 67 · 71 · 103 · 239 · 307 · 631 ϕ(Cm)/256
10 7 · 11 · 19 · 31 · 47 · 79 · 139 · 163 · 271 · 2347 ϕ(Cm)/512
Table 4.1: The smallest number Cm with m prime factors that meets the
upper bound of ϕ(Cm)/2
m−1 on S(Cm).
where the pi are prime and, by assumption, pi = 3 mod 4 for each i. As before, we
write n = 2ed + 1 where d is odd and pi = 2
eidi + 1 where each di is odd. Since
pi = 3 mod 4 for each i, it is immediate that ei = 1 for each i. Moreover, by Korselt’s
criterion, we have 2eidi|2ed, and hence di|d, for each i. The result follows from the
converse part of Theorem 4.3.




i . Suppose pi = 2
eidi + 1 where di is odd and
n = 2ed+ 1 where d is odd. Necessarily, e ≥ 1. By Theorem 4.3, since S(n) = ϕ(n)
2m−1 ,
we have that n is square free, ei = 1 for all i and di | d for all i. Since ei = 1 ∀i,
we have that pi = 3 mod 4 and 2
ei | 2e for all i. Also, since di | d for all i, it follows
that 2eidi | 2ed for all i, and thus pi − 1 | n− 1 for all i. Hence, n satisfies Korselt’s
criterion, and n is a Carmichael number.
Example 4.1. Table 4.1 gives, for each 3 ≤ m ≤ 10, the smallest number with
m prime factors achieving the bound of Theorem 4.3. In the light of Theorem 4.4,
these are all Carmichael numbers whose prime factors are all congruent to 3 mod 4.
These are obtained from data made available by Pinch and reported in [129]. Of
course, these examples are all much too small for cryptographic use.
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4.3 Generating Large Carmichael Numbers
The results in the previous section motivate the search for cryptographically-sized
Carmichael numbers with a chosen number of prime factors, with each factor congru-
ent to 3 mod 4. In this section, we discuss two existing constructions for Carmichael
numbers: the Erdös method [51] and the method of Granville and Pomerance [67].
We show how to combine these two methods to produce large examples. We also
show how to modify the constructions to improve the probability that they will
succeed in constructing large examples by the introduction of sieving during the
generation process.
4.3.1 The Erdös Method
Erdös [51] gave a method to construct Carmichael numbers with many prime factors.
The method starts with a highly composite number L and then considers the set
P(L) = {p : p prime, p − 1 | L, p - L}. If for some subset {p1, p2, . . . , pm} of P(L),
we have p1p2 · · · pm = 1 mod L, then n = p1p2 · · · pm is a Carmichael number, by
Korselt’s criterion. This is easy to see: by construction, pi − 1 | L; the condition
n = 1 mod L implies that L | n− 1; it follows that pi − 1 | n− 1, and n is evidently
square-free.
Example 4.2. If L = 120 = 23 · 3 · 5, then P(L) = {7, 11, 13, 31, 41, 61}. If we
examine all the subsets of P(L), we find that 41040 = 7 · 11 · 13 · 41, 172081 =
7 ·13 ·31 ·61 and 852841 = 11 ·31 ·41 ·61 are all 1 mod 120, and so are all Carmichael
numbers.
The Erdös method lends itself to a computational approach to generating Carmichael
numbers with a chosen number of prime factors m for moderate values of L. For
a given L, the set P(L) can be quickly generated by considering each factor f
of the selected L and testing the primality of f + 1. One can then examine all m-
products of distinct elements from P(L) and test the product n against the condition
n = 1 mod L.
Alternatively, as pointed out in [26], one can employ a time-memory trade-off
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(TMTO): for some k, build a table of all k-products p1 · · · pk from P(L), and look for
collisions in that table with the inverses of (m− k)-products (pk+1 · · · pm)−1 mod L
from P(L). Such a collision gives an equation
p1 · · · pk = (pk+1 · · · pm)−1 mod L
and hence
p1 · · · pkpk+1 · · · pm = 1 mod L.
Of course, one needs to take care to avoid repeated primes in such an approach.
For the L we use later, the direct approach suffices, and so we did not explore this
direction further.
4.3.2 The Selection of L in the Erdös Method
Clearly, L must be even, otherwise the integers p satisfying p − 1 | L will all be
even. We can ensure that all primes p in P(L) satisfy p = 3 mod 4 by setting the
maximum power of 2 in L to be 1, i.e. by setting L = 2 mod 4. For then each factor
f of L must be 2 mod 4, and hence p = f+1 = 3 mod 4. As we shall see later, other
conditions can be imposed on L as needed.
Note that since 2 | L, p = 3 is a candidate for inclusion in P(L). However, if 3 is
also a factor of L then it is excluded from P(L) because of the additional condition
p - L on elements of P(L); this condition is needed in general, since if p | L, then
any product p1p2 · · · pm including p as a factor would be 0 mod L instead of the
required 1 mod L.
For the Erdös method to be successful in producing a Carmichael number with m
prime factors, we need to find a product pi such that p1p2 · · · pm = 1 mod L. One





Let us make the heuristic assumption that the values of p1p2 · · · pm are uniformly






for the method to have a reasonable chance of success, since we need some product
equal to 1 mod L, and there are L/2 possible odd values mod L that a product may
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Lbound Lbest |P(Lbest)|
220 810810 = 2 · 34 · 5 · 7 · 11 · 13 39
221 2088450 = 2 · 33 · 52 · 7 · 13 · 17 50
222 4054050 = 2 · 34 · 52 · 7 · 11 · 13 58
223 7657650 = 2 · 32 · 52 · 7 · 11 · 13 · 17 65
224 13783770 = 2 · 34 · 5 · 7 · 11 · 13 · 17 73
225 22972950 = 2 · 33 · 52 · 7 · 11 · 13 · 17 89
226 53603550 = 2 · 32 · 52 · 72 · 11 · 13 · 17 93
Table 4.2: For a given Lbound (column 1), the value Lbest (column 2) gives
the value of L ≤ Lbound resulting in the largest set of primes P(L), subject
to the additional restriction that p = 3 mod 4 for all p ∈ P(L).
take.
Thus it is desirable to find L such that |P(L)| is as large as possible. In turn, this
heuristically depends on L being as smooth as possible, since such an L has many
factors f and therefore many possible candidates p = f + 1 that, if prime, can be
included in P(L). This analysis of course depends on the primality of the different
values f + 1 being in some sense independent for the different factors f of L; this is
a reasonable assumption given standard heuristics on the distribution of primes.
For various bounds Lbound, we have computed the value of L ≤ Lbound giving the
largest set P(L), where we impose the restriction L = 2 mod 4 to ensure the primes
in P(L) are all 3 mod 4. This was done by a brute-force search. The results are
shown in Table 4.2, and bear out our heuristic analysis suggesting that smooth L
make the best choices.
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Example 4.3. Suppose L = 53603550 = 2 · 32 · 52 · 72 · 11 · 13 · 17. Then |P(L)| = 93
with:
P(L) = {19, 23, 31, 43, 67, 71, 79, 103, 127, 131, 151, 199, 211, 239, 307, 331, 443,
463, 491, 547, 631, 859, 883, 911, 991, 1051, 1123, 1171, 1327, 1471, 1531,
1667, 1871, 1951, 2003, 2143, 2311, 2551, 2731, 3571, 3823, 3851, 4951,
4999, 5851, 6007, 7151, 7351, 8191, 9283, 10711, 11467, 11551, 16831,
17851, 19891, 22051, 23563, 26951, 27847, 28051, 33151, 34651, 41651,
42043, 43759, 46411, 50051, 53551, 54979, 57331, 72931, 77351, 91631
102103, 117811, 124951, 126127, 150151, 232051, 242551, 286651,
324871, 350351, 450451, 824671, 1051051, 1093951, 1191191, 1624351,
2144143, 4873051, 10720711}.
As representative examples, the following Carmichael numbers with, respectively 8
and 16 prime factors, can then be obtained by running a simple search algorithm
over subsets of P(L) to find subsets whose products are 1 mod L:
C8 = 19 · 23 · 43 · 239 · 859 · 9283 · 11467 · 242551





Our SAGE [148] implementation of the Erdös method running on a 3.3GHz processor
took 4.83 seconds to find C8 and 1.78 seconds to find C16. The code used to generate
these examples can be found in Appendix A.1.
It would be tempting to think that this method could easily be scaled-up to numbers
of cryptographic size. However, this is not so easy. To illustrate, suppose we wanted
to construct a 1024-bit n with, say, m = 8 prime factors, all having about 128 bits.
This would necessitate using an L substantially larger than 2128, which would make
the direct approach of finding a product p1 · · · p8 = 1 mod L infeasible; even the
TMTO version would require prohibitive time and memory, on the order of 264 of
each.
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4.3.3 The Method of Granville and Pomerance
The second method of generating Carmichael numbers that we consider is due to
Granville and Pomerance [67]. This takes a small Carmichael number with m
(known) factors and produces from it a larger Carmichael number, also with m
factors. It is based on the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5 (Granville and Pomerance [67]). Let n = p1p2 · · · pm be a Carmichael
Number. Let L = lcm(pi − 1) and let M be any integer with M ≡ 1 mod L. Set
qi = 1 + M(pi − 1). Then N = q1 · · · qm is a Carmichael number whenever each qi
is prime.
Recall that we are interested in Carmichael numbers N in which all prime factors
are congruent to 3 mod 4. Fortunately, as the following lemma shows, the method
of Granville and Pomerance ‘preserves’ this property.
Lemma 4.1. With notation as in Theorem 4.5, suppose pi ≡ 3 (mod 4). Then
qi = 3 (mod 4).
Proof. The integer L is even as it is the least common multiple of even integers
pi − 1. But M ≡ 1 (mod L) implies that M is odd; write M = 2s + 1. Moreover,
since pi = 3 mod 4, we have pi − 1 = 2di with di odd; write di = 2ti + 1. Then
qi = 1 +M(pi − 1) = 1 + (2s+ 1)(4ti + 2) = 3 + 4(2sti + s+ ti), which is evidently
3 mod 4.
There are two important choices of variable in this method: M and the starting
Carmichael number n.
Clearly, the properties of the resulting Carmichael number N are dependent on n,
for example the value of each prime factor mod 4 (as seen in Lemma 4.1) and the
number m of these factors.
The effects of M are more subtle. In particular, we need to select an M such that all
the resulting qi = 1 +M(pi−1) are prime. Using the heuristic that the values qi are
as likely to be prime as random choices of odd qi of the same size, the probability
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that a random choice of M yields m primes is approximately (2/ ln(B))m where B
is a bound on the qi. This probability drops very quickly for N of cryptographic
size and even moderate m. For example, with B of 128 bits and m = 8 (so that
the target N has 1024 bits), we obtain (2/ ln(B))m ≈ 2−43.77. Clearly then, simply
making random choices of M is unlikely to yield candidates of cryptographically
interesting sizes in a reasonable amount of time. We therefore turn to investigating
methods for improving the probability that the qi are all prime by careful choice of
M .
4.3.4 The Selection of M in the Method of Granville and Pomerance
The only requirement on M coming from Theorem 4.5 is that M ≡ 1 (mod L),
where L = lcm(pi − 1). However, by a careful choice of M we can both ensure that
this is true, and that the resulting values qi = 1 + M(pi − 1) are more likely to be
prime than if M was chosen at random.
Our approach is inspired by techniques originally introduced in [81, 80] for generating
primes on low-end processors. There, one considers numbers of the form p = kH+δ
where H is smooth (say, H is the product of the first h primes, H =
∏h
i=1 si), δ is
chosen to be co-prime to H, and k is a free parameter. Then p is guaranteed to be
divisible by each of s1, . . . , sh, since p = δ 6= 0 mod si. By choosing different values of
k, one can generate different candidates for p, and test them for primality. Numbers
p generated in this way have a higher probability of being prime than uniformly
random candidates, since they are effectively guaranteed to pass trial divisions by
each of the small primes dividing H. We refer to this process as ‘sieving’ by the
primes s1, s2, . . . , sh. An analysis using the inclusion-exclusion principle can be used
to evaluate the increase in probability that can be achieved by this means; a factor
of 5 increase is typical even for moderate values of h, since many small divisors can
be eliminated.
We present an adaptation of this method to generate candidates for M in the method
of Granville and Pomerance, such that the resulting qi are guaranteed to be indivis-
ible by many small primes.
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Since M = 1 (mod L), we can write M = kL + 1, where k now becomes the free
parameter in the construction method. Then
qi − 1 = M(pi − 1) = (kL+ 1)(pi − 1) = kLpi + pi − kL− 1.
Rearranging, we get:
qi = kLpi + pi − kL = kL(pi − 1) + pi.
Note that, typically, many small primes will divide L because L is the least common
multiple of the pi − 1. This is especially so if we use the Erdös method to generate
the starting Carmichael number n, since it starts with a smooth number which all
the pi − 1 will divide.
Now none of the primes dividing L can be a pi (again, because L is the least common
multiple of the pi − 1). For each such prime p, we have:
qi = pi 6= 0 mod p.
Hence, we are assured that qi is not divisible by any of the prime divisors of L: we
achieve ‘free’ sieving on qi for every such divisor.
Now we consider other primes (not equal to any of the pi, and not dividing L). Let
s denote such a prime, and suppose we choose k such that s divides k. Recalling
that M = kL+ 1, then we get:
qi = kL(pi − 1) + pi = pi 6= 0 mod s.
Hence, by choosing k so that it is divisible by a product of primes sj that do not
equal any of the pi nor any of the divisors of L, we also obtain sieving on all the sj .
Of course, we can include an additional factor when building k to ensure that the
resulting qi are of any desired bit-size and that there are sufficiently many choices
for k (and thence M). In what follows, we write k = k′
∏
j sj for some collection of
primes sj subject to the above constraints; k
′ now replaces k as the free parameter
in the construction.
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The overall sieving effectiveness will be determined by the collection of prime factors
present in L and the sj . Let us denote the complete set of primes from these two
sources as {s1, . . . , sh}. Then the fraction of non-prime candidates for each qi that









This follows easily by noting that a fraction 1 − 1si of integers are not divisible by







, and hence the probability that a randomly sampled odd integer
is divisible by at least one si is σ. This means that the prime values of qi are now
concentrated in a fraction 1 − σ of the initial set of candidates, so that a random
selection from this reduced set is 1/(1 − σ) times more likely to result in a prime.
Notice that the effect here is multiplicative across all m of the qi – they all benefit
from the sieving on the si. Note too how powerful the prime s = 3 is in sieving,
contributing a factor 2/3 to the product term determining σ.
The overall effect is to improve the success probability for each trial of the modified
Granville-Pomerance construction (involving a choice of k′) from (2/ ln(B))m to
(2/(1− σ) ln(B))m.
Example 4.4. Using a C implementation of the modified Granville-Pomerance con-
struction, with the Carmichael number C8 of Example 4.3 as the starting value n
and L = 53603550, we found that choosing
k = 7891867750444302551322686487
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Here, q8, the largest prime factor, has 137 bits.
As pointed out in Section 4.3.3, with B of 128 bits and m = 8 (so that the target
N has 1024 bits), we estimate the standard Granville-Pomerance construction to
have a success rate of (2/ ln(B))m ≈ 2−43.8 per trial, so that the expected number of
trials would be about 243.8. With our modified version of the Granville-Pomerance
construction we obtain sieving on each of the qi by the primes 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17 that
divide L (in this case, we did not add any more primes to k to improve the sieving
further). This gives us σ = 0.6393 and therefore reduces the expected number of
trials by a factor of about 1/(1 − σ)m ≈ 211.8 to roughly 232 trials. Finding the
above N using our ‘C’ implementation actually took 231.51 trials and less than one
core-hour running on 3.3GHz CPUs.
The above example illustrates that we can generate numbers that are of crypto-
graphically interesting size, have a controlled number of prime factors (and there-
fore achieve a given smoothness bound), achieve the upper bound of Theorem 4.3
on the number of Miller-Rabin non-witnesses, and hence maximise the probability
of passing random-base Miller-Rabin primality tests.
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4.4 Fooling Diffie-Hellman Parameter Validation in the Safe-
Prime Setting
In this section, we target the problem of producing Diffie-Hellman parameters for
the prime order setting, where the parameters are able to pass validity tests on the
parameters but where the relevant Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is relatively
easy.
A Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameter set (p, q, g) in the prime order setting is formed
of a prime p with g ∈ Zp generating a group of prime order q, where q | p − 1. As
explained in both Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 and Section 4.1 of this chapter, validating
the correctness of DH parameters is vital in ensuring the subsequent security of the
DH key exchange. As also explained there, Bleichenbacher [26] provided an extreme
example of this in the context of Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE):
he showed that a client that accepts bad DH parameters in the SRP protocol can
be subject to an offline dictionary attack on its password. Here, the attacker im-
personates the server in a run of the SRP protocol, and induces the client to send
a password-dependent protocol message; the attacker’s ability to solve the DLP is
what enables the offline password recovery.
DH validation checks should consist of primality tests on both p and q as well as
a verification that p = kq + 1 for some integer k. The checks should also ensure
that the given generator g generates the subgroup of order q. The security is based
in part on size of q: it must still be large enough to thwart the Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm for solving the DLP. For prime q, this algorithm runs in time O(
√
q).
In Chapter 3 we already showed how to subvert DH parameters in the case where
k is permitted to be large and where a weak primality test based on Miller-Rabin
with a small number of rounds is permitted. For example, we selected q to be of the
form (2x + 1)(4x + 1) with both factors prime, and then tried k of a suitable size
until kq + 1 was prime. This gives an O(q1/4) algorithm using the Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm in the subgroups of orders 2x+ 1 and 4x+ 1, with q passing t rounds of
random-base Miller-Rabin testing with the best possible probability 4−t (this coming
from the Monier-Rabin bound).
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However, many implementations insist on using DH parameters in which p is a safe
prime; that is, they require p = 2q+1, in which case g must have order q or 2q if it is
not equal to ±1. OpenSSL in its default setting is a good example of such a library.
Insisting on safe primes to a large extent eliminates small subgroup attacks. It is also
a good option in the context of protocols like SSL/TLS in which a server following
the specification only provides p and g but not q.2 As noted in the introduction of
this chapter, the techniques of the previous chapter do not extend to the safe-prime
setting, since they need the flexibility in k to force p = kq + 1 to be prime. The
resulting q would also be too large and have too few prime factors to make the
Pohlig-Hellman algorithm effective.
This leaves open the problem of fooling DH parameter validation upon safe prime
parameter sets, when random-base Miller-Rabin tests are used for checking p and q
(as should be the case in practice, in light of the work of [8] and [26]).
4.4.1 Generating Carmichael Numbers q such that p = 2q + 1 is Prime
To summarise the above discussion, we wish to construct a number q such that q
and p = 2q+1 both pass random-base Miller-Rabin primality testing, and such that
q is sufficiently smooth that the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm can be used to solve the
DLP in some subgroup mod p.
Our approach parallels that of [26]: we construct q as a large Carmichael number
with m prime factors that are all 3 mod 4 using the techniques from the previous
section. Then q will pass random-base Miller-Rabin primality tests with the highest
possible probability amongst all integers with m prime factors. After constructing
a candidate q, we test 2q + 1 for primality (using a robust primality test), rejecting
q if this test fails, and stopping if it passes. If 2q + 1 is prime, then the DLP in the
subgroup of order q can be solved with O(mB1/2) effort where B is an upper bound
on the prime factors of q.
The approach just described will fail in practice. The first reason is that it is unlikely
2For if p is not a safe prime, then the client is forced to blindly accept the parameters or to do
an expensive computation to factorise p− 1 and then test g for different possible orders arising as
factors of p− 1. We know of no cryptographic library that does the latter.
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that 2q + 1 will happen to be prime by chance (the probability is about 1/ ln q by
standard density estimates for primes). The second reason is that there may be
arithmetic reasons why 2q+ 1 can never be prime. We investigate and resolve these
issues next.
4.4.1.1 Sieving for 2q + 1
We begin by examining the method of Granville and Pomerance and its consequences
for the values of 2q + 1 modulo small primes.
Assume we have some starting Carmichael number n = p1 · · · pm, and we apply the
method of Granville and Pomerance, setting qi = M(pi − 1) + 1 where M = 1 + kL
and L = lcm(pi − 1). We assume k is such that the qi are all prime, and we write
q = q1 · · · qm for the resulting Carmichael number.
Lemma 4.2. With notation as above, for all primes s dividing kL, we have that
2q + 1 = 2n+ 1 (mod s).
Proof. Since qi = M(pi− 1) + 1 = (1 + kL)(pi− 1) + 1, it follows that for any prime
s with s | kL we have qi = pi (mod s), therefore 2q + 1 ≡ 2n+ 1 (mod s).
The importance of the above lemma is that we can determine at the outset, based
only on the small starting Carmichael number n, whether 2q + 1 will be divisible
by each of the primes s or not. In particular, we should just ignore any n for which
2n + 1 ≡ 0 (mod s) for any of the primes s dividing L or k, since then 2q + 1 can
never be prime. Typically, there are many such primes s, since L is usually rather
smooth, arising as the least common multiple of the pi − 1. This is particularly so
when the Erdös method is used to construct n.
4.4.1.2 The Prime 3
The prime 3 plays a particularly important role when applying our sieving trick in
the method of Granville and Pomerance: it contributes a factor 2/3 to the product
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when computing σ. It is therefore desirable to keep 3 as a factor
of kL in the construction. On the other hand, the above lemma then imposes the
necessary condition 2n + 1 6= 0 mod 3 for 2q + 1 to be prime; this in turn requires
n = 0 mod 3 or n = 2 mod 3.
We consider the two cases n = 0 mod 3 and n = 2 mod 3.
The case n = 0 mod 3: In this case, we have 3 | n, and so we can set p1 = 3.
Recall that, in our approach, n = p1 · · · pm will be obtained using the Erdös method,
in which case p1 = 3 is contained in the set P(L∗) (henceforth L∗ denotes the smooth
number used in the Erdös method; we use L∗ to distinguish it from L = lcm(pi− 1)
in the method of Granville and Pomerance – they are often equal but need not be
so). From the conditions on P(L∗), we deduce that 3 - L∗. Since each prime in
P(L∗) is constructed by adding 1 to a factor of L∗, we deduce that p = 2 mod 3
for every p ∈ P(L∗) \ {3}. Since we will also have p = 3 mod 4 by choice of L∗, we
deduce that p = 11 mod 12 for every p ∈ P(L∗) \ {3}.
Hence, in the case where 3 appears as a factor in the starting Carmichael number
n, and n is obtained via the Erdös method, then the remaining primes arising as
factors of n must all be 11 mod 12. This happens automatically in the Erdös method
simply by ensuring 3 - L∗.
The case n = 2 mod 3: In this case, we can show that pi = 2 mod 3 for all primes
pi arising as factors of n. For suppose that pi = 1 mod 3 for some i. This implies
3 | pi − 1. By Korselt’s criterion, we deduce that 3 | n− 1, and hence n = 1 mod 3.
This contradicts our starting assumption on n.
Moreover, it is easy to see that we must take m, the number of prime factors of n,
to be odd in this case. For n =
∏m
i=1 pi = 2
m mod 3, and so n = 2 mod 3 if and only
if m is odd.
Hence, in the case where n = 2 mod 3, we are forced to use a starting Carmichael
number with m odd in which pi = 2 mod 3 for each prime factor pi (whether or
not we use the Erdös method). This may sound overly restrictive. But, fortunately,
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we have already seen how to arrange this for the Erdös method: we simply need to
ensure that 3 - L∗, where L∗ denotes the smooth number used in that construction,
and then all but one of the primes p ∈ P(L∗) will satisfy this requirement. We then
remove p = 3 from P(L∗) when running the last step in the Erdös method.
4.4.1.3 Other Primes
Of course, Lemma 4.2 imposes a single condition on n for every other prime s dividing
kL, but these conditions are much less restrictive than that in the case s = 3, and
so we do not investigate the implications for the pi any further here.
4.4.1.4 Completing the Construction
We have now assembled all the tools necessary to produce a suitable Carmichael
number n such that when the method of Granville and Pomerance is applied to
produce q from n, then 2q + 1 6= 0 mod 3; moreover q will attain the bound of
Theorem 4.3 on S(q), the number of Miller-Rabin non-witnesses for q, namely S(q) =
ϕ(q)/2m−1. Our procedure is as follows:
1. We use the first step of the Erdös method with an L∗ such that 2 | L∗, 4 - L∗,
3 - L∗. This ensures that the resulting set P(L∗) contains the prime 3, and a
collection of other primes that are all 11 mod 12.3
2. We remove 3 from P(L∗) and run the second step of the Erdös method with
an odd m to find a subset of primes p1, . . . , pm such that n := p1 · · · pm = 1
(mod L); n is then a Carmichael number with m prime factors that are all
11 mod 12 and therefore both 3 mod 4 and 2 mod 3.
3. We set L = lcm(pi−1) and test the condition 2n+1 6= 0 mod s for each prime
factor s of L (cf. Lemma 4.2). If any test fails, we go back to the previous step
and generate another n.
3Of course, one could choose not to restrict L∗ in this way and just filter the resulting set P(L∗)
for primes that are 11 mod 12, but this involves wasted computation and the use of larger L∗ than
is necessary.
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4. Integer n is then used in the method of Granville and Pomerance to produce
candidates for q (in which the qi are all prime). By construction of the pi, we
will have 3 - L in the Granville-Pomerance method, but we desire 3 | kL in
view of the power of sieving by 3 in that method. We therefore set k = 3k′ for
k′ of suitable size when running this step, introducing the prime 3 in k.
5. Finally, we test 2q + 1 for primality. By choice of n, we are guaranteed that
2q + 1 6= 0 mod 3 and 2q + 1 6= 0 mod s for each prime divisor s of L, so we
are assured that 2q + 1 will not be divisible by certain (small) primes.
Note that the procedure as described focusses on the case n = 2 mod 3. An alter-
native procedure could be developed for the case n = 0 mod 3. The procedure can
be enhanced by setting k at step 4 to contain additional prime factors s beyond
3 not already found in L, to increase the effect of sieving. Of course, in view of
Lemma 4.2, certain bad choices of s should be avoided at this stage.
4.4.2 Examples of Cryptographic Size
Using the method described above, we now give two examples of Carmichael numbers
q such that p = 2q+ 1 is a 1024-bit prime. In the first example q is the product of 9
prime factors, which by construction will pass a random-base Miller-Rabin primality
test with probability approximately 1/28. Since the largest factor of q is 121 bits
in size, the DLP in the subgroup of order q mod p for this parameter set can be
solved in approximately 9 · 260.5 ≈ 264 operations. In the second example, q is the
product of 11 prime factors, which by construction will pass a random-base Miller-
Rabin primality test with probability approximately 1/210. However, because the
q with 11 factors is smoother, with largest factor 100 bits in size, the DLP in the
subgroup of order q mod p for this parameter set can be solved in approximately
11 · 250 ≈ 254 operations. We give both these examples to illustrate the trade-off
between the probability of a parameter set being accepted and the work required to
solve the DLP for that parameter set.
Example 4.5. Using SAGE [148] we examined all L∗ < 230 such that 2 | L∗,
4 - L∗, 3 - L∗. We found the largest set of primes P(L∗) was produced when
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L = 565815250 = 2 · 53 · 72 · 11 · 13 · 17 · 19. Here, |P(L∗)| = 53 (including the prime
3).
Then, using the Erdös method with L∗ = 565815250 we generated the 9-factor
Carmichael number
n = 1712969394960887942534921587572251
= 71 · 131 · 647 · 1871 · 4523 · 4751 · 46751 · 350351 · 432251.
Using the procedure described above, we found that k = 3k′ with
k′ = 1844674409176776955124
produced a 9-factor, 1023-bit Carmichael number q such that n = 2q+1 is a 1024-bit
prime.
To generate a target q with 1023 bits, with m = 9 factors each around 114 bits in
size, we estimate the standard Granville-Pomerance construction to have a success
rate of (2/ ln(B))m ≈ 2−47.73 per trial, so that the expected number of trials would
be about 247.7. With our modified version of the Granville-Pomerance construction
we obtain sieving on each of the qi by the primes 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19 that divide L and
the prime 3 since it divides k. This gives us σ = 0.658 and therefore reduces the
expected number of trials by about 1/(1 − σ)m ≈ 213.9 to roughly 233.8 trials. We
then need to consider the probability that the q produced is such that p = 2q + 1 is
also prime. By Lemma 4.2 we know that we obtain sieving on 2q+1 from all primes
s | kL, hence a success rate of (2/(1 − σ) ln(21024)) ≈ 2−6.9. Therefore we expect
to require 233.8+6.9 = 240.7 total trials. Finding the above q such that p = 2q + 1 is
prime actually took 238.15 trials, so we were somewhat lucky. Our implementation
is in ‘C’ and ran for 136 core-days on 3.2GHz CPUs.
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Since 2q ≡ 1 (mod p) we can set a generator g = 2 to obtain a complete set of
DH parameters (p, q, g). By construction q will pass a random-base Miller-Rabin
primality test with probability approximately 1/28. Since q9, the largest factor of q,
is 121 bits in size, the DLP in the subgroup of order q mod p for this parameter set
can be solved in approximately 9 · 260.5 ≈ 264 operations.
The C code used to generate this example can be found in Appendix A.2.
Example 4.6. Again, using the Erdös method with L∗ = 565815250 we generated
the 11-factor Carmichael number
n = 96647594591145401276131753609264751
= 23 · 71 · 191 · 419 · 491 · 3851 · 4523 · 4751 · 9311 · 17291 · 113051.
Using the procedure described above, we found that k = 3k′ with
k′ = 3994916512074331
produced a 11-factor, 1023-bit Carmichael number q such that p = 2q + 1 is a
1024-bit prime.
To generate a target q with 1023 bits, with m = 11 factors each around 93 bits in size,
we estimate the standard Granville-Pomerance construction to have a success rate of
(2/ ln(B))m ≈ 2−55.11 per trial, so that the expected number of trials would be about
255.1. Again, using our modified version of the Granville-Pomerance construction
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we sieve as in the previous example to reduce the expected number of trials by
about 1/(1 − 0.658)m ≈ 217 to roughly 238.1 trials. Then again by considering the
probability that the q produced is such that 2q+1 is also prime we expect to require
238.1+6.9 = 245 total trials. Finding the above q such that 2q + 1 was prime took
244.83 trials. The computation using our ‘C’ implementation ran for 1680 core-days
on 3.3GHz CPUs.












Since 2q ≡ 1 (mod p) we can set a generator g = 2 to obtain a complete set of
DH parameters (p, q, g). By construction q will pass a random-base Miller-Rabin
primality test with probability approximately 1/210. Since q11, the largest factor of
q, is 100 bits in size, the DLP in the subgroup of order q mod p for this parameter
set can be solved in approximately 11 · 250 ≈ 254 operations.
4.4.3 Application to OpenSSL and PAKE protocols
OpenSSL provides the DH parameter verification function DH check in dh check.c.
This function takes a DH parameter set (p, q, g) and performs primality testing on
both p and q. A safe-prime setting is enforced by default, and if q is not provided
then it is calculated from p via q = (p− 1)/2. For this reason, we were not able to
create malicious DH parameter sets passing OpenSSL’s testing using the approach
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in Chapter 3. However, using the work of this chapter we are now able to create
such parameter sets.
The primality test that OpenSSL uses is BN is prime ex; this performs t rounds of
random-base Miller-Rabin testing, where t is determined by the bit-size of p and
q. Since p and q are 1024 and 1023 bits respectively, t = 3 rounds of Miller-Rabin
are performed, at least in versions prior to OpenSSL 1.1.1pre9, 1.1.0i and 1.0.2p
(released 14th August 2018). From versions 1.1.1pre9, 1.1.0i and 1.0.2p onwards,
t was increased to 5, with the aim of achieving 128 bits of security instead of 80
bits.4 This change was made based from disclosures of the findings of Chapter 3
to OpenSSL: the numbers 3 and 5 were selected based on estimates for the average
case performance of Miller-Rabin primality testing, with the OpenSSL developers
implicitly assuming that p and q are generated randomly rather than maliciously.
For the DH parameter set given in Example 4.5, we know that q has ϕ(q)/28 Miller-
Rabin non-witnesses, and thus a probability of approximately 1/28 of being declared
prime by a single round of Miller-Rabin testing. Hence this DH parameter set will
be accepted by DH check as being valid with probability approximately 2−24 (and
the lower probability of 2−40 in versions 1.1.1pre9, 1.1.0i and 1.0.2p of OpenSSL).
This may seem like a small probability, and indeed it is in a scenario where, say,
malicious DH parameters are hard-coded into a server by a developer with the hope
of later compromising honestly established TLS sessions between a client and a
server: only 1 in 224 sessions would be successfully established, and the malicious
DH parameters would be quickly spotted if ever careful validation were to be carried
out.
Consider instead a PAKE scenario like that envisaged by Bleichenbacher [26]. Here,
a client and server use some hypothetical PAKE protocol which relies on DH param-
eters as part of the protocol, with the server supplying the DH parameters. Assume
OpenSSL’s DH parameter validation is used by the client. Then an attacker im-
personating the server to the client has a 1 in 224 chance of fooling the client into
using a weak set of DH parameters. For specific PAKE protocols, this may allow
the client’s password to be recovered thereafter. For example, this is the case for
4Interestingly, the last time these iteration counts were changed was in February 2000 (OpenSSL
version 0.9.5), before which they were all 2, independent of the bit-size of the number being tested.
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SRP [162, 152], as seen in [26]. It is also true of J-PAKE [72]: in this protocol,
the client in a first flow sends values g1 = g
x1 , g2 = g
x2 , while the server sends
g3 = g
x3 , g4 = g
x4 (along with proofs of knowledge of the exponents). In the second
flow in J-PAKE, the client sends (g1g3g4)
x2s where s is the password or a derivative
of it. At this point, the attacker aborts the protocol, and uses its ability to solve
the DLP to recover x2 from the first flow and then again to recover x2s and thence
s from the second flow.
We pick SRP and J-PAKE here only as illustrative examples; many other proto-
cols would be similarly affected. We also note that the specification for using SRP
in TLS [152] makes careful mention of the need to use trusted DH parameters,
and gives examples of suitable parameter sets. However, [152] states that clients
SHOULD only accept group parameters that come from a trusted source, leaving
open the possibility for implementations to use parameters from untrusted sources
(to remove that possibility the IETF reserved term “MUST” should have been used).
Meanwhile J-PAKE [72] just assumes that the DH parameters are agreed in advance
and suggests some methods and sources for obtaining parameters. This does not re-
move the possibility of the parties using bad parameters and side-steps the important
problem of parameter verification.
The power of the attack in the PAKE scenario is that the client has a secret that an
attacker would like to learn; the attacker then gains an advantage by impersonating
the server in a standard attack scenario. This is different from a protocol like
TLS where there is no such static secret and the server is usually authenticated
and therefore hard to impersonate; there we require a “malicious developer” attack
scenario.
The attack can be carried out repeatedly to boost its success probability, and it
can be done across a large population of users in a stealthy manner. Thus even a
small per-attempt success probability of 2−24 may represent a significant weakness
in practice.
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4.4.4 OpenSSL Disclosure and Mitigations
As remediation to attacks of this form, we recommend that OpenSSL and other
cryptographic libraries modify their DH parameter testing code to carry out stronger
primality tests – as our analysis shows, 3 rounds of random-base Miller-Rabin testing
is insufficient; 5 rounds are better in that it reduces the success probability of our
attack to 2−40, but this is still far from the 128-bit security level that the OpenSSL
developers have targeted.
As part of ongoing work with the developers of OpenSSL to improve security within
primality testing and prime parameter validation, we disclosed the findings of this
work to OpenSSL. This resulted in a contribution to the OpenSSL codebase by a
pull request5 to increase the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin performed during
the primality test on Diffie-Hellman parameters p and q during the check found in
DH check. This update modified the primality tests within DH check to perform at
the 128-bit security level, by replacing the call to set the number of Miller-Rabin
rounds on the bit-size of the parameters with an enforced 64 rounds. This request
was accepted by reviewers and merged into OpenSSL in March 2019 and was utilised
as part of OpenSSL 1.1.1c in May 2019. A preferable solution would have been to
change the primality test itself to be safe under all use cases rather than to make
a bespoke change to the DH parameter testing, and this is something we go on to
address in Chapter 5.
5see https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2500c093aa1e9c90c11c415053c0a27a00661d0d.
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4.5 The Elliptic Curve Setting
An elliptic curve over a prime field Fp in short Weierstrass form is the set of solutions
(x, y) ∈ Fp × Fp satisfying an equation of the type y2 = x3 + ax+ b, where a, b ∈ Fp
satisfy 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0, together with the point at infinity O. When using a scheme
such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), one typically transmits a description
of the used curve via a set of domain parameters as part of the protocol, uses hard-
coded parameters, or uses a standardised ‘named’ curve. An ECDH parameter set
is typically composed of (p,E, P, q, h), where E is a description of the elliptic curve
equation (typically represented by a and b), P is a base point that generates a
subgroup of order q on the curve and h is the cofactor of this subgroup.
Analogously to our attacks on the parameter sets on finite field DH, we can create
malicious ECDH parameter sets. The idea is to first construct a composite number
q that is designed to be declared ‘probably prime’ by a target implementation of a
probabilistic primality test but which is actually reasonably smooth, then retroac-
tively construct a curve of suitable order n = h · q. This can be done using the
algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen [32].
Depending on the specific structure of n, a composite order will expose ECDH to
attacks like Lim-Lee style small subgroup attacks as in [92], or may aid in solving the
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) in the order q subgroup. For
this we would use the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm to solve ECDLP in time O(B1/2)
where B is an upper bound on the largest prime factor of q. For example, we could
produce a 256-bit q with 4 prime factors, and hope to use the algorithm of Bröker
and Stevenhagen to find a suitable curve over a 256-bit prime p of order n = h · q
possibly even with h = 1. During parameter validation, q would pass a single round
of the Miller-Rabin test with probability 1/8. And the ECDLP could be solved with
effort approximately 4 · 232 = 234 group operations.
4.5.1 The Algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen
This subsection was written by Steven Galbraith. Steven provided us with the method-
ology of creating elliptic curves in this way as well as the implementation included in
131
4.5 The Elliptic Curve Setting
Appendix A.3. I provided Steven with the pseudoprime parameters that matched his
requested criteria (e.g. a composite number n with the highest probability of passing
a Miller-Rabin test, such that n was 256-bit and had 4 composite factors) which
allowed Steven to produce the Examples in Section 4.5.2.
For completeness, we give a short exposition of the algorithm of Bröker and Steven-
hagen [32].
An elliptic curve E over Fp has #E(Fp) = p + 1 − t points where |t| < 2
√
p. The
endomorphism ring of E contains Z[
√
t2 − 4p], which is a subring of the imaginary
quadratic field K = Q(
√
t2 − 4p). Conversely, if E is an elliptic curve over a number
field whose endomorphism ring is the ring of integers of K, then (by the Complex
Multiplication theory of elliptic curves) the reduction modulo p of E is an elliptic
curve over Fp and, by taking a suitable isomorphism (a twist), we may ensure that
the reduced curve has p+ 1− t points.
The algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen exploits these ideas. Given an integer n,
the first step is to construct a prime p and an integer t such that p+ 1− t = n and
such that Q(
√
t2 − 4p) has small discriminant D. Once this is done, the curve E
is constructed using standard tools in Complex Multiplication (namely the Hilbert
class polynomial).
We now briefly sketch the first step of the algorithm. The input is an integer n, and
we wish to construct an elliptic curve with n points.
Let D < 0 be a discriminant of an imaginary quadratic field. We will try to find
(p, t) such that t2 − 4p = f2D for some f ∈ N. We also need p + 1 − t = n and so
p = n+ t− 1. If t2 − 4p = f2D then
(t− 2)2 − f2D = t2 − f2D − 4t+ 4 = 4(p− t+ 1) = 4n.
Hence, to construct a curve with n points it suffices to choose a discriminant D, solve
the equation w2 − f2D = 4n, and then check whether n+ (w + 2)− 1 = n+ w + 1
is prime. Note that if ` | n then w2 − f2D ≡ 0 (mod `) and so (D` ) 6= −1.
An important ingredient is Cornacchia’s algorithm [37], which solves the equation
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w2 − f2D = 4n (note that D < 0, so the left hand side is positive definite and the
equation only has finitely many solutions). Cornacchia’s algorithm starts by taking
as input an integer x0 such that x
2
0 ≡ D (mod 4n).
Putting everything together, the algorithm is as follows (we refer to [32] for the full
details). Let n = `1 · · · `k be the target group order. Search over all D < 0 such
that D ≡ 0, 1 (mod 4), up to some bound |D| < Dbound. Ensure that (D`i ) ≥ 0
for all `i | n. Determine all solutions x0 ∈ Z/4nZ such that x20 ≡ D (mod 4n)
and run Cornacchia’s algorithm for each. Whenever we find an integer solution
w2 − f2D = 4n check whether p = n+ w + 1 is prime. If so, output (p, t).
Note that the algorithm is not guaranteed to succeed for a given integer n, because
we are restricting to |D| < Dbound. In our application this is not a serious problem,
because we are able to generate many viable choices for n.
In practice one usually desires elliptic curves of order q (supposed to be prime) or
whose group order is 4q (Edwards and Montgomery curves have group order divisible
by 4). We make one remark about the case when n = 4q is even. If D is odd then
any solution (w, f) to w2 − f2D = 4n has w odd, and so t is odd. If n is odd then
this means p = n+w+1 is odd, which is all good, whereas if n is even then p cannot
be prime when D is odd, so when n is odd we must use odd discriminants D. On
the other hand, when n is even then we can take D even (so that w and t will be
even and so p = n+ w + 1 will be odd).
4.5.2 Examples
We implemented the algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen [32] in SAGE, and ran it
with q that are 256-bit Carmichael numbers with 3 and 4 prime factors, all congru-
ent to 3 mod 4. These were generated using methods described in Section 4.3. By
design, these values of q pass random-base Miller-Rabin primality testing with prob-
ability 1/4 and 1/8 per iteration, respectively. We used an early abort strategy for
each q and estimate a success probability of roughly 1/4 for each q we tried. When
successful, the computations took less than a minute on a laptop. The SAGE code
for the first stage (finding p, t) of the 3-prime case can be found in the Appendix A.3.
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Then q is a Carmichael number with 3 prime factors that are all congruent to
3 mod 4, so q passes random-base Miller-Rabin primality testing with probability
1/4 per iteration. Using the algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen, we obtain the
elliptic curve E(Fp) defined by y2 = x3 + 5, where
p = 58417055476151343628013443570006259007184622249466895656635947464036346655953
such that #E(Fp) = q and p has 256 bits. Every point P on this curve satisfies
[q]P = O, the point at infinity, so any point can be used as a generator (of course
such points may not have order q, but if q is accepted as being prime then this will
not matter). The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm can be used to solve the ECDLP on
this curve using about 3 · 242.5 group operations, since the largest prime factor of q
has 85 bits.





Then q is a Carmichael number with 4 prime factors that are all congruent to
3 mod 4, so q passes random-base Miller-Rabin primality testing with probability
1/8 per iteration. Using the algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen, we obtain the
elliptic curve E(Fp) defined by y2 = x3 + 2, where
p = 63076648027364534028465951740325404957612973168788427535105160157981242952139
such that q = #E(Fp) and p has 256 bits. Every point P on this curve satisfies
[q]P = O, the point at infinity, so any point can be used as a generator. The Pohlig-
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Hellman algorithm can be used to solve the ECDLP on this curve using about 4·233.5
group operations, since the largest prime factor of q has 67 bits.
The two examples above both construct examples of order q. We were also able to
construct examples of order 4q, compatible with applications that use Montgomery
or Edwards curves, see for example [21, 28].





Then q is a Carmichael number with 4 prime factors that are all congruent to
3 mod 4, so q passes random-base Miller-Rabin primality testing with probability
1/8 per iteration. Using the algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen, we obtain the






such that 4q = #E(Fp) and p has 256 bits. Every point P on this curve satisfies
[4q]P = O, the point at infinity, so any point can be used as a generator. The Pohlig-
Hellman algorithm can be used to solve the ECDLP on this curve using about 4·233.5
group operations, since the largest prime factor of q has 67 bits.
We have not attempted to do it, but we see no reason why similar examples could
not be constructed where q passes fixed-base Miller-Rabin primality tests with prob-
ability 1, as per [26].
These examples illustrate the necessity for careful parameter validation, in partic-
ular robust primality testing of q, when accepting bespoke curves in cryptographic
applications.
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4.6 Conclusion and Recommendations
The best countermeasure to malicious DH and ECDH parameter sets is for protocols
and systems to use only widely vetted sets of parameters, and to eliminate any op-
tions for using bespoke parameters. This is already widely done in the elliptic curve
setting, not necessarily because parameter validation is hard, but because suitable
parameter generation is non-trivial in the first place, and because safe and efficient
implementation is much easier with a limited and well-understood set of curves.
Nevertheless, issues can still arise with the provenance of parameter sets. In short,
it is difficult to eliminate suspicion that a curve may have a hidden backdoor unless
the generation process is fully explained and has demonstrably little opportunity
for manipulation; see [20] for an extensive treatment. Similar concerns apply in the
finite field setting, in the light of [63, 54].
On the flip-side is the argument that, in the finite field setting, using a common set
of DH parameters may be inadvisable because, with the best known algorithms for
finding discrete logarithms, the cost of solving many logarithms can be amortised
over the cost of a large pre-computation, making commonly used DH parameter an
even more attractive target. This was a crucial factor in assessing the impact of the
Logjam attack on 512-bit DH arising in export cipher suites in TLS [3].
Our work adds to the weight of argument in favour of using only limited sets of
carefully vetted DH parameters even in the finite field setting. This approach was
recently adopted in TLS 1.3, for example, which in contrast to earlier versions of
the protocol only supports a small set of DH and ECDH parameter sets, with the
allowed DH parameters being specified in [61].
If bespoke parameters must be used, then implementations should employ robust
primality testing as part of parameter validation, using, for example, at least 64
rounds of Miller-Rabin tests, or the Baillie-PSW primality test for which there are
no known pseudoprimes, as discussed in Chapter 3.
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In this chapter we set out to design a performant primality test that provides strong
security guarantees across all use cases and that has the simplest possible API. We
examine different options for the core of our test, describing four different candidate
primality tests and analysing them theoretically and experimentally. We then evalu-
ate the performance of the chosen test in the use case of prime generation and discuss
how our proposed test was fully adopted by the developers of OpenSSL through a
new API and primality test scheduled for release in OpenSSL 3.0 (2020).
5.1 Introduction and Motivation
Primality testing, and closely related tasks like random prime generation and testing
of Diffie-Hellman parameters, are core cryptographic tasks. Primality testing is
by now very well understood mathematically; there is a clear distinction between
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accuracy and running time of different tests in settings that are malicious (i.e. where
the input may be adversarially-selected) and non-malicious (e.g. where the input is
random, as is common in prime generation).
Yet the results of Chapter 3 on how primality testing is actually done in practice have
highlighted the failure of popular cryptographic libraries to provide primality testing
APIs that are “misuse-resistant”, that is, which provide reliable results in all use
cases even when the developer is crypto-naive. Extending Chapter 3, in Chapter 4
we showed how failure to perform robust primality testing in the popular OpenSSL
library has serious security consequences in the face of maliciously generated Diffie-
Hellman parameter sets (see also Bleichenbacher [26] for an earlier example involving
the GNU Crypto library).
The main underlying issue identified in Chapter 3 is that, while all libraries exam-
ined performed well on random inputs, some failed miserably on maliciously crafted
ones in their default settings. Meanwhile code documentation was generally poor
and did not distinguish clearly between the different use cases. And developers were
faced with complex APIs requiring them to understand the distinctions between use
cases and choose parameters to the APIs accordingly. An illustrative example is
provided by the OpenSSL 1.1.1c primality testing code. This requires the devel-
oper using the function BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex1 to pass multiple parameters,
including checks, the number of rounds of Miller-Rabin testing to be carried out;
and do_trial_division, a flag indicating whether or not trial division should be
performed. Setting checks to 0 makes the test default to using a number of rounds
that depends only on the size of the number being tested;2 then the number of
rounds decreases as the size increases, this being motivated by average-case error
estimates for the Miller-Rabin primality test operating on random numbers (see
Table 3.4 in Section 3.3.1). This makes the default setting performant for random
prime generation, but dangerous in potentially hostile settings, e.g. Diffie-Hellman
parameter testing.
As an illustration of how this can go wrong in practice, in Section 4.4.3 we pointed
1See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/
3e3dcf9ab8a2fc0214502dad56d94fd95bcbbfd5/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c#L186.
2Strictly, the default is invoked by setting checks to BN prime checks, an environmental variable
that is set to 0.
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out that OpenSSL (pre-1.1.1c May 2019) itself makes the wrong choice in using the
default setting when testing finite field Diffie-Hellman parameters. We then went on
and exploited this choice to construct Diffie-Hellman parameter sets (p, q, g) of cryp-
tographic size that fool OpenSSL’s parameter validation with a non-trivial success
rate. In response to our work, the Diffie-Hellman parameter validation in OpenSSL
1.1.1c was subsequently changed to remedy this issue (though without changing
the underlying primality test).3 This example provides prima facie evidence that
even very experienced developers can misunderstand how to correctly use complex
primality testing APIs.
One may argue that developers who are not cryptography experts should not be us-
ing such security-sensitive APIs. However, they inevitably will, and, as our OpenSSL
example shows, even expert developers can get it wrong. This motivates the search
for APIs that are “misuse-resistant” or “robust”, and that do not sacrifice perfor-
mance (too much). This search accords with a long line of work that identifies the
problem of API design as being critical for making it possible for developers to write
secure cryptographic software (see [70, 164, 68] amongst others).
5.1.1 Contributions
Given this background, we set out to design a performant primality test that provides
strong security guarantees across all use cases and that has the simplest possible API:
it takes just one input, the number being tested for primality, and returns just one
integer (or Boolean) indicating that the tested number is highly likely to be prime
(1) or is definitely composite (0). We note that none of the many crypto libraries
examined in Chapter 3 provide such an API.
We examine different options for the core of our test – whether to use many rounds
of Miller-Rabin (MR) testing (up to 64 or 128, to achieve false positive rates of
2−128 or 2−256, respectively), or to rely on a more complex primality test, such as
the Baillie-PSW test [134] which combines MR testing with a Lucas test. Based on
a combination of code simplicity, performance and guaranteed security, we opt for
64 rounds of MR as the core of our test.
3See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8593 for our contribution to OpenSSL on
this issue.
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We also study the performance impact of doing trial division prior to more expensive
testing. This is common practice in primality testing code, with the idea being that
one can trade fast but inaccurate trial division for much slower but more accurate
number theoretic tests such as Miller-Rabin. For example, OpenSSL 1.1.1c tests for
divisibility using a fixed list of the first 2047 odd primes. We show that this is a
sub-optimal choice when testing random inputs of common cryptographic sizes, and
that the running time can be reduced substantially by doing trial division with fewer
primes. The optimal amount of trial division to use depends on the size of the input
being tested, though is not a new observation – see for example [105, 102, 82]. What
is more surprising is that OpenSSL chooses so conservatively and with a fixed list
of primes (independent of the input size). For example, with 1024-bit random, odd
inputs, trial division using the first 128 odd primes already removes about 83% of
candidates, while extending the list to 2047 primes, as OpenSSL does, only removes
a further 5.5%. On average, it turns out to be faster to incur the cost of an MR test
on that additional 5.5% than it is to do the full set of trial divisions.
The outcome of our analysis is a primality test whose performance on random, odd,
1024-bit inputs is on average 17% faster than the current OpenSSL test, but which
guarantees that composites are identified with overwhelming probability (1−2−128),
no matter the input distribution. The downside is that, for inputs that are actually
prime rather than random, our test is significantly slower than with OpenSSL’s
default settings (since we do 64 MR tests compared to the handful of tests used by
OpenSSL). This is the price to be paid for a misuse-resistant API.
We then examine how our choice of primality test affects the performance of a crucial
use case for primality testing, namely generation of random k-bit primes. OpenSSL
1.1.1c already includes code for this. It makes use of a sieving step to perform
trial division at reduced cost across many candidates, obviating the need to perform
per-candidate trial division internally to the primality test. OpenSSL avoids the
internal trial division via the above-mentioned do_trial_division input to the
primality test in OpenSSL. Since we do not allow such an input in our simplified
primality testing API, a developer using our API would be (implicitly) forced to
do trial division on a per candidate basis, potentially increasing the cost of prime
generation. Moreover, our primality test may use many more rounds of MR testing
than OpenSSL selects in this case, since our API does not permit the user to vary the
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number of rounds according to the use case. However, for random prime generation,
most candidates are rejected after just one MR test, and so the full cost of our test
(trial division plus 64 rounds of MR testing) is only incurred once, when a prime is
actually encountered. So we seek to understand the performance impact of plugging
our new API and primality test into the existing OpenSSL prime generation code.
We find that, for generation of random 1024-bit primes OpenSSL’s prime generation
code is 35-45% slower when using our primality test internally. For this cost, we
gain an API for primality testing that is as simple as possible and where the test
has strong security guarantees across all use cases.
We communicated our findings to the OpenSSL developers, and they have adopted
our suggestions with only minor modifications: the forthcoming OpenSSL 3.0 (sched-
uled for release in Q4 of 2020) will include our simplified API for primality testing,
and the OpenSSL codebase has been updated to use it almost everywhere (the ex-
ception is prime generation, which uses the old API in order to avoid redundant trial
division). Moreover, OpenSSL will now always use our suggested primality test (64
rounds of MR) on all inputs up to 2048 bits, and 128 rounds of MR on larger inputs.
This represents the first major reform of the primality testing code in OpenSSL for
more than 20 years.
5.1.2 Related Work
The topic of API design for cryptography has a long history and connections to
related fields such as usable security and API design for security more generally.
As early as 2002, Gutmann [70] identified the need to carefully define cryptographic
APIs, recommending to “[p]rovide crypto functionality at the highest level possible
in order to prevent users from injuring themselves and others through misuse of
low-level crypto functions with properties they aren’t aware of.” This is precisely
what we aim to do for primality testing in this chapter.
Later, Wurster and van Oorschot [164] (in the broader context of security) argued
that attention should be focussed on those developers who produce core functionality
used by other developers, e.g. producers of APIs. They identified the need to design
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APIs which can be easily used in a secure fashion.
Green and Smith [68] extensively discuss the need for usable security APIs, and focus
on cryptographic ones. They give an extensive list of requirements for good APIs,
including: APIs should be easy to learn, even without cryptographic expertise;
defaults should be safe and never ambiguous; APIs should be easy to use, even
without documentation; APIs should be hard to misuse and incorrect use should
lead to visible errors. These precepts have influenced our API design for primality
testing.
Acar et al. [2] advocate for a research agenda for usable security and privacy research
that focusses on developers rather than end users. This encompasses cryptography.
Recent research related to this agenda and having a cryptographic focus includes [50,
52, 89, 1, 112, 111, 65].
Nonce-based Authenticated Encryption (AE), a primitive introduced by Rogaway
[138], can be seen as an attempt to simplify the symmetric encryption API for
developers, replacing the need to understand various requirements on IVs with the
arguably simpler need to be able to supply unique (per key) inputs to an encryption
algorithm. It has become the standard target for algorithm designers. However,
as [27] showed, developers can accidentally misuse even this simplified API, with
disastrous results for nonce-sensitive modes like AES-GCM. This motivated the
development of misuse-resistant AE schemes, which attempt to preserve as much
security as possible even when nonces are repeated. Prominent examples include
SIV [139], Deoxys-II (part of the CAESAR competition final portfolio), and AES-
GCM-SIV [69] (see also RFC 8452). Later authors identified the fact that developers
may want an even higher-level API, for example a secure streaming channel like that
provided by TLS [53, 127] or channels that tolerate some forms of reordering and
repetition [30]; the mismatch between what developers want and what nonce-based
AE can provide can lead to attacks, cf. [24].
Bernstein’s design for DH key exchange on Curve25519 [19] deliberately presents
a simple API for developers: public and private keys are represented by 32-byte
strings, and the need for public key validation is avoided.
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The NaCl crypto library [22] has provision of a simple API to developers as one of
its primary aims. It gives the user a crypto_box function that encrypts and au-
thenticates messages, with a simple API of the form: c = crypto_box(m,n,pk,sk),
where m is a message, n is a nonce, pk is the public key of the recipient and sk is
the private key of the sender. Its security does rely on developers correctly han-
dling nonces; we are unaware of reports of any misuse of this type. Some criticism
of NaCl’s approach, especially the way in which it breaks the developer’s expected
paradigm, can be found in [68].
There is an extensive literature on primality testing and generation, nicely sum-
marised in [105, Chapter 4]. The state-of-the-art has not changed significantly since
the publication of that book in 1996. On the other hand, as Chapter 3 showed,
primality testing and generation as it is done in practice has many shortcomings.
Our work can be seen as an effort to narrow the gap between the literature and its
practical application.
5.1.3 Outline
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2 we give further
background on primality testing and detail the approach used in OpenSSL 1.1.1c.
In Section 5.3 we describe four different candidate primality tests and analyse them
theoretically and experimentally. Our chosen primality test (64 rounds of Miller-
Rabin with a varied amount of trial division based upon the bit-size of the number
being tested) emerges from this analysis as our preferred test. We then evaluate the
performance of this chosen test in the use case of prime generation in Section 5.4.
Section 5.5 briefly discusses how our test is being adopted in OpenSSL, while Sec-





In this chapter we will be discussing in depth the three primality tests introduced
in Chapter 2. These are the Miller-Rabin, Lucas and Baillie-PSW tests. We shall
also be discussing the details of the supplementary and preliminary tests (e.g. trial
division).
5.2.1.1 Primality Testing in OpenSSL
Since we will extensively compare our primality test and its API with those of
OpenSSL, we give a detailed description of the approach in OpenSSL 1.1.1c here.
OpenSSL’s primality test is based mainly on the Miller-Rabin test as introduced in
Section 2.4.2 and discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.1. The Miller-Rabin test
is probabilistic, in that a t-round MR test using uniformly random bases declares
any composite number to be composite with probability at least 1− 4−t. Moreover,
this bound is tight: there are composites which are not identified as being such
over t rounds of testing with probability 4−t. Such numbers, then, are worst-case
adversarial inputs for the test. They are treated extensively in Chaper 3. On the
other hand, the test never declares a prime to be composite.
The above discussion holds for any input n, no matter how it is chosen. When n is a
uniformly random odd k-bit integer, much better performance can be assured. For
example, a result of [41] assures that the probability pk,1 that a composite n chosen
in this way passes one round of random-base MR testing is bounded by k242−
√
k.
Thus, for k = 1024, we have pk,1 ≤ 2−40. Using more precise bounds from [41],
this can be improved to pk,1 ≤ 2−42.35. These bounds are what motivates the rather
small numbers of rounds of MR testing in the default setting in OpenSSL’s primality
test.
OpenSSL provides two functions for primality testing: BN is prime ex and BN is-
prime fasttest ex, both in file bn prime.c. The core part of the code is in the
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k t λ (bits)
k ≥ 3747 3 192
k ≥ 1345 4 128
k ≥ 476 5 80
k ≥ 400 6 80
k ≥ 347 7 80
k ≥ 308 8 80
k ≥ 55 27 64
k ≥ 6 34 64
Table 5.1: The default number of rounds t of Miller-Rabin performed by
OpenSSL 1.1.1c when testing k-bit integers determined by the function
BN prime checks for size and the associated bits of security λ.
second of these, while the first simply acts as a wrapper to this function that forces
omission of trial division. The second function call has the form:
int BN is prime fasttest ex(const BIGNUM *w, int checks,
BN CTX *ctx passed, int do trial division, BN GENCB *cb)
Here, w is the number being tested. The option to do trial division is defined via the
do_trial_division flag. When set, the function will perform trial division using
the first 2047 odd primes (excluding 2), with no gcd optimisations (the code also
separately tests whether the number being tested is equal to 2 or 3, and whether
it is odd). After this, the function calls bn miller rabin is prime to invoke the
MR testing with pseudo-random bases. The number of MR rounds is set using the
argument checks. When checks is set to BN prime checks, a value that defaults
to zero, then the number of MR rounds is chosen such that the probability of the
test declaring a random composite number n with k bits as being prime is at most
2−λ, where λ is the security level that a 2k-bit RSA modulus should provide. Thus,
the number of MR rounds performed is based on the bit-size k, as per Table 5.1.
The entries here are based on average case error estimates taken from [105], which
in turn references [41].4
4One might note how Table 5.1 differs from that shown in Table 3.4 of Section 3.3.1. This is
due to the natural development of OpenSSL between the version 1.1.1-pre6 in August 2018 and




A critical use case for primality testing is prime generation (e.g. for use in RSA
keys). The exact details of the algorithms used vary across implementations, but
the majority follow a simple technique based on first generating a random initial
candidate n of the desired bit size k, possibly setting some of its bits, then doing
trial division against a list of small primes, before performing multiple rounds of
primality testing using a standard probabilistic primality test such as the MR test.
If the trial division reveals a factor or the MR test fails, then another candidate is
generated. This can be a fresh random value, but more commonly, implementations
add 2 to the previous candidate n. This allows an important optimisation: if a table
of remainders for the trial divisions of n is created in the first step, then this table
of remainders can be quickly updated for the new candidate n+ 2. Fresh divisions
can then be avoided – one just needs to inspect the updated table of remainders.
We refer to this procedure as trial division by sieving or just sieving. It is, of course,
much more efficient than performing trial divisions anew for each candidate. Note
that this approach leads to a slightly non-uniform distribution on primes: primes
that are preceded by a long run of composites are more likely to result from it
than primes that are close to their preceding primes. However, it is known that the
deviation from the uniform distribution is small [31].
5.2.2.1 Prime Generation in OpenSSL
OpenSSL adopts the above high-level procedure, with one important difference. The
code is found in BN generate prime ex in file bn prime.c. The function call has
the following form:
int BN generate prime ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM
*add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN GENCB *cb)
Here bits is the desired bit-size, safe is a flag that, when set, asks the function to
produce a safe prime p = 2q + 1, and add and rem allow the callee to set additional
conditions on the returned prime. We will ignore safe, add and rem in our further
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work; an analysis of how they affect prime generation when using our primality test
is left to future work.
The initial steps are performed together in a separate function called probable-
prime. A cryptographically strong pseudo-random number is first generated by
BN priv rand. The two most significant bits and the least significant bit are then
set to ensure the resulting candidate n is odd and of the desired bit-size. This number
is then sieved using a hard-coded list of the first 2047 odd primes p2, . . . , p2048, so
p1 = 2, p2 = 3, . . . , p2048 = 17863. If a candidate passes the sieving stage, it is tested
for primality by BN is prime fasttest ex. This function carries out the default
number of Miller-Rabin rounds, as per Table 5.1. Trial division is omitted by setting
the do_trial_division flag in the function call. This is because trial division has
already been carried out externally via sieving. This exploits the complexity of the
OpenSSL API for primality testing to gain performance, an option not available if a
simplified API is desired (as we do). Importantly, if the MR tests fail, then instead
of going to the next candidate that passes sieving, a fresh, random starting point is
selected and the procedure begins again from the start.
5.3 Construction and Analysis of a Primality Test With a
Misuse-resistant API
We now propose how to construct a performant primality test with a misuse-resistant
API. Our design goal is to ensure good performance in the most important use cases
(malicious input testing, prime generation) while still maintaining strong security.
At the same time, we want the simplest possible API for developers: a single input n
(the number being tested) and single a 1-bit output (0 for composite, 1 for probably
prime).
We propose four different primality testing functions, all built from the algorithms
described in Chapter 2. The first of these follows OpenSSL with its default settings,
and we name this Miller-Rabin Average Case (MRAC). It provides a baseline for
analysis and comparison. The second and third use 64 and 128 rounds of MR testing,
respectively. We name them MR64 and MR128. The fourth uses the Baillie-PSW
test, and we name it BPSW for short. For each of these four options, we provide
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an assessment (both by analysis and by simulation) of its security and performance
when considering random composite, random prime, and adversarially generated
composite inputs. We also consider the influence of trial division on each test’s
performance. For concreteness, throughout we focus on the case of 1024-bit inputs,
but of course the results are easily extended to other bit-sizes.
5.3.1 Miller-Rabin Average Case (MRAC)
The first test we introduce, MRAC, is a reference implementation of OpenSSL’s pri-
mality test, as per the function BN is prime fasttest ex described in Section 5.2.1.1
with input checks set to BN prime checks, so that the number of MR rounds per-
formed is based on the bit-size k, as per Table 5.1. Recall that this function either
does no trial division or does trial division with the first 2047 odd primes. Of course,
this test is quite unsuitable for use in general, because it performs badly on adver-
sarial inputs: Chapter 3 showed that it has a worst case false positive rate of 1/22t
where for example t = 5 for 1024-bit inputs. On the other hand, it is designed to
perform well on random inputs.
5.3.1.1 MRAC on Random Input
We now consider the expected number of MR rounds performed when receiving a
random 1024 bit odd input. For now, we ignore the effect of trial division. The
probability that a randomly chosen odd k-bit integer is prime is qk := 2/ ln(2
k) by
standard estimates for the density of primes (for k = 1024, qk ≈ 1/355). In this
case MRAC will do t MR rounds, as per Table 5.1. Otherwise, for composite input,
up to t rounds of MR testing will be done. One could use the bounds from [41]
to obtain bounds on the expected number of MR rounds that would be carried out
on composite input. However, for numbers of cryptographic size (e.g. k = 1024
bits), to a very good approximation, the number needed is just 1, since with very
high probability, a single MR test is sufficient to identify a composite (recall that the
probability that a single round of MR testing fails to identify a 1024-bit composite is
less than 2−40). From this, one can compute the expected number of rounds needed
for a random, odd input: it is approximately the weighted sum t · qk + 1 · (1− qk) =
148
5.3 Construction and Analysis of a Primality Test With a
Misuse-resistant API
1 + (t − 1)qk. For k = 1024, we have t = 5 and qk = 0.0028, and this expression
evaluates to 1.026.
5.3.1.2 MRAC on Random Input with Trial Division
Now we bring trial division into the picture. Its overall effectiveness will be deter-
mined by the collection of small primes in the list P = {p1, p2, . . . , pr} used in the
process (where we assume all the pi are odd) and the relative costs of MR testing
and trial division (about 800:1 in our experiments).
For random odd inputs, the fraction σ(P ) of non-prime candidates that are removed
by the trial division by the primes in P can be computed using the formula:








This follows easily by noting that a fraction 1 − 1pi of integers are not divisible by







, and hence the probability that a randomly sampled odd integer
is divisible by at least one pi is σ(P ). In turn, this means that any candidate that
passes the trial division stage is 1/(1− σ(P )) times more likely to be a prime than
an odd candidate of equivalent bit-size chosen at random (this is because a fraction
1− σ(P ) of integers remain after sieving, and all primes survive sieving).
But simply adding more primes to the list P is not necessarily effective: fewer
additional composites are removed at a fixed cost (one additional trial division per
prime), and eventually it is better to move on to a more heavyweight test (such as
rounds of MR testing). Moreover, from inspecting the formula for σ(P ), it is evident
that, for a given size r of set P (and hence a given cost for trial division), it is better
to set P as containing the r smallest odd primes (including 2 is not useful as the
input n is already assumed to be odd). Henceforth, we assume that when P is of
size r, then it consists of the first r odd primes. We write σr in place of σ(P ) in this
case. Using Mertens’ theorem, we can approximate σr as follows:
σr ≈ 1− 2e−γ/ ln(pr).
where γ = 0.5772 . . . is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
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As an example, BN is prime fasttest ex in OpenSSL performs trial division on
the first 2047 odd primes (ending at p2047 = 17863). As shown in Figure 5.1, using
the first r = 2047 primes gives a value of σ2047 = 0.885. This is only a little larger
than using, say, the r = 128 smallest odd primes yielding σ128 = 0.831.
Figure 5.1: Proportion of candidates removed by trial division, σr, as a
function of r, the number of primes used.
Now we build a cost model for MRAC including trial division. This will also be
applicable (with small modifications) for our other tests.
Let Ci denote the cost of a trial division for prime pi and let CMR denote the cost




Ci + t · CMR (5.2)
since the test then always performs all r trial divisions (assuming k is large enough)
and all t MR tests. For random, odd composite inputs, the average cost is approxi-
5In practice, we could set Ci to be a constant CTD for the range of i we are interested in, but
using a more refined approach is not mathematically much more complex.
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mately:
σ1 · C1 + (σ2 − σ1) · (C1 + C2) + . . .+ (σr − σr−1) · (C1 + · · ·+ Cr)




This is because a fraction σ1 of the composites are identified by the first trial division,
a further fraction σ2 − σ1 are identified after 2 trial divisions, etc, while a fraction
(1− σr) require all r trial divisions plus (roughly) 1 round of MR. Here we assume
that the MR test performs in the same way on numbers after trial division as it does
before. After some manipulation, this last expression can be simplified to:
r∑
i=1
(1− σi−1) · Ci + (1− σr) · CMR (5.3)
where we set σ0 = 0. This expression can be simplified further if we assume that
the Ci are all equal to some CTD (a good approximation in practice), and apply
Mertens’ theorem again. For details, see the equivalent analysis in [102].
From expressions (5.2) and (5.3), the expected cost for random, odd, k-bit input can
be easily computed via a weighted sum (qk)(5.2) + (1− qk)(5.3). However, the cost
is dominated by expression (5.3) for the composite case. From (5.3), the futility of
trial division with many primes is revealed: adding a prime by going from r to r+ 1
on average adds a term (1 − σr) · Cr+1, but only decreases by a fraction σr+1 − σr
the term in front of CMR. As can be seen from Figure 5.1, when r is large, 1− σr is
around 0.1, while σr+1 − σr becomes very small. So each increment in r only serves
to increase the average cost by a fraction of a trial division (and with the cost of
trial division increasing with r).
Figure 5.2 shows a sample (theoretical) plot of the average cost of MRAC as a
function of r for k = 1024. This uses as costs CTD = 0.000371ms and CMR =
0.298ms obtained from our experiments (reported below) for k = 1024 and the
weighted sum of expressions (5.2), (5.3). This curve broadly confirms the analysis
of [102] which suggests setting pr = CMR/CTD to minimise the running time of
primality testing with trial division; here we obtain CMR/CTD ≈ 800, corresponding
to r ≈ 140.6
6The analysis of [102] technically applies to prime generation, but ignores certain terms in such
a way as to actually analyse the cost of primality testing of composite numbers. In this sense, it is
only valid when the cost of primality testing for prime inputs can be ignored compared to the case
of composite inputs; this is not the case in general, but is a reasonable approximation for MRAC.
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Figure 5.2: A plot of the theoretical running time of MRAC as a function
of r, the number of primes r used in trial division for k = 1024, using
CTD = 0.000371ms and CMR = 0.298ms obtained from our experiments.
5.3.1.3 MRAC on Adversarial Input
Recall from Chapter 3 that worst-case adversarial inputs can fool random-base MR
testing with probability 1/4 per round. The expected number of rounds needed to
identify such inputs as composite is then 1.33. However, with t rounds of testing,
MRAC will fail to identify such composites as being so with probability 1/22t (and
will indicate that the input was prime). Note that this analysis is unaffected by trial
division, since the adversarial inputs used have no small primes factors – the trial
division just increases the running time of the test.
5.3.2 Miller-Rabin 64 (MR64)
Next we consider trial division followed by up to 64 rounds of MR testing with
random bases (the test will exit early if a base that is a witness to compositeness of
the input n is found). We refer to this test as MR64. By design, this test guarantees
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a failure probability of at most 2−128, no matter the input distribution, so it offers
robust security guarantees without the user needing to understand the context of
the test (i.e. whether the test is being done with adversarial inputs or not).
5.3.2.1 MR64 on Random Input
As for MRAC, for a random, odd composite, k-bit input, the expected number
of rounds of MR testing (without trial division) is very close to 1. On the other
hand, for prime, k-bit input, the number of rounds is exactly 64. This enables the
average cost without trial division on random, odd, k-bit input to be computed: it
is approximately given by the weighted sum
(64 · qk + 1 · (1− qk)) · CMR = (1 + 63qk) · CMR
For k = 1024, we again have qk = 2/ ln(2
k) = 0.0028, and this sum evaluates to
1.18CMR, about 17% higher than MRAC for the same input distribution.
5.3.2.2 MR64 on Random Input with Trial Division
Following the analysis for MRAC, we can compute the cost of MR64 on random,
prime, k-bit input as:
r∑
i=1
Ci + 64 · CMR (5.4)
since here all trial divisions are performed, together with 64 rounds of MR testing.
For random, odd, composite input with r-prime trial division, the expected cost is
very close to that of MRAC with the same r, since whenever MR testing is invoked,
almost always one round suffices. As for the case of MR64 without trial division, it
is the prime inputs that make the cost difference here: they involve 64 rounds of MR
testing instead of the (close to) 1 needed for composite inputs. Again, a theoretical
prediction for random, odd input can be made by combining the expressions for odd,
composite and prime input using a weighted sum. This sum is (qk)(5.4)+(1−qk)(5.3),
differing only from the cost model for MRAC by the term representing the cost of
testing prime input. Figure 5.3 shows the theoretical curve for MR64 as compared
to MRAC (using costs CTD = 0.000371ms and CMR = 0.298ms for k = 1024 as
before).
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Figure 5.3: Comparing the theoretical running time of MR64 and MRAC
as a function of r (the number of primes r used in trial division) for
k = 1024, using CTD = 0.000371ms and CMR = 0.298ms obtained from our
experiments.
5.3.2.3 MR64 on Adversarial Input
By design, the MR64 test will fail to identify a worst-case adversarial input as a
composite with probability at most 2−128, this after 64 rounds of MR testing. The
expected number of rounds needed to successfully classify such inputs is again 1.33.
5.3.3 Miller-Rabin 128 (MR128)
This test is identical to MR64, but up to 128 rounds of MR testing are invoked.
The intention is to reduce the false positive rate from 2−128 to 2−256. The analysis
is almost identical to that for MR64, replacing 64 by 128 where it appears in the
relevant formulae. We include it for comparison purposes and because the OpenSSL
documentation does target 256 bits of security when testing very large numbers
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(larger than 6394 bits in size7). The headline figure for this test is its expected cost
(without trial division) of (1+127qk) ·CMR, equating to 1.36 ·CMR on random, odd,
1024-bit inputs, roughly 35% higher than MRAC at the same input size.
5.3.4 Baillie-PSW (BPSW)
The final test we consider is the Baillie-PSW test. Recall that this is the combination
of a single Miller-Rabin test to base 2, with a Lucas test using Selfridge’s Method A
to select D. If the input n we are testing is a perfect square, then there does not exist
a valid choice of D (see Section 2.4.4). So we must decide upon a point to test for
this. Baillie and Wagstaff [15] show that, when n is not square, the average number
of D values that need to be tried until a suitable one is found is 1.78. We choose to
run a test to check if n is a perfect square only after 7 unsuccessful attempts to select
D. This choice is inspired by other implementations [96] and the fact that, if n is
a random non-square, then the probability of failing 7 times is extremely unlikely.
This provides a balance between the relatively cheap process of testing a choice
of D with the more expensive test for n being a perfect square. We perform the
Miller-Rabin part of the test first, since it is the more efficient of the two techniques,
omitting the Lucas test early if this indicates compositeness. We then search for D
using Selfridge’s Method A, using it to carry out a Lucas test if found. We abort
the search for D after 7 attempts and then test n for being a perfect square. If this
test fails, we revert to searching for a suitable D and then perform the Lucas test
when one is eventually found.
Algorithm 3 gives example pseudocode for the process of selecting the parameter D
and performing the Baillie-PSW test in the manner described above. The detail of
the pseudocode for the Miller-Rabin test, Lucas test, Jacobi symbol calculation, and
perfect square test are omitted, as these are discussed within the preliminary mate-
rial in Chapter 2. However, a full reference implementation (including all of these
functions) of the Baillie-PSW test used for this work is included in Appendix B.1.
7See the man page https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/
man3/BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex.html and code documentation https://github.com/openssl/
openssl/blob/fa4d419c25c07b49789df96b32c4a1a85a984fa1/include/openssl/bn.h#L159.
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Algorithm 3 The Baillie-PSW test on n
Input a positive integer n.
Output the result of the B-PSW test on n. Returns 1 if the test indicates that
n is prime and 0 if n is composite.
Step 1: perform the Miller-Rabin test on n. Here MillerRabin(a, n) is a func-
tion that performs a single round of Miller-Rabin on n to base a, returning 1 if
n is a probable prime and 0 if n is composite.
1: a← 2
2: if MillerRabin(a, n) == 0 then
3: res← 0
4: go to Step 4
5: end if
Step 2: find the parameter D for the Lucas test. Here JacobiSymbol(D,n) is a





and PerfectSquare(n) is a function
that returns 1 if n is a perfect square and 0 otherwise.
6: D ← 5
7: while JacobiSymbol(D,n) 6= −1 do
8: if D < 0 then
9: D ← abs(D) + 2 # where abs(x) is the absolute value of x.
10: else
11: D ← −(D + 2)
12: end if






14: if PerfectSquare(n) == 1 then
15: res← 0




Step 3: perform the Lucas test on n. Here Lucas(P,Q,D, n) performs a Lucas
test on n, returning 1 if the test indicates that n is prime and 0 if n is composite.
20: P ← 1 # the remaining parameters for Selfridge’s method are set.
21: Q← (1−D)/4
22: if Lucas(P,Q,D, n) == 0 then
23: res← 0
24: go to Step 4
25: end if
26: res← 1 # if we have reached this point, n has passed the B-PSW test.
Step 4: output result.
27: Return res
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5.3.4.1 BPSW on Random Input
The analysis without trial division is much like that of MRAC, assuming that MR
with a fixed base 2 performs as well as MR with a random base when the number
being tested is uniformly random. For prime inputs, the average cost is CMR +CL,
where CL is average the cost of doing the Lucas part of the test (and any tests
of squareness); for composite inputs, the cost is roughly CMR since the MR test
catches the vast majority of composites. The performance on random inputs is the
weighted sum of these, as usual. In our implementation, the average for CL for
1024-bit inputs is equal to 17.04 · CMR (5.078ms compared to 0.298ms on average
for 1024-bit inputs, based on 220 trials). Overall, then, this test has an expected
cost (without trial division) of 1.05 ·CMR on random, odd, 1024-bit inputs, roughly
4% more than MRAC.
The analysis with trial division is again similar to that for MRAC: when the input is
prime, the average cost is
∑r
i=1Ci +CMR +CL, while when the input is composite,
it is of the same form as in (5.3) (where we are able to omit a term CL under the
assumption that the base 2 MR test is effective in detecting composites). We omit
further detail.
5.3.4.2 BPSW on Adversarial Input
It is relatively easy to construct composites passing a base 2 MR test. For example,
integers of the form (2x + 1)(4x + 1) with each factor a prime have a roughly 1 in
4 chance of doing so (see Section 3.2.1.1 for further discussion). Such inputs are
highly likely to be detected by the Lucas part of the BPSW test, so the cost of
BPSW on such inputs would be
∑r
i=1Ci +CMR +CL. However, we do not know if
such numbers are worst-case adversarial inputs for BPSW, and indeed, we cannot
rule out the existence of BPSW pseudoprimes, that is, composites which are declared
probably prime by the test. Recall that Pomerance [133] has given heuristic evidence
that there are infinitely many such pseudoprimes. Perhaps the smallest is beyond
the bit-size we care about in cryptographic applications, but we cannot be sure.
Note also that such a pseudoprime, if it can be found, would always fool the BPSW
test (because the choice of parameters used within the test is deterministic). This
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is in sharp contrast to MR64 and MR128, where we can give precise bounds on the
false positive rate of the tests. We consider this, along with the relative complexity
of implementing the BPSW test, to be a major drawback.
5.3.5 Experimental Results
Having described our four chosen primality tests and given a theoretical evaluation
of them, we now turn to experimental analysis. This analysis gives us a direct
comparison with the current approach of OpenSSL (MRAC with trial division either
off or based on 2047 primes). It also allows us to study how the Baillie-PSW test
performs against Miller-Rabin testing in practice, something that does not appear to
have been explored before. We focus initially on testing 1024-bit numbers to avoid
deluging the reader with data; results for other bit-sizes are presented later in the
section.
5.3.5.1 Random Input
Our results for random, odd, 1024-bit inputs to the tests are shown in Tables 5.2
and 5.3. We worked with 225 inputs, produced using OpenSSL’s internal random
number generator. All timings are in milliseconds, and are broken down into results
for composite inputs, inputs that were declared prime, and overall results. We also
report results for different amounts of trial division — none, r = 128 (which, from
our theoretical analysis above, we consider to be a sensible amount of trial division
for 1024-bit inputs) and r = 2047 (as in OpenSSL). All results were obtained using
a single core of an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2690 v4 @ 3.20GHz processor, with
code written in C using OpenSSL 1.1.1c (May 2019) for big-number arithmetic and
basic Miller-Rabin functionality.
Of the 225 random, odd, 1024-bit numbers that we generated, 94947 were prime.
This is closely in line with the estimated q1024 × 225 ≈ 94548 given by the usual
density estimate.
The results in Table 5.2 are broadly in-line with our earlier theoretical analysis.
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Some highlights:
• MRAC is fast overall, but with r = 2047, OpenSSL is doing far too much trial
division on 1024-bit inputs. Much better performance could be achieved for
this input size in OpenSSL by setting r = 128 (more than 2x speed-up overall
can be gained).
• MR64 is 8-9 times slower than MRAC on prime input, reflecting the many
more rounds of MR testing being done in MR64.
• MR128 is roughly twice as slow as MR64 on prime input (reflecting the dou-
bling of rounds of MR testing). On random input, the gap between MR64 and
MR128 is not so large (because most composites are identified by trial division
or after just one round of MR testing).
• BPSW is quite competitive with MRAC overall and only 2-3 times slower for
prime input. This is because the Lucas test part of BPSW is expensive but
rarely invoked for random input, but always done for prime input.
• Based on overall figures, MR64 with r = 128 outperforms MRAC with r =
2047 (as used in OpenSSL) by 17% on 1024-bit input. This indicates that, by
tuning parameters carefully, it is possible to obtain improved performance over
the current approach used in OpenSSL whilst enjoying strong security across
all use cases (i.e. a guaranteed false positive rate of 2−128). Even MR128 with
r = 128 is not far behind MRAC with r = 2047 on overall figures at this input
size.
Further improvements in running time can be obtained by fine-tuning the value of
r on a per test basis, and according to input size. Importantly, the latter is feasible
even with a simple API (and indeed seems to be the only general, input-dependent
optimisation possible). To illustrate this, we show in Figure 5.4 the average running
times for MRAC and MR64 on random, odd, 1024-bit input for varying r. The
figure also shows the theoretical curves obtained previously. There is an excellent
agreement between the experimental data and the curves obtained from the model.
In both cases, the curve is quite flat around its minimum, but we see that using
r = 128 gives close to optimal performance for this value of k = 1024. The figure
also illustrates that using large amounts of trial division (as per OpenSSL) harms
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r Declared Composite
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 0.312 0.313 0.312 0.302
128 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.061
2047 0.135 0.134 0.134 0.133
r Declared Prime
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 1.50 19.1 38.1 5.39
128 1.55 19.1 38.2 5.44
2047 2.26 19.8 38.9 6.15
r Overall
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 0.315 0.366 0.419 0.316
128 0.067 0.117 0.170 0.077
2047 0.141 0.190 0.244 0.150
Table 5.2: The mean running time (in ms) for each test when testing MRAC,
MR64, MR128 and BPSW for random 1024-bit, odd inputs and various amounts
of trial division (r). Broken down by input primality. Results based on 225 trials.
r Declared Composite
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006
128 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.129
2047 0.338 0.338 0.337 0.335
r Declared Prime
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 0.028 0.359 0.716 0.099
128 0.028 0.358 0.717 0.097
2047 0.032 0.363 0.720 0.104
r Overall
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 0.064 1.00 2.01 0.270
128 0.154 1.02 2.02 0.312
2047 0.356 1.10 2.08 0.462
Table 5.3: The standard deviation of the running time (in ms) for each test
when testing MRAC, MR64, MR128 and BPSW for random 1024-bit, odd inputs
and various amounts of trial division (r). Results based on 225 trials.
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Figure 5.4: Experimental and theoretical performance of MRAC and
MR64 on random, odd, 1024-bit input for varying amounts of trial di-
vision, r. The horizontal dashed line represents the minimum of the
average running time of MR64 across all choices of r. This gives a visual
representation of the comparison between MR64 with r = 128 and MRAC
with r = 2047.
performance for this input size, as was also explained theoretically in Section 5.3.1.
Specifically, OpenSSL uses r = 2047, putting its performance with default settings
(MRAC) well above the minimum obtainable with MR64 with a carefully tuned
choice of r.
5.3.5.2 Adversarial Input
To bring into sharp relief the failings of MRAC as a general-purpose primality test,
we generated a set of 220 1024-bit composites of the form n = (2x + 1)(4x + 1)
in which the factors 2x + 1, 4x + 1 are both prime. Numbers of this special form
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Table 5.4: Number of rounds of MR testing needed to identify as compos-
ite 1024-bit numbers of the form n = (2x+1)(4x+1) with 2x+1, 4x+1 prime
from an initial set of 220 candidates. MRAC only performs 5 rounds of
MR testing for this bit-size and failed to identify exactly 1000 candidates.
are known to pass random-base MR tests with probability 1/4. We then put these
n through our MRAC and MR64 tests without trial division,8 tracking how many
rounds of MR were used on each input by each test. Table 5.4 shows the results.
MR64 needed a maximum of 10 rounds of MR testing to correctly classify all the
inputs, while MRAC, using only 5 rounds of MR for inputs of this size, incorrectly
classified exactly 1000 of the inputs. This performance is in-line with expectations,
as the expected number of misclassifications is 220 × (1/4)5 = 210.
5.3.6 Other Bit Sizes
So far in our experimental evaluation, we have focussed on k = 1024, i.e. testing of
1024-bit inputs. We have carried out similar testing also for k = 512, 2048, 3072.
Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 show these additional results for the MRAC and MR64
tests, focussing on the effect of varying r on running time. Notice the characteristic
“hockey-stick” shape of the curves in all the figures.
In each figure, the dashed horizontal time highlights the minimum running time for
MR64. Notably, for k = 512, this is significantly lower than MRAC with r = 2047
(as in OpenSSL). We saw the same effect for k = 1024 in Figure 5.4. For k = 2048,
8Including trial division would not change the results.
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Figure 5.5: Experimental and theoretical performance of MRAC and
MR64 on random, odd, 512-bit input for varying amounts of trial division,
r.
MR64 with the best choice of r is slightly slower than MRAC with r = 2047 (but
still competitive). For k = 3072, the influence of r on running time is quite small,
and MRAC consistently comes out ahead of MR64 (but recall that MRAC is unsafe
for maliciously chosen inputs).
These experiments confirm our earlier observation: the choice of r, the amount of
trial division, can have a significant effect on running time of primality tests, and
should be taken into account when selecting a test.
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Figure 5.6: Experimental and theoretical performance of MRAC and
MR64 on random, odd, 2048-bit input for varying amounts of trial divi-
sion, r.
Figure 5.7: Experimental and theoretical performance of MRAC and
MR64 on random, odd, 3072-bit input for varying amounts of trial divi-
sion, r.
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5.3.7 Selecting a Primality Test
We select MR64 with the amount of trial division, r, depending on the input size as
our preferred primality test. Our reasons are as follows:
• MR64 has strong security guarantees across all use cases (unlike MRAC and
BPSW). These guarantees can be improved by switching to MR128, but we
consider the guarantees of MR64 to be sufficient for perhaps all but the most
stringent requirements.
• MR64 is easy to implement, while a test like BPSW requires significant ad-
ditional code. We give a reference implementation of the BPSW test in Ap-
pendix B.1 as it could be implemented in OpenSSL 1.1.1c. This helps provide
an understanding of the increase in code complexity involved in using this test.
• MR64 with an input-size-dependent choice of r outperforms the current ap-
proach used in OpenSSL (MRAC with fixed r = 2047) up to k = 1024 and
remains competitive with MRAC even for larger inputs. (Obviously OpenSSL
could also be made faster by tuning r, but this would not improve security for
malicious inputs).
• MR64 permits a very simple API, with a single input (the number being tested)
and a single output (whether the input was composite or probably prime),
whilst still allowing input-size-dependent tuning of r.
Table 5.5 shows our recommended values of r to use with MR64, based on the exper-
imental results obtained above. Further small improvements in performance could
be obtained by being more precise in setting r values and by further partitioning
the set of k values, but the gains would be marginal.
We further validate this selection of MR64 in the next section, where we examine





k ∈ [1, 512] 64
k ∈ [513, 1024] 128
k ∈ [1025, 2048] 384
k ∈ [2049, 3072] 768
k ∈ [3073,∞) 1024
Table 5.5: Recommended values of r for use with the MR64 primality
test.
5.4 Prime Generation
In this section, we want to assess the impact of our choice of primality test on a key
use case, prime generation. We focus on the scenario where our primality test is
used as a drop-in replacement for the existing primality test in OpenSSL, without
making any modifications to the prime generation code. We are not suggesting this
should be done in practice, but are merely evaluating a strawman example when
switching to our proposed test.
5.4.1 Experimental Approach
In order to establish a benchmark, we first use OpenSSL’s prime number generating
function BN generate prime ex as it appears in the standard library. As discussed
in detail in Section 5.2.2, this involves sieving with s = 2047 primes and using the
OpenSSL primality test that consumes t rounds of MR testing on a sequence of
candidates n, n+ 2, . . ., restarting the procedure from scratch whenever an MR test
fails. Here t is determined as in Table 5.1 (i.e. the test is what we call MRAC).
Importantly, OpenSSL exploits the rich API of its primality test to switch off trial
division in the primality tests, since that trial division is already taken care of by
the cheaper sieving step.
Next, we change the underlying primality test to use our selected test: MR64 with
input-length-dependent trial division (as per Table 5.5), keeping all other aspects of
OpenSSL’s prime generation procedure the same. All the trial division done in our
underlying primality test is of course redundant, because of the sieving step carried
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k r used MR64 MRAC Overhead
512 64 12.37 8.859 40%
1024 128 60.83 45.20 35%
2048 384 385.2 268.5 43%
3072 768 1379 946.7 46%
Table 5.6: Running time (in ms) for prime generation using our proposed
primality test (MR64 with input-length-dependent trial division) and
current OpenSSL primality test (MRAC with no trial division). Each
timing is based on 220 trials.
out in OpenSSL’s prime generation code. However, with our deliberately simplified
API for primality testing, that extra work would be unavoidable. Similarly, our
underlying primality test performs more rounds of MR testing (64 instead of the 3-5
used in MRAC) when a prime is finally encountered. It is the amount of this extra
work that we seek to quantify here.
Our experimental results are shown in Table 5.6. It can be seen that the overhead
of switching to our primality test in this use case ranges between 35% and 46%.
This is a significant cost for this use case, but recall that the gain is a primality
test that has strong security guarantees across all use cases, along with a simple and
developer-friendly API.
5.4.2 Cost Modelling
We can build simple cost models which illustrate the performance differences we
have observed; see also [102] for a similar model. Sieving can be recast as a one-time
trial division of the first candidate n with the first s odd primes (OpenSSL uses
s = 2047), followed by per candidate updating of a table of remainders. We assume
the latter can be done essentially for free compared to other operations and ignore
its cost henceforth. Then the average cost of prime generation when the underlying







ln(2k) · (1− σs)/2
)
· CMR + (t− 1) · CMR. (5.5)
Here the first term comes from sieving. The second term comes from, on average,
inspecting ln(2k) · (1− σs)/2 odd, composite candidates in the sieved version of the
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list n, n + 2, n + 4, . . . before encountering a prime, and doing 1 MR test to reject
each composite (recall that, because of sieving, the density of primes in the list
n, n + 2, n + 4, . . . is boosted by a factor 1/(1 − σs); recall also that almost every
random composite is rejected with just 1 MR test). The third term comes from
doing a further t− 1 MR tests when a prime is finally found. To model OpenSSL’s
performance, we would set t according to Table 5.1.
Note that this analysis ignores the fact that OpenSSL aborts and restarts with a
fresh, random value whenever an MR test fails; this effect may be significant in
practice and we leave a detailed evaluation to future work. Note also that this
modelling deficiency does not affect our experimental results reported in the main
body, since they were obtained by measuring the running time of the actual OpenSSL
code.
It should be evident from expression (5.5) that, as with trial division, working with
large s in the initial sieve is not profitable: eventually, the gains made from decreas-
ing the term 1 − σs are outweighed by the cost of initial sieving by trial division.
Moreover, this model neglects the true cost of updating the table of remainders
between candidates. This cost is linear in s (albeit with a small constant) and so
heightens the effect. A more detailed model including this cost could of course be
developed.
If we now assume that (redundant) trial division with r ≤ s primes is also carried
out in the underlying primality test, and that the test uses up to t′ rounds of MR












Ci) + CMR) + (t
′ − 1) · CMR (5.6)
Here, the additional cost compared to (5.5) is precisely that of doing a full set of r
trial divisions for each candidate – this cost is always incurred because when r ≤ s,
all the candidates which might fail trial division at some early stage have already
failed on sieving. To model the performance of OpenSSL with our chosen primality
test, MR64, t′ must be set to 64 rather than the values in Table 5.1; the difference
means that, when a prime is finally encountered, the cost of testing it will be higher.
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The difference in the costs as expressed in (5.5) and (5.6) is given by:(





Ci) + δt · CMR (5.7)
where δt = t
′−t, depending on k, is the difference in the maximum number of rounds
of MR testing carried out in the two cases.
For MR64 and MRAC, and for k of cryptographic size, δt ranges between 59 and 61.
For our selected primality test, MR64 with input-length-dependent trial division, r
in the above expression is also k-dependent, and is set by Table 5.5. The first term
in (5.7) accounts for the cost of redundant trial division over the first r primes for
N := ln(2k) · (1− σs)/2 different candidates. Here both r and N are in the range of
a few hundred. For example, when k = 1024 we set r = 128, and when s = 2047, we
have N ≈ 41. Hence, when k = 1024, we do about 5200 redundant trial divisions,
compared to an extra δt = 59 MR tests. For this k, the extra MR tests are about 8
times more expensive than the redundant trial divisions (roughly 17.5ms versus 2ms
based on our experimental timings). This indicates that the redundant trial division
contributes much less to the overhead of prime generation than do the extra MR
tests that are necessary to make our primality test secure in all use cases.
5.5 Implementation and Integration in OpenSSL
We communicated our findings to the OpenSSL development team, specifically to
Kurt Roeckx, one of the OpenSSL core developers. He did his own performance
testing, and concluded that our new API and primality test should be deployed in
OpenSSL. In personal communication with Roeckx, we were informed that these
changes are slated for inclusion in OpenSSL 3.0, which is scheduled for release in
Q4 of 2020.
In more detail, the following changes were made:
• Our proposed API is included via a new, external-facing function (see https:
//github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c#L253):
int BN_check_prime(const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb)
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{
return bn_check_prime_int(p, 0, ctx, 1, cb);
}
This code wraps the existing “internal” primality testing function bn check-
prime int. Note that the API has 3 parameters, instead of our desired 1:
OpenSSL still needs to pass pointers to context and callback objects for pro-
grammatic reasons.
• The “internal” primality testing function bn check prime int has been up-
dated to do a minimum of 64 rounds of MR testing (and 128 rounds for 2048+
bit inputs). This deviates slightly from our recommendation to always do 64
rounds of testing – it is more conservative. Note that the average case analysis
of [41] is no longer used to set the number of rounds of MR testing in the de-
fault case. This function also uses a small table to determine how many primes
to use in trial division; the numbers are aligned with our recommendations in
Table 5.5. Details are in the new function calc trial divisions.9
• The rest of the OpenSSL codebase has been updated to use the new API,
except for the prime generation code. That code has also been updated (see
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/bn/bn_prime.
c#L123). It now uses yet a third internal function for its primality testing (see
bn_prime.c#L170):
bn_is_prime_int(ret, checks, ctx, 0, cb);
Here, checks determines the number of rounds of MR testing done, and is
set to either 64 or 128 according to the input size. In the call,“0” indicates
that trial division is no longer done. The number of MR rounds here could
have been set based on average case performance, as was formerly the case,
rather than worst case, but it seems the OpenSSL developers have opted for
simplicity over performance. Not doing trial division inside the primality test
is appropriate here because the inputs have already been sieved to remove
numbers with small prime factors by this point.
• The “old” and complex external-facing APIs in the functions BN is prime ex
and BN is prime fasttest ex have been marked for deprecation in OpenSSL
9See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c#L74.
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3.0: they will only be included in a build of the library in case the environ-
mental variable OPENSSL NO DEPRECATED 3 0 is set.10
5.6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed a primality test that is both performant and misuse-resistant, in
the sense of presenting a simplest-possible interface for developers. The test balances
code simplicity, performance, and security guarantees across all use cases. We have
not seen a detailed treatment of this fundamental problem in the literature before,
despite the by-now classical nature of primality testing as a cryptographic task. Our
recommendations – both for the API and for the underlying primality test – have
been adopted in full by OpenSSL and are scheduled for inclusion in OpenSSL 3.0,
which is expected to be released in Q4 2020.11
We have focussed in this work on regular prime generation. Our work could be
extended to consider efficiency of safe-prime generation. Special sieving procedures
can be used in this case: if one creates a table of values n mod pi, then one can also
test 2n + 1 for divisibility by each of the pi very cheaply; techniques like this were
used in [57] in a slightly different context. Further work is also needed to fully assess
the impact of the amount of sieving (s) on the performance of prime generation at
different input lengths (k). Our work could also be extended to make a systematic
study of prime generation code in different cryptographic libraries. For example, we
have already noted that the OpenSSL code aborts and restarts whenever a Miller-
Rabin test fails; this behaviour leads to sub-optimal performance, and it would be
interesting to see how much the code in OpenSSL and in other leading libraries could
be improved.
One can view our work as addressing a specific instance of the problem of how to
design simple, performant, misuse-resistant APIs for cryptography. In our discus-
sion of related work, we highlighted other work where this problem has also been





5.6 Conclusions and Future Work
research effort in this direction seems likely to yield significant rewards for the se-





In this chapter we provide an overall summary for this thesis, and then go on to give
a more detailed breakdown with respect to each individual chapter. We also briefly
mention avenues for future work.
In this thesis we have provided a holistic analysis of primality testing and its use as
a mathematical tool within cryptography. Using primality testing as a case study,
we journeyed from the very inception of the fundamental primality testing algo-
rithms, to their standardisation and recommended configuration, to the real world
implementation. Using this systematic style of analysis, we are able to uncover
flaws in these primality tests at many different stages. Some flaws are inherent to
the design of the primality test, for example the nature of pseudoprimes for the
Miller-Rabin test. In this case, we expanded existing techniques for creating such
pseudoprimes, and furthered their use as malicious parameter sets for public-key
cryptography. We also uncovered numerous flaws in the implementation of primal-
ity testing across cryptographic libraries. The fault here is usually contingent upon
the authors not fully understanding the importance of selecting random bases when
performing Miller-Rabin, or not performing enough rounds of testing. We also wit-
nessed a common misunderstanding in distinguishing between when the primality
test is performed on either random, or adversarial input – this often resulted in
a failure to use the correct error bounds or the correct context for applying these
bounds to the result of the test. As an outcome of this analysis, we were able to im-
pact the primality testing procedures in numerous implementations across different
libraries to provide security against these pseudoprimes in the real world. For exam-
ple, we worked with the developers of the most widely used cryptographic library,
OpenSSL, at many different stages of the primality testing functionality. OpenSSL
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have fully adopted the solutions provided by this work, from amending the public
key parameter checking function for Diffie-Hellman, working to make the documen-
tation clearer on testing random or malicious input, to even re-writing the core
primality tests to provide a more robust API. We also worked with other vendors
such as Apple, Bouncy Castle, Botan, Mozilla and WolfSSL to improve the security
of their primality testing procedures.
In Chapter 3 we explored primality testing in the adversarial setting and its im-
pact on Diffie-Hellman parameter testing. Our main finding is that leading libraries
are not designed for this setting, and are therefore often vulnerable to accepting
maliciously chosen composite inputs – as being prime. We can generally classify the
underlying cause of the failure in prime classification accuracy as a non-consideration
of the adversarial setting. More explicitly, we can categorise most failures in terms
of how the bases for Miller-Rabin are chosen, i.e. fixed base, predictable bases, insuf-
ficient number of bases. Apple’s corecrypto and CommonCrypto, Mini-GMP, JSBN,
Cryptlib, LibTomMath, LibTomCrypt and WolfSSL all fail due to the selection of
bases from a fixed list, whereas Mozilla’s NSS, GNU GMP, and GoLang pre-1.8 all
suffer from predictable bases. OpenSSL, Libgcrypt, Botan and Bouncy Castle C#
all have options to run as many rounds of Miller-Rabin as the user desires, but either
default to, or call the test (elsewhere in the library) with too few rounds. Problems
left open by this work are to find malicious Diffie-Hellman parameter sets that can
fool primality tests in the safe-prime setting (this is addressed later in Chaper 4).
Further work may also include an investigation into which other seemingly innocu-
ous assumptions concerning domain parameters in the literature can be undermined
in a similar fashion.
In Chapter 4 we considered the problem left open from Chapter 3 of construct-
ing Diffie-Hellman parameters which pass parameter validation functions that test
for safe primes, but for which the Discrete Logarithm Problem is relatively easy to
solve. We then went on to provide malicious parameter sets for elliptic curve Diffie-
Hellman, in a method analogous to the finite field case. This chapter dived much
deeper into the existence of pseudoprimes for the Miller-Rabin test – to determine
if there are other forms of composite numbers that possess a significant probability
(perhaps not optimal) to be declared as prime. The Monier-Rabin bound is syn-
onymous with understanding the accuracy of the Miller-Rabin test; it states that
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any odd composite n 6= 9 can have at most ϕ(n)/4 non-witnesses, and therefore can
pass a single round of Miller-Rabin with probability at most ≈ 1/4. We were suc-
cessful in expanding the bound, by proving that any odd composite number n with
m distinct prime factors can have at most ϕ(n)/2m−1 non-witnesses (and therefore
a probability of at most ≈ 1/2m−1 of being declared prime by a single round of
Miller-Rabin). We then went on to prove that for any m ≥ 3 (m = 2 was covered
significantly in Chapter 3), this maximum bound of non-witnesses can be achieved,
and happens if and only if n is a Carmichael number with each factor congruent to
3 mod 4. Not only does this vastly increase the knowledge of how pseudoprimes for
the Miller-Rabin test are distributed among the integers, it also gives us the abil-
ity to create relatively smooth numbers that still posses a significant probability of
falsely being declared prime. This was instrumental in being able to create pseudo-
primes to be part of malicious parameter sets (for both finite field and elliptic curve
Diffie-Hellman) that allow the Discrete Logarithm Problem to be relatively easy to
solve. In the remainder of this chapter, we harnessed techniques from Erdös [51] and
Granville and Pomerance [67] to a give methodology for creating such pseudoprimes
in an efficient manner. Further work in this area might include additional analysis
on the sieving techniques for generation of primes (particularly the ones that form
the factors of Carmichael numbers), so that large pseudoprimes with many more
factors can be more efficiently generated.
In Chapter 5 we focused on the development of an API for primality testing that
stands robust against misuse within the context of testing input from any source.
This is an effort to eliminate the common pitfall identified in Chapters 3 and 4:
a failure to consider the case of testing on adversarial input. We provided various
different options for the core testing procedure within a primality test, and compared
their performance (both accuracy and efficiency) against each other, along with the
current implementation in OpenSSL. This work also allowed us to perform a more
detailed analysis of a competitor to the Miller-Rabin test: the Baillie-PSW test. The
Baillie-PSW test is becoming increasingly more popular within primality testing
techniques found in cryptographic libraries and mathematical software, yet there
are still serious questions to ask about its performance – both in terms of accuracy
and efficiency. In this chapter, we focused on giving a more concrete analysis of the
efficiency of the test, particularly with respect to how long the Miller-Rabin test
takes to test the same input. We studied the tests in multiple contexts, from testing
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random input, to maliciously generated input, to how the time taken to generate
prime numbers is affected when this was the core primality test used. This provided
us with the ability to propose a primality test that is both performant and misuse-
resistant, in the sense of presenting a simplest-possible interface for developers. Our
recommendations – both for the API and for the underlying primality test – have
been adopted in full by OpenSSL and are scheduled for inclusion in OpenSSL 3.0,
which is expected to be released in Q4 2020. Further work in this area would
include the continued study of the Baillie-PSW test, in particular the search for
pseudoprimes for the test. Our work could also be extended to make a systematic
study of prime generation code in different cryptographic libraries. For example, we
have already noted that the OpenSSL code aborts and restarts whenever a Miller-
Rabin test fails; this behaviour leads to sub-optimal performance, and it would be
interesting to see how much the code in OpenSSL and in other leading libraries could
be improved. A broader research effort could also be made within the direction of




Here we provide three example implementations of some of the methods described
in Chapter 4. Namely, a SAGE code implementation of the Erdös Method for
generating Carmichael numbers, the C code used to generate a Carmichael number
q with 9 prime factors such that p = 2q+ 1 is a 1024 bit prime, and the SAGE code
for the first step of the algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen in the case where N ,
the target group order, has 3 prime factors.
A.1 SAGE code of the Erdös Method for Generating Carmichael
Numbers
We present below our SAGE code implementation of the Erdös Method for generat-
ing Carmichael numbers. This particular code was used to generate the Carmichael
numbers with 8 and 16 factors in Example 4.3.
import itertools
from operator import mul
from sage.arith.functions import LCM_list
def all_combinations(any_list ):
"""




itertools.combinations(any_list , i + 1)
for i in xrange(len(any_list )))
def LCMpim1(n):
"""




A.1 SAGE code of the Erdös Method for Generating Carmichael
Numbers
for pi in n:





Takes as input a (highly composite) number L and returns a list of all primes
p such that p-1 | L where p does not divide L. We include the additional




for y in a:




for pp in pvals:
t = reduce(mul , pp , 1)
tt = t + 1
if tt.is_prime(proof=False) and L % tt != 0:




# we now filter results to only inlude p with p = 3 mod 4
for p in ps:
if p % 4 == 3:
pps.append(p)
return pps
def erdos_build(factors , L, k):
"""
This function takes a list of possible factors , a (highly composite) integer L
and k, and produces a Carmichael number with k factors sampled from "factors"
such that the LCM of each factor p_i - 1 is equal to L. Output is parsed as
n,[p_1 ,p_2 ,...,p_k] where n = p_1 * p_2 * ... * p_k.
"""
if k <=2:
print "Choice of factors must be >=3"
return 0
for i in itertools.combinations(factors , k):
v = reduce(mul , i, 1)
if v % L == 1:
fin = list(i)
fin.sort()
if LCMpim1(fin) == L:
return [v,fin]
print "None found , try increasing size of factor list"
L = 53603550
factors = listbuild(L)
print factors , L, len(factors)
print erdos_build(factors , L, 8)
print erdos_build(factors , L, 16)
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Generating Carmichael Numbers q such that p = 2q + 1 is Prime
A.2 C Code of the Modified Granville and Pomerance Method
for Generating Carmichael Numbers q such that p =
2q + 1 is Prime
We present below our C code used to generate a Carmichael number q with 9 prime
factors such that p = 2q + 1 is a 1024 bit prime as in Example 4.5.
#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h> /* printf () */
#include <stdlib.h> /* abort () */
#include <unistd.h> /* getopt () */
#include <gmp.h>




uint32_t count; // we use this for parallelisation
uint32_t offset; //< how much we want to offset the starting value of k by
};
typedef struct _cmdline_params_struct cmdline_params_t [1];
static inline void print_help_and_exit () {
printf("-c log2 of number of trials (default: %d)\n", DEFAULT_COUNT );




static inline void parse_cmdline(cmdline_params_t params , int argc ,
char *argv []) {
params ->count = DEFAULT_COUNT;
params ->offset = DEFAULT_OFFSET;
int c;
while ((c = getopt(argc , argv , "c:o:")) != -1) {
switch(c) {
case ’c’:
params ->count = (uint32_t)strtoul(optarg , NULL , 10);
break;
case ’o’:
params ->offset = (int32_t)strtoul(optarg ,NULL , 10);
break;






printf("-c %d -o %d\n",
params ->count , params ->offset );
}
/* Logging */
void logit(mpz_t q, mpz_t q1, mpz_t q2, mpz_t q3, mpz_t q4 , mpz_t q5,
mpz_t q6 , mpz_t q7,mpz_t q8 , mpz_t q9) {
char tmp [2000];
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snprintf(tmp , 2000, "0x%s:0x%s:0x%s:0x%s:0x%s:0x%s:0x%s:0x%s:0x%s:0x%s",
mpz_get_str(NULL , 16, q), mpz_get_str(NULL , 16, q1), mpz_get_str(NULL , 16, q2),
mpz_get_str(NULL , 16, q3), mpz_get_str(NULL , 16, q4), mpz_get_str(NULL , 16, q5),
mpz_get_str(NULL , 16, q6), mpz_get_str(NULL , 16, q7), mpz_get_str(NULL , 16, q8),
mpz_get_str(NULL , 16, q9));







* This function uses the modified Granville Pomerance method to generate a
* Carmichael number q of cryptographic size , such that N = 2q+1 is prime.
*
* This function is currently not set up for generality , and does not perform
* sanity checks. We specifically set up an instance of this code to search for
* a single valid example. This is the 9 factored example that is given a starting
* Carmichael number p = p_1 *...* p_9 generated previously by the Erdos method.
*
* The function iterates through kprime (k ’) values to construct:
* m = kL + 1, where k = k’ * s
* then q_i = M(p_i -1)+1 for all i
* such that q = q_1 * ... * q_9 is approx 1023 bits.
*
* We then test each q_i for primality , iterating to the next k’ value if composite.
* Finally , if all q_i are prime , we construct q = q_1 * ... * q_9 and test if
* N = 2q+1 is prime. If true , we log q, and its factors.
*
*/
int main(int argc , char *argv [])
{
mpz_t s,p1,p2 ,p3,p4,p5 ,p6,p7 ,p8,p9,q,q1,q2,q3,q4,q5 ,q6,q7,q8 ,q9,kprime ,fudge2 ,

















parse_cmdline(params , argc , argv);
// here we set up our specific starting Carmichael number p and other parameters
mpz_init_set_str(s, "3", 10);
mpz_init_set_str(kprime , "1", 10);
mpz_init_set_str(fudge2 , "1", 10);
mpz_init_set_str(fudge3 , "1", 10);
mpz_init_set_str(fudge4 , "1", 10);
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uint64_t Lbits = 30;
mpz_init_set_ui(off ,params ->offset );
mpz_mul_2exp(off ,off ,params ->count);
size_t p1bits = mpz_sizeinbase (p1 , 2);
size_t sbits = mpz_sizeinbase (s, 2);
// we now make some speicific alterations to ensure the final N is 1024 bits
uint64_t t = 9;
uint64_t fudgefactor = 1;
uint64_t power = 113 - (t/2 -1) -p1bits - Lbits - sbits + fudgefactor;
mpz_mul_2exp(kprime ,kprime ,power );
mpz_mul_2exp(fudge2 ,fudge2 ,power -1);
mpz_mul_2exp(fudge3 ,fudge3 ,power -4);
mpz_mul_2exp(fudge4 ,fudge4 ,power -5);
mpz_mul_2exp(fudge5 ,fudge5 ,power -6);
mpz_sub(kprime ,kprime ,fudge2 );
mpz_sub(kprime ,kprime ,fudge3 );
mpz_sub(kprime ,kprime ,fudge4 );
if (params ->offset != 0) {
mpz_add(kprime ,kprime ,off);
}
// The following for loop accounts for the bulk of the time to run
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Generating Carmichael Numbers q such that p = 2q + 1 is Prime
mpz_add_ui(q5,q5 ,1);


















































































A.3 SAGE code for Algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen
We present below our SAGE code for the first step of the algorithm of Bröker and
Stevenhagen in the case where N , the target group order, has 3 prime factors. This
code was written by Steven Galbraith, with the exception of the parameters p, q, r
which were from myself.
# Generate elliptic curve using CM with group order divisible by product p*q*r
# that is a fake prime.
# Cornacchia algorithm
def Cornacchia( A, B, D ):
a = A
b = B
while (b^2 > A):




f2 = (A - x^2) / -D








# First try to construct a curve with N points
D = -3
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while (D > DBOUND ):
if (1 == legendre_symbol( D, p )) and (1 == legendre_symbol( D, q )) and
(1 == legendre_symbol( D, r )):
F = GF( p )
x01 = int( sqrt( F( D ) ))
F = GF( q )
x02 = int( sqrt( F( D ) ))
F = GF( r )
x03 = int( sqrt( F( D ) ))
# There are 8 possible choices for x0 coming from the 2^3 choices of sign
# +/- x01 , +/- x02 , +/- x03
ct = 0
while (ct < 8):
x0 = crt( crt( x01 , x02 , p, q ), x03 , p*q, r )
while (0 != Mod(x0^2-D,4*N)):
x0 = x0+N
x, f = Cornacchia( 4*N, x0 , D )
if ( 0 == (x^2 - D*f^2 - 4*N)):
pp = int( N + x + 1 )
if is_prime(pp):
print "Success (D,x,f) = ", D, x, f
print "And get a prime p = ", pp
pp = int( N - x + 1 )
if is_prime(pp):
print "Success with other sign (D,x,f) = ", D, x, f
print "And get a prime p = ", pp
x01 = p - x01
if (0 == (ct % 2)):
x02 = q - x02
if (0 == (ct % 4)):
x03 = r - x03
ct = ct + 1
D = D - 4
# Now consider curves whose number of points is a multiple of 2*N
# Algorithm is basically the same except D now must be even
c = 1
while (c < 5):
NN = 2*c*N
c = c + 1
D = -4
while (D > DBOUND ):
D = D - 4
DD = D
if (1 == legendre_symbol( D, p )) and (1 == legendre_symbol( D, q )) and
(1 == legendre_symbol( D, r )):
F = GF( p )
x01 = int( sqrt( F( DD ) ))
F = GF( q )
x02 = int( sqrt( F( DD ) ))
F = GF( r )
x03 = int( sqrt( F( DD ) ))
ct = 0
while (ct < 8):
x0 = crt( crt( x01 , x02 , p, q ), x03 , p*q, r )
chk=0
while (0 != Mod(x0^2-DD ,4*NN)) and (chk < 100):
chk = chk+1
x0 = x0+N
x, f = Cornacchia( 4*NN , x0, D )
if ( 0 == (x^2 - DD*f^2 - 4*NN)):
pp = int( NN + x + 1 )
if is_prime(pp):
print "Success (D,x,f) = ", DD , x, f
print "And get a prime p = ", pp
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pp = int( NN - x + 1 )
if is_prime(pp):
print "Success with other sign (D,x,f) = ", DD, x, f
print "And get a prime p = ", pp
x01 = p - x01
if (0 == (ct % 2)):
x02 = q - x02
if (0 == (ct % 4)):
x03 = r - x03




B.1 Reference Implementation of the Baillie-PSW Test
For completeness, we include here our code that implements a Baillie-PSW primality
test in the context of OpenSSL’s bn prime.c from version 1.1.1c. bn prime bpsw.c
/*
* Copyright 1995 -2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License "). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy








static int witness(BIGNUM *w, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *a1,
const BIGNUM *a1_odd , int k, BN_CTX *ctx ,
BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
static int probable_prime(BIGNUM *rnd , int bits , prime_t *mods);
static int probable_prime_dh_safe(BIGNUM *rnd , int bits ,
const BIGNUM *add , const BIGNUM *rem ,
BN_CTX *ctx);
static int BN_lucas_test_ex(BIGNUM * n);
static int BN_jacobi(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *n);
static BIGNUM * BN_lucas_sequence(BIGNUM *d, BIGNUM *k, BIGNUM *n);
static BIGNUM * BN_is_perfect_square(BIGNUM * C);
static int BN_is_prime_BPSW_ex(BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx_passed ,
int do_trial_division , BN_GENCB *cb);
int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b)
{





/* Deprecated -style callbacks */
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/* New -style callbacks */




/* Unrecognised callback type */
return 0;
}
int BN_is_prime_BPSW_ex(BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx_passed ,
int do_trial_division , BN_GENCB *cb)
{
int i, j, l, ret = -1;
int k;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *A1, *A1_odd , *check = BN_new (); /* taken from ctx */
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BN_set_word(check , 2); //only testing MR to base 2
/* Take care of the really small primes 2 & 3 */
if (BN_is_word(a, 2) || BN_is_word(a, 3))
return 1;
/* Check odd and bigger than 1 */
if (! BN_is_odd(a) || BN_cmp(a, BN_value_one ()) <= 0)
return 0;
/* first look for small factors */
if (do_trial_division) {
for (i = 1; i < TRIAL_DIVISION_PRIMES; i++) {
BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(a, primes[i]);
if (mod == (BN_ULONG )-1)
goto err;
if (mod == 0)
return BN_is_word(a, primes[i]);
}
if (! BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, -1))
goto err;
}
if (ctx_passed != NULL)
ctx = ctx_passed;





if (check == NULL)
goto err;
/* compute A1 := a - 1 */
if (! BN_copy(A1 , a) || !BN_sub_word(A1 , 1))
goto err;
/* write A1 as A1_odd * 2^k */
k = 1;
while (! BN_is_bit_set(A1, k))
k++;
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if (! BN_rshift(A1_odd , A1, k))
goto err;
/* Montgomery setup for computations mod a */
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new ();
if (mont == NULL)
goto err;
if (! BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont , a, ctx))
goto err;
j = witness(check , a, A1, A1_odd , k, ctx , mont);















if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);






int BN_lucas_test_ex(BIGNUM * n){
// performs a Lucas test (with Selfridge ’s paramters) on n
BIGNUM *two = BN_new ();
BN_set_word(two , 2);
// sanity check input , n odd and > 2












BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
BIGNUM *result = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *zero= BN_new ();
BIGNUM *np1 = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *minusone = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *u = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *d = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *minusnineteen = BN_new ();
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int32_t J;
int32_t res;
const char *m1 = " -1";
const char *m19 = " -19";
BN_add(np1 ,n,BN_value_one ());
BN_zero(zero);
BN_dec2bn (&minusone , m1);
BN_dec2bn (& minusnineteen , m19);
BN_set_word(d, 5);
// while jacobi(d,n) != -1
while ((J = BN_jacobi(d,n))!= -1) {

















u = BN_lucas_sequence(d,np1 ,n);
BN_mod(result ,u,n,ctx);



















int BN_jacobi(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *n){
// computes jacobi symbol of (a/n), currently returns 2 if a,n are invalid input
BIGNUM *x = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *y = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *halfy = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *r = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *s = BN_new ();




B.1 Reference Implementation of the Baillie-PSW Test
int J = 1;
int k = 0;
BIGNUM *three = BN_new ();
BN_set_word(three , 3);
BIGNUM *four = BN_new ();
BN_set_word(four , 4);
BIGNUM *five = BN_new ();
BN_set_word(five , 5);
BIGNUM *eight = BN_new ();
BN_set_word(eight , 8);




while (BN_cmp(y,BN_value_one ()) == 1) { // while y > 1
BN_mod(x,x,y,ctx);
BN_rshift1(halfy ,y);
if (BN_cmp(x,halfy )==1) {
BN_sub(x,y,x);
BN_mod(r,y,four ,ctx);









//count the zero bits in x, i.e the largest value of n s.t 2^n divides x evenly.
k = 0;
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void BN_rshift1_round(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a){
// temporary fix as part of code demo , but the rounding in BN_rshift1
// is not consistant with python/java across positive and negative numbers.
// This function adds one before the shift if a is negative and performs
// BN_rshift1 normally otherwise. e.g this function rounds -127/2 = -63.5
// to -64 (toward -infinity), where as BN_rshift1 would round to -63 (toward 0)
// This is needed in my implementation of jacobi symbol calculation.
//Can’t simply negate result , as we still want 127/2 = 63.
BIGNUM *zero= BN_new ();
BIGNUM *one= BN_new ();
BN_zero(zero);
BN_one(one);










BIGNUM * BN_lucas_sequence(BIGNUM *d, BIGNUM *k, BIGNUM *n){
// computes the Lucas sequence U_k modulo n, where d = p^2 -4q
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
BIGNUM *kp1 = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *u = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *v = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *u2 = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *v2 = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *r= BN_new ();
BIGNUM *zero= BN_new ();






size_t k_bits = BN_num_bits(kp1) -1;
for (size_t i = k_bits -1; i != (size_t) -1; --i) {
BN_mod_mul(u2,u,v,n,ctx);
BN_mod_sqr(r,u,n,ctx); //r = u^2 mod n
BN_mod_mul(r,r,d,n,ctx); // r = r *d = u^2 *d (mod n)
BN_mod_sqr(v2,v,n,ctx); //v2 = v^2 mod n
BN_mod_add(v2,v2,r,n,ctx); // v2 = v2 + r = v^2 + (u^2*d) (mod n)
if (BN_is_odd(v2)) {






BN_nnmod(r,v,n,ctx); //r= v mod
BN_add(u2,u,r); // u2 = u + v mod n
if (BN_is_odd(u2)) {
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BN_mod_mul(r,d,u,n,ctx); // r = d*u mod n



















BIGNUM * BN_is_perfect_square(BIGNUM * C){
//https :// nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS .186 -4. pdf sec C.4
// checks if C is a perfect square. If so , function returns X where C = X^2
// else function returns 0
BIGNUM *one= BN_new ();
BIGNUM *zero= BN_new ();
BIGNUM *ret= BN_new ();
BN_one(one);
BN_zero(zero);
if (BN_cmp(one ,C)==1) {








BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
BIGNUM *B = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *X = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *r = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *s = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *X2 = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *two= BN_new ();
size_t c_bits = BN_num_bits(C);





































static int witness(BIGNUM *w, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *a1,
const BIGNUM *a1_odd , int k, BN_CTX *ctx ,
BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
{
if (! BN_mod_exp_mont(w, w, a1_odd , a, ctx , mont)) /* w := w^a1_odd mod a */
return -1;
if (BN_is_one(w))
return 0; /* probably prime */
if (BN_cmp(w, a1) == 0)
return 0; /* w == -1 (mod a), ’a’ is probably prime */
while (--k) {
if (! BN_mod_mul(w, w, w, a, ctx)) /* w := w^2 mod a */
return -1;
if (BN_is_one(w))
return 1; /* ’a’ is composite , otherwise a previous ’w’
* would have been == -1 (mod ’a’) */
if (BN_cmp(w, a1) == 0)
return 0; /* w == -1 (mod a), ’a’ is probably prime */
}
/*
* If we get here , ’w’ is the (a-1)/2-th power of the original ’w’, and
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Marc Fischlin and Jean-Sébastien Coron, editors, EUROCRYPT 2016, Part I,
volume 9665 of LNCS, pages 644–669. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2016.
[150] SymPy. SymPy GitHub repository. Available at https://github.com/
sympy/sympy/commit/9e35a94eceaff73b350794dcc70b4a412dc2f6e6#
diff-e20bc128d13486b598a04fce77584900, 2017.
[151] SymPy Development Team. SymPy: Python library for symbolic mathematics,
2017.
[152] D. Taylor, T. Wu, N. Mavrogiannopoulos, and T. Perrin. Using the Secure
Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS Authentication. RFC 5054 (Infor-
mational), November 2007.
[153] The PARI Group, Univ. Bordeaux. PARI/GP Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, 2018. Available from http://pari.math.u-bordeaux.fr/faq.html#
primetest.
[154] The PARI Group, Univ. Bordeaux. PARI/GP version 2.9.0, 2018. Available
from http://pari.math.u-bordeaux.fr/.
[155] Bhavani M. Thuraisingham, David Evans, Tal Malkin, and Dongyan Xu, edi-
tors. ACM CCS 2017. ACM Press, October / November 2017.
208
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[156] Luke Valenta, David Adrian, Antonio Sanso, Shaanan Cohney, Joshua Fried,
Marcella Hastings, J. Alex Halderman, and Nadia Heninger. Measuring small
subgroup attacks against Diffie-Hellman. In NDSS 2017. The Internet Society,
February / March 2017.
[157] Waterloo Maple (Maplesoft). Maple Version 2017, 2017. Available at https:
//www.maplesoft.com/products/Maple/.
[158] Eric W. Weisstein. Baillie-PSW primality test from MathWorld-
a Wolfram web resource. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/
Baillie-PSWPrimalityTest.html, April 2018.
[159] WolfSSL Inc. Pull request - Prime Number Testing. https://github.com/
wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/1665, August 2018.
[160] WolfSSL Inc. WolfSSL. https://www.wolfssl.com/wolfSSL/Home.html,
April 2018.
[161] David Wong. How to Backdoor Diffie-Hellman. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2016/644, 2016. https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/644.
[162] T. Wu. The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System. RFC 2945
(Proposed Standard), September 2000.
[163] Tom Wu. JSBN: RSA and ECC in JavaScript. http://www-cs-students.
stanford.edu/~tjw/jsbn/, April 2017.
[164] Glenn Wurster and Paul C. van Oorschot. The developer is the enemy. In
Matt Bishop, Christian W. Probst, Angelos D. Keromytis, and Anil Somayaji,
editors, Proceedings of the 2008 Workshop on New Security Paradigms, Lake
Tahoe, CA, USA, September 22-25, 2008, pages 89–97. ACM, 2008.
[165] Scott Yilek, Eric Rescorla, Hovav Shacham, Brandon Enright, and Stefan Sav-
age. When private keys are public: Results from the 2008 debian OpenSSL
vulnerability. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM Conference on In-
ternet Measurement, pages 15–27. ACM, 2009.
[166] Adam Young and Moti Yung. Kleptography: Using cryptography against
cryptography. In Walter Fumy, editor, EUROCRYPT’97, volume 1233 of
LNCS, pages 62–74. Springer, Heidelberg, May 1997.
209
